with "TLS-Required: no". This could result in unnecessary
failures. Fix by Viktor Dukhovni & Wietse. Files: smtp/smtp.h,
smtp/smtp_policy.c, smtp/smtp_connect.c.
+
+20250710
+
+ Bugfix (defect introduced: postfix-2.2, date 20050203):
+ after detecting a lookup table change, and after starting
+ a new postscreen process, the old postscreen process logged
+ an ENOTSOCK error while attempting to accept a connection
+ on a socket that it was no longer listening on. This error
+ was introduced first in the multi_server skeleton code, and
+ was five years later duplicated in the event_server skeleton
+ that was created for postscreen. Problem reported by Florian
+ Piekert. Files: master/multi_server.c, master/event_server.c.
+
+20250714
+
+ Deleted an <openssl/engine.h> dependency, because the feature is
+ being removed from OpenSSL, and Postfix no longer needs it. File:
+ posttls-finger/posttls-finger.c.
+
+20250716
+
+ Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 2.8, date 20101230):
+ after detecting a cache table change and before starting a
+ new postscreen process, the old postscreen process did not
+ close the postscreen_cache_map, and therefore kept an
+ exclusive lock that could prevent a new postscreen process
+ from starting. Problem reported by Florian Piekert. File:
+ postscreen/postscreen.c.
+
+20250717
+
+ Workaround: Postfix daemons no longer automatically restart
+ after a btree:, dbm:, hash:, lmdb:, or sdbm: table file
+ modification time change, when they opened that table for
+ writing. Files: util/dict.c, util/dict_db.c, util/dict_dbm.c,
+ util/dict_lmdb.c, util/dict_sdbm.c.
+
+20250730
+
+ Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.6, date 20200710):
+ Postfix TLS client code logged "Untrusted TLS connection"
+ (wrong) instead of "Trusted TLS connection" (right), for a
+ new or resumed TLS session, when a server offered a trusted
+ (valid PKI trust chain) certificate that did not match the
+ expected server name pattern. Viktor Dukhovni. Files:
+ tls/tls_client.c, tls/tls_verify.c.
+
+20250801
+
+ Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.7): incorrect backwards
+ compatible support for the legacy configuration parameters
+ tlsproxy_client_level and tlsproxy_client_policy. This
+ disabled the tlsproxy TLS client role when a legacy parameter
+ was set. Reported by John Doe, diagnosed by Viktor Dukhovni.
+ File: global/mail_params.h.
+
+ Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.4): with the TLS client
+ role disabled by configuration, the tlsproxy daemon
+ dereferenced a null pointer while handling a tlsproxy client
+ request. Reported by John Doe. File: tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c.
+
+20250803
+
+ Cleanup: with "tls_required_enable = yes", the Postfix SMTP
+ client will no longer maintain TLSRPT statistics for
+ messages that contain a "TLS-Required: no" header. This
+ can prevent TLSRPT notifications for TLSRPT notifications.
+ Files: smtp/smtp_connect.c, smtp_tls_policy.c.
/* Migrate an incorrect name. */
#define OBS_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL "tlsproxy_client_level"
#define VAR_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL "tlsproxy_client_security_level"
-#define DEF_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL "${" OBS_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL ":$" VAR_SMTP_TLS_LEVEL "}"
+#define DEF_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL "${" OBS_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL "?{$" \
+ OBS_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL "}:{$" \
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_LEVEL "}}"
extern char *var_tlsp_clnt_level;
#define VAR_TLSP_CLNT_PER_SITE "tlsproxy_client_per_site"
/* Migrate an incorrect name. */
#define OBS_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY "tlsproxy_client_policy"
#define VAR_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY "tlsproxy_client_policy_maps"
-#define DEF_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY "${" OBS_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY ":$" VAR_SMTP_TLS_POLICY "}"
+#define DEF_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY "${" OBS_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY "?{$" \
+ OBS_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY "}:{$" \
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_POLICY "}}"
extern char *var_tlsp_clnt_policy;
/*
* Patches change both the patchlevel and the release date. Snapshots have no
* patchlevel; they change the release date only.
*/
-#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20250710"
-#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "3.10.3"
+#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20250818"
+#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "3.10.4"
#ifdef SNAPSHOT
#define MAIL_VERSION_DATE "-" MAIL_RELEASE_DATE
static void (*event_server_pre_disconn) (VSTREAM *, char *, char **);
static void (*event_server_slow_exit) (char *, char **);
static int event_server_watchdog = 1000;
+static int event_server_drain_was_called = 0;
/* event_server_exit - normal termination */
const char *myname = "event_server_drain";
int fd;
+ if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+ return (0);
+
switch (fork()) {
/* Try again later. */
case -1:
msg_warn("%s: dup2(%d, %d): %m", myname, STDIN_FILENO, fd);
}
var_use_limit = 1;
+ event_server_drain_was_called = 1;
return (0);
/* Let the master start a new process. */
default:
int time_left = -1;
int fd;
+ if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
+
/*
* Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
* got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
if (event_server_pre_accept)
event_server_pre_accept(event_server_name, event_server_argv);
+ if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
fd = LOCAL_ACCEPT(listen_fd);
if (event_server_lock != 0
&& myflock(vstream_fileno(event_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
int fd;
HTABLE *attr = 0;
+ if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
+
/*
* Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
* got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
if (event_server_pre_accept)
event_server_pre_accept(event_server_name, event_server_argv);
+ if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
fd = pass_accept_attr(listen_fd, &attr);
if (event_server_lock != 0
&& myflock(vstream_fileno(event_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
int time_left = -1;
int fd;
+ if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
+
/*
* Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
* got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
if (event_server_pre_accept)
event_server_pre_accept(event_server_name, event_server_argv);
+ if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
fd = inet_accept(listen_fd);
if (event_server_lock != 0
&& myflock(vstream_fileno(event_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
static int multi_server_in_flow_delay;
static unsigned multi_server_generation;
static void (*multi_server_pre_disconn) (VSTREAM *, char *, char **);
+static int multi_server_drain_was_called = 0;
/* multi_server_exit - normal termination */
const char *myname = "multi_server_drain";
int fd;
+ if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+ return (0);
+
switch (fork()) {
/* Try again later. */
case -1:
msg_warn("%s: dup2(%d, %d): %m", myname, STDIN_FILENO, fd);
}
var_use_limit = 1;
+ multi_server_drain_was_called = 1;
return (0);
/* Let the master start a new process. */
default:
int time_left = -1;
int fd;
+ if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
+
/*
* Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
* got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
if (multi_server_pre_accept)
multi_server_pre_accept(multi_server_name, multi_server_argv);
+ if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
fd = LOCAL_ACCEPT(listen_fd);
if (multi_server_lock != 0
&& myflock(vstream_fileno(multi_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
int fd;
HTABLE *attr = 0;
+ if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
+
/*
* Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
* got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
if (multi_server_pre_accept)
multi_server_pre_accept(multi_server_name, multi_server_argv);
+ if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
fd = pass_accept_attr(listen_fd, &attr);
if (multi_server_lock != 0
&& myflock(vstream_fileno(multi_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
int time_left = -1;
int fd;
+ if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
+
/*
* Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
* got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
if (multi_server_pre_accept)
multi_server_pre_accept(multi_server_name, multi_server_argv);
+ if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+ return;
fd = inet_accept(listen_fd);
if (multi_server_lock != 0
&& myflock(vstream_fileno(multi_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
if (new_event_time >= last_event_time + 1
&& (name = dict_changed_name()) != 0) {
msg_info("table %s has changed - finishing in the background", name);
- event_server_drain();
+ psc_drain(unused_name, unused_argv);
} else {
last_event_time = new_event_time;
}
#ifdef USE_TLS
#include <tls_proxy.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
/*
smtp.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp.o: ../../include/stringops.h
smtp_addr.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_addr.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_addr.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_addr.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_addr.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_addr.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_addr.o: ../../include/stringops.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_key.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_key.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
smtp_map11.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_map11.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_map11.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_map11.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_map11.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_map11.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_map11.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
smtp_misc.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_misc.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_misc.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_misc.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_misc.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_misc.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_misc.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/sent.h
smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/stringops.h
smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/stringops.h
smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/smtp_stream.h
smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/split_at.h
smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/sasl_mech_filter.h
smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/stringops.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_session.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/stringops.h
smtp_state.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_state.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_state.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_state.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_state.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_state.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_state.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/sane_strtol.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/stringops.h
smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/stringops.h
smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/smtp_stream.h
smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/string_list.h
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
#include <tok822.h>
#include <dsn_buf.h>
#include <header_body_checks.h>
+#include <sendopts.h>
/*
* Postfix TLS library.
VSTRING *host; /* hostname or empty */
VSTRING *addr; /* printable address or empty */
unsigned port; /* network byte order or null */
-#ifdef USE_TLS
- int tlsreqno; /* "TLS-Required: no" */
-#endif
struct DNS_RR *rr; /* DNS resource record or null */
struct DNS_RR *mx; /* DNS resource record or null */
/* Private members. */
struct SMTP_STATE *parent; /* parent linkage */
} SMTP_ITERATOR;
-#ifdef USE_TLS
-#define IF_USE_TLS(...) (__VA_ARGS__)
-#else
-#define IF_USE_TLS(...)
-#endif
-
#define SMTP_ITER_INIT(iter, _dest, _host, _addr, _port, state) do { \
vstring_strcpy((iter)->dest, (_dest)); \
vstring_strcpy((iter)->host, (_host)); \
vstring_strcpy((iter)->addr, (_addr)); \
(iter)->port = (_port); \
- IF_USE_TLS((iter)->tlsreqno = 0); \
(iter)->mx = (iter)->rr = 0; \
vstring_strcpy((iter)->saved_dest, ""); \
(iter)->parent = (state); \
unsigned logged_line_length_limit:1;
} SMTP_STATE;
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+#define STATE_TLS_NOT_REQUIRED(state) \
+ (var_tls_required_enable && \
+ ((state)->request->sendopts & SOPT_REQUIRETLS_HEADER))
+#endif
+
/*
* Primitives to enable/disable/test connection caching and reuse based on
* the delivery request next-hop destination (i.e. not smtp_fallback_relay).
SMTP_ITERATOR *iter = state->iterator;
SMTP_TLS_POLICY *tls = state->tls;
- /*
- * If the message contains a "TLS-Required: no" header, update the
- * iterator to limit the policy at TLS_LEV_MAY.
- *
- * We must do this early to avoid possible failure if TLSA record lookups
- * fail, or if TLSA records are found, but can't be activated because the
- * security level has been reset to "may".
- *
- * Note that the REQUIRETLS verb in ESMTP overrides the "TLS-Required: no"
- * header.
- */
-#ifdef USE_TLS
- if (var_tls_required_enable
- && (state->request->sendopts & SOPT_REQUIRETLS_HEADER)) {
- iter->tlsreqno = 1;
- }
-#endif
-
/*
* Determine the TLS level for this destination.
*/
* level of "may" to "encrypt"? This would disable falling back to
* plaintext, and could break interoperability with receivers that
* crank up security up to 11.
+ *
+ * With "TLS-Required: no" in effect, the SMTP client ignores the
+ * recipient-side policy mechanism TLSRPT, in addition to the already
+ * ignored DANE and MTA-STS mechanisms. This prevents TLSRPT
+ * notifications for all SMTP deliveries that do not require TLS.
*/
#ifdef USE_TLSRPT
if (smtp_mode && var_smtp_tlsrpt_enable
+ && STATE_TLS_NOT_REQUIRED(state) == 0
&& tls_level_lookup(var_smtp_tls_level) > TLS_LEV_NONE
&& !valid_hostaddr(domain, DONT_GRIPE))
smtp_tlsrpt_create_wrapper(state, domain);
* Compute the per-site TLS enforcement level. For compatibility with the
* original TLS patch, this algorithm is gives equal precedence to host
* and next-hop policies.
+ *
+ * When "TLS-Required: no" is in effect, skip TLS policy lookup and limit
+ * the security level to "may". Do not reset the security level after
+ * policy lookup, as that would result in errors. For example, when TLSA
+ * records are looked up for security level "dane", and then the security
+ * level is reset to "may", the activation of those TLSA records will
+ * fail.
*/
tls->level = global_tls_level();
site_level = TLS_LEV_NOTFOUND;
- if (iter->tlsreqno) {
+ if (STATE_TLS_NOT_REQUIRED(iter->parent)) {
if (msg_verbose)
msg_info("%s: no tls policy lookup", __func__);
if (tls->level > TLS_LEV_MAY)
static void verify_x509(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, X509 *peercert,
const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
{
+ int x509_err = SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con);
/*
* On exit both peer_CN and issuer_CN should be set.
* Is the certificate trust chain trusted and matched? Any required name
* checks are now performed internally in OpenSSL.
*/
- if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK) {
+ if (x509_err == X509_V_OK) {
TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_TRUSTED;
if (TLScontext->must_fail) {
msg_panic("%s: cert valid despite trust init failure",
tls_dane_log(TLScontext);
}
}
+ } else if (TLS_MUST_MATCH(TLScontext->level) &&
+ x509_err == X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH) {
+ /*
+ * If the only error is a hostname mismatch, the certificate must have
+ * been trusted.
+ */
+ TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_TRUSTED;
}
/*
/* update_error_state - safely stash away error state */
-static void update_error_state(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, int depth,
- X509 *errorcert, int errorcode)
+static void update_error_state(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext,
+ int depth, X509 *errorcert, int errorcode)
{
- /* No news is good news */
- if (TLScontext->errordepth >= 0 && TLScontext->errordepth <= depth)
- return;
+
+ /*
+ * Report the error that is closest to the leaf certificate, any errors
+ * higher up the chain are immaterial until the "inner" errors are fixed.
+ *
+ * We special-case "X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH" (at depth 0) in order to
+ * distinguish between untrusted certificates and trusted certificates
+ * with a hostname mismatch. Any other error has a higher priority.
+ */
+ if (TLScontext->errordepth >= 0) {
+ if ((TLScontext->errordepth <= depth &&
+ TLScontext->errorcode != X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH) ||
+ errorcode == X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, TLScontext->errorcode);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
/*
* The certificate pointer is stable during the verification callback,
if (TLScontext->must_fail) {
if (depth == 0) {
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED);
- update_error_state(TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
+ update_error_state(ctx, TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
}
return (1);
}
if (ok == 0)
- update_error_state(TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
+ update_error_state(ctx, TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
if (TLScontext->log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE) {
if (cert) {
init_buf = vstring_alloc(100);
init_key = tls_proxy_client_init_serialize(attr_print_plain, init_buf,
init_props);
+#define TLSP_CLIENT_INIT_RETURN(retval) do { \
+ vstring_free(init_buf); \
+ vstring_free(param_buf); \
+ return (retval); \
+ } while (0)
+
if (tlsp_pre_jail_done == 0) {
if (tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key == 0
|| tlsp_pre_jail_client_init_key == 0) {
* TLS_APPL_STATE instance; this makes a mismatch of TLS_CLIENT_PARAMS
* settings problematic.
*/
- if (tlsp_pre_jail_done
- && !been_here_fixed(tlsp_params_mismatch_filter, param_key)
- && strcmp(tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key, param_key) != 0) {
+ else if (tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key == 0
+ || tlsp_pre_jail_client_init_key == 0) {
+ msg_warn("TLS client role is disabled by configuration");
+ TLSP_CLIENT_INIT_RETURN(0);
+ } else if (!been_here_fixed(tlsp_params_mismatch_filter, param_key)
+ && strcmp(tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key, param_key) != 0) {
msg_warn("request from tlsproxy client with unexpected settings");
tlsp_log_config_diff(tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key, param_key);
log_hints = 1;
SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
| SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
}
- vstring_free(init_buf);
- vstring_free(param_buf);
- return (appl_state);
+ TLSP_CLIENT_INIT_RETURN(appl_state);
}
/* tlsp_close_event - pre-handshake plaintext-client close event */
TLSP_INIT_TIMEOUT, (void *) state);
return;
} else {
+ state->flags |= TLSP_FLAG_DO_HANDSHAKE;
tlsp_request_read_event(plaintext_fd, tlsp_get_fd_event,
TLSP_INIT_TIMEOUT, (void *) state);
return;
{
TLSP_STATE *state = (TLSP_STATE *) mymalloc(sizeof(*state));
- state->flags = TLSP_FLAG_DO_HANDSHAKE;
+ state->flags = 0;
state->service = mystrdup(service);
state->plaintext_stream = plaintext_stream;
state->plaintext_buf = 0;
/* .IP "char *context"
/* Application context from the caller.
/* .PP
-/* dict_changed_name() returns non-zero when any dictionary needs to
-/* be re-opened because it has changed or because it was unlinked.
+/* dict_changed_name() returns non-zero when any dictionary is
+/* opened read-only and has changed, or because it was unlinked.
/* A non-zero result is the name of a changed dictionary.
/*
/* dict_load_file_xt() reads name-value entries from the named file.
dict = ((DICT_NODE *) h->value)->dict;
if (dict->stat_fd < 0) /* not file-based */
continue;
- if (dict->mtime == 0) /* not bloody likely */
- msg_warn("%s: table %s: null time stamp", myname, h->key);
+ if (dict->mtime < 0) /* not bloody likely */
+ msg_warn("%s: table %s: negative time stamp", myname, h->key);
if (fstat(dict->stat_fd, &st) < 0)
msg_fatal("%s: fstat: %m", myname);
if (((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_MULTI_WRITER) == 0
+ && dict->mtime > 0
&& st.st_mtime != dict->mtime)
|| st.st_nlink == 0)
status = h->key;
dict_db->dict.stat_fd = dbfd;
if (fstat(dict_db->dict.stat_fd, &st) < 0)
msg_fatal("dict_db_open: fstat: %m");
- dict_db->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+ if (open_flags == O_RDONLY)
+ dict_db->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
dict_db->dict.owner.uid = st.st_uid;
dict_db->dict.owner.status = (st.st_uid != 0);
msg_fatal("open database %s: cannot support GDBM", path);
if (fstat(dict_dbm->dict.stat_fd, &st) < 0)
msg_fatal("dict_dbm_open: fstat: %m");
- dict_dbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+ if (open_mode == O_RDONLY)
+ dict_dbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
dict_dbm->dict.owner.uid = st.st_uid;
dict_dbm->dict.owner.status = (st.st_uid != 0);
msg_fatal("dict_lmdb_open: fstat: %m");
dict_lmdb->dict.lock_fd = dict_lmdb->dict.stat_fd = db_fd;
dict_lmdb->dict.lock_type = MYFLOCK_STYLE_FCNTL;
- dict_lmdb->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+ if (open_flags == O_RDONLY)
+ dict_lmdb->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
dict_lmdb->dict.owner.uid = st.st_uid;
dict_lmdb->dict.owner.status = (st.st_uid != 0);
dict_sdbm->dict.stat_fd = sdbm_pagfno(dbm);
if (fstat(dict_sdbm->dict.stat_fd, &st) < 0)
msg_fatal("dict_sdbm_open: fstat: %m");
- dict_sdbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+ if (open_flags == O_RDONLY)
+ dict_sdbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
dict_sdbm->dict.owner.uid = st.st_uid;
dict_sdbm->dict.owner.status = (st.st_uid != 0);