When the overflow protection kicks in, it makes sure that ip - ctx->base
isn't too large. However, it didn't ensure that saved offsets are
still valid. This change ensures that any valid offsets (<= windowLog)
are still representable after the update.
The bug would shop up on line 1056, when `offset_1 > current + 1`, which
causes an underflow. This in turn, would cause a segfault on line 1063.
The input must necessarily be longer than 1 GB for this issue to occur.
Even then, it only occurs if one of the last 3 matches is larger than
the chain size and block size.
if (cctx->lowLimit > (1<<30)) {
U32 const btplus = (cctx->params.cParams.strategy == ZSTD_btlazy2) | (cctx->params.cParams.strategy == ZSTD_btopt) | (cctx->params.cParams.strategy == ZSTD_btopt2);
U32 const chainMask = (1 << (cctx->params.cParams.chainLog - btplus)) - 1;
- U32 const supLog = MAX(cctx->params.cParams.chainLog, 17 /* blockSize */);
+ U32 const supLog = MAX(MAX(cctx->params.cParams.chainLog, 17 /* blockSize */), cctx->params.cParams.windowLog);
U32 const newLowLimit = (cctx->lowLimit & chainMask) + (1 << supLog); /* preserve position % chainSize, ensure current-repcode doesn't underflow */
U32 const correction = cctx->lowLimit - newLowLimit;
ZSTD_reduceIndex(cctx, correction);