The C parser consults lua_url_filter for every byte of userinfo past
max_email_user (64); the filter previously rejected anything longer
than 2048 bytes, which silently dropped the entire URL. That blanket
length REJECT killed exactly the userinfo-obfuscation phishing pattern
(https://legit.com<lots-of-spaces>@evil.com/...) the parser is meant
to surface.
Raise the catastrophic-length REJECT to 16 KiB (still well under the
parser's own G_MAXUINT16/2 cap) and have parse_user mark the URL as
RSPAMD_URL_FLAG_OBSCURED | RSPAMD_URL_FLAG_HAS_USER as soon as the
userinfo crosses 64 bytes, regardless of the filter verdict, so
downstream rules can act on the obfuscation signal.