drbd: reject data replies with an out-of-range payload size

drbd: reject data replies with an out-of-range payload size

recv_dless_read() receives a P_DATA_REPLY from a peer into the bio of an
outstanding read request. The peer-supplied payload length reaches it as
the signed int data_size, and two peer-controlled inputs can make it
negative. With a negotiated data-integrity-alg the digest length is
subtracted first, so a reply whose payload is smaller than the digest
underflows data_size. With no integrity algorithm (the default) data_size
is assigned from the unsigned h95/h100 wire length and drbdd() never
bounds it for a payload-carrying command, so a length above INT_MAX casts
it negative; this path needs no non-default feature. The bio receive loop
then computes expect = min_t(int, data_size, bv_len), which is negative,
and drbd_recv_all_warn(mapped, expect) receives with a size_t of SIZE_MAX
into the first mapped page.

The sibling receive path read_in_block() is not affected: it uses an
unsigned size and rejects it against DRBD_MAX_BIO_SIZE before receiving.
Reject a data reply whose size is negative after the optional digest
subtraction, covering both triggers.

Impact: a malicious or man-in-the-middle DRBD peer copies attacker-chosen
bytes past a bio page in the receiver, corrupting kernel memory. A node
that reads from its peer (a diskless node, or read-balancing to the peer)
is exposed in the default configuration; data-integrity-alg is not
required.

Fixes: b411b3637fa7 ("The DRBD driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Böhmwalder <christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710022837.3738461-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>