This re-enables Squid peer selection algorithms for intercepted
traffic which has failed Host header verification.
When host verification fails Squid will use, in order of preference:
* an already PINNED server connection
* the client ORIGINAL_DST details
* cache_peer as chosen by selection algorithms
NOTE: whenever DIRECT is selected by routing algorithms the
ORIGINAL_DST is used instead.
Peer selection results are updated to display PINNED and
ORIGINAL_DST alongside DIRECT and cache_peer.
SECURITY NOTE:
At this point Squid will pass the request to cache_peer using the
non-trusted Host header in their URLs. Meaning that the peers
may still be poisoned by CVE-2009-0801 attacks. Only the initial
intercepting proxy is protected.
Full protection against CVE-2009-0801 can be enjoyed by building
Squid with the -DSTRICT_HOST_VERIFY compile-time flag. This will
make the peers unreachable for intercepted traffic where the
Host verification has failed.