]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commit
bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size
authorAndrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
Wed, 27 Mar 2024 02:42:45 +0000 (22:42 -0400)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 10 Apr 2024 14:35:43 +0000 (16:35 +0200)
commit3f0784b2f1eb9147973d8c43ba085c5fdf44ff69
treea5f98b1d4eb5a44a2f6ca7b3f113365b56f8c0a4
parent867a2f598af6a645c865d1101b58c5e070c6dd9e
bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size

[ Upstream commit ecc6a2101840177e57c925c102d2d29f260d37c8 ]

This patch re-introduces protection against the size of access to stack
memory being negative; the access size can appear negative as a result
of overflowing its signed int representation. This should not actually
happen, as there are other protections along the way, but we should
protect against it anyway. One code path was missing such protections
(fixed in the previous patch in the series), causing out-of-bounds array
accesses in check_stack_range_initialized(). This patch causes the
verification of a program with such a non-sensical access size to fail.

This check used to exist in a more indirect way, but was inadvertendly
removed in a833a17aeac7.

Fixes: a833a17aeac7 ("bpf: Fix verification of indirect var-off stack access")
Reported-by: syzbot+33f4297b5f927648741a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+aafd0513053a1cbf52ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQLORV5PT0iTAhRER+iLBTkByCYNBYyvBSgjN1T31K+gOw@mail.gmail.com/
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327024245.318299-3-andreimatei1@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kernel/bpf/verifier.c