Merge branch 'net-tls-fail-splice-after-a-failed-async-decrypt'
Chuck Lever says:
====================
net/tls: Fail splice after a failed async decrypt
tls_sw_recvmsg() and tls_sw_read_sock() both read ctx->async_wait.err
once they hold the reader lock, so a record that failed
authentication fails the call. tls_sw_splice_read() has no such
check. sk_err does not stand in for one. The first reader to reach
sock_error() clears sk_err, while async_wait.err persists. A splice
therefore keeps delivering records on a connection the other two
readers have already refused.
Both patches come from a receive-path series for zero-length data
records. Jakub asked for them separately, since the rest of that
series is still under discussion.
Link to the original series:
https://patch.msgid.link/
20260726-tls-follow-on-v1-0-
99bf4cc1c729@kernel.org
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806-tls-splice-crypto-fix-v1-0-a2624005a286@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>