Bound EDNS option length in dig's process_opt() walk
process_opt() reads the per-option (optcode, optlen) header from the
OPT rdata and then advances the buffer by optlen, both for the COOKIE
branch (via process_cookie()) and for any other optcode. The walk
itself never compared optlen to the buffer remainder; the only reason
it cannot trip the isc_buffer_forward() REQUIRE today is that
fromwire_opt() (lib/dns/rdata/generic/opt_41.c) already validates each
option's length against the rdata bounds before the rdataset is
handed back, so process_opt() never sees a self-inconsistent rdata.
That upstream guarantee is fine, but it leaves the local walker
trusting an invariant established elsewhere. Add a defensive check
that just stops the walk when a future caller (a cached message, an
alternate parser, a refactor of the OPT validator) hands process_opt()
a buffer where optlen would run past the end.