--- /dev/null
+From 3a1230e7b043c62737b05a3e9275ca83a43ad20a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
+Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 14:29:06 -0500
+Subject: exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()
+
+From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
+
+commit 3a1230e7b043c62737b05a3e9275ca83a43ad20a upstream.
+
+In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the
+output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the
+accumulated name length:
+
+ if (++order == 2)
+ uniname = p_uniname->name;
+ else
+ uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
+ len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
+ name_len += len;
+ unichar = *(uniname+len);
+ *(uniname+len) = 0x0;
+
+uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len
+grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name
+fragment contains an early NUL. The only guard is
+`name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short
+name fragments lets uniname run far past the
+p_uniname->name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small,
+causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len).
+
+The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops
+on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard
+added in commit d42334578eba ("exfat: check if filename entries exceeds
+max filename length")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the
+equivalent. Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a
+fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would
+exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer.
+
+Fixes: ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Suggested-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
+Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/exfat/dir.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/exfat/dir.c
++++ b/fs/exfat/dir.c
+@@ -1045,6 +1045,7 @@ rewind:
+
+ if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
+ unsigned short entry_uniname[16], unichar;
++ unsigned int offset;
+
+ if (step != DIRENT_STEP_NAME ||
+ name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH) {
+@@ -1053,13 +1054,15 @@ rewind:
+ continue;
+ }
+
+- if (++order == 2)
+- uniname = p_uniname->name;
+- else
+- uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
+-
++ offset = (++order - 2) * EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
+ len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
+ brelse(bh);
++ if (offset > MAX_NAME_LENGTH ||
++ len > MAX_NAME_LENGTH - offset) {
++ step = DIRENT_STEP_FILE;
++ continue;
++ }
++ uniname = p_uniname->name + offset;
+ name_len += len;
+
+ unichar = *(uniname+len);
--- /dev/null
+From 5140f099ecd8a2f2808b7f7b720ee1bad8468974 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Benjamin Coddington <ben.coddington@hammerspace.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 17:02:15 -0400
+Subject: NFSv4: include MAY_WRITE in open permission mask for O_TRUNC
+
+From: Benjamin Coddington <ben.coddington@hammerspace.com>
+
+commit 5140f099ecd8a2f2808b7f7b720ee1bad8468974 upstream.
+
+POSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that
+specifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the
+O_ACCMODE access mode.
+
+nfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to
+nfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the
+client serves itself from a cached write delegation via the
+can_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is
+derived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a
+file the caller cannot write requests only MAY_READ and passes the
+local check. The OPEN is then satisfied locally and the truncation is
+issued to the server as a SETATTR(size=0) over the delegation stateid,
+which the server accepts under standard write-delegation semantics.
+POSIX requires that this open fail with EACCES.
+
+Include MAY_WRITE in the mask whenever O_TRUNC is set so the local
+check matches the access the server would have enforced.
+
+Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@kernel.org>
+Fixes: af22f94ae02a ("NFSv4: Simplify _nfs4_do_access()")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@hammerspace.com>
+Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfs/dir.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
++++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
+@@ -2803,6 +2803,8 @@ static int nfs_open_permission_mask(int
+ mask |= MAY_READ;
+ if ((openflags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
+ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
++ if (openflags & O_TRUNC)
++ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+ }
+
+ return mask;
--- /dev/null
+From 0a6070839b1ef276d5b05bedfb787743e140fb17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Huihui Huang <hhhuang@smu.edu.sg>
+Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 18:28:46 +0800
+Subject: tracing: Prevent out-of-bounds read in glob matching
+
+From: Huihui Huang <hhhuang@smu.edu.sg>
+
+commit 0a6070839b1ef276d5b05bedfb787743e140fb17 upstream.
+
+String event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter
+predicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and
+filter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match
+callbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it.
+
+regex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called
+glob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some
+string fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char
+array of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied without a
+trailing NUL. For such a field, glob matching reads past the end of
+the event field, causing a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in
+glob_match(), reached via regex_match_glob() and filter_match_preds()
+from the xfs_lookup tracepoint.
+
+Add a length-bounded glob_match_len() and use it from regex_match_glob()
+so glob matching always stops at the field boundary. The matching loop
+is factored into a shared helper so glob_match() keeps its behaviour.
+
+Fixes: 60f1d5e3bac4 ("ftrace: Support full glob matching")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/da1aaf125fc3b63320b0c540fd6afa7c3d5b4f1a.1782836943.git.hhhuang@smu.edu.sg
+Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
+Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
+Signed-off-by: Huihui Huang <hhhuang@smu.edu.sg>
+Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
+Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/linux/glob.h | 1 +
+ kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c | 6 ++----
+ lib/glob.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/glob.h
++++ b/include/linux/glob.h
+@@ -6,5 +6,6 @@
+ #include <linux/compiler.h> /* For __pure */
+
+ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str);
++bool __pure glob_match_len(char const *pat, char const *str, size_t len);
+
+ #endif /* _LINUX_GLOB_H */
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
+@@ -865,11 +865,9 @@ static int regex_match_end(char *str, st
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-static int regex_match_glob(char *str, struct regex *r, int len __maybe_unused)
++static int regex_match_glob(char *str, struct regex *r, int len)
+ {
+- if (glob_match(r->pattern, str))
+- return 1;
+- return 0;
++ return glob_match_len(r->pattern, str, len) ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ /**
+--- a/lib/glob.c
++++ b/lib/glob.c
+@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
+ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("glob(7) matching");
+ MODULE_LICENSE("Dual MIT/GPL");
+
++static bool __pure glob_match_str(char const *pat, char const *str,
++ char const *str_end);
++
+ /**
+ * glob_match - Shell-style pattern matching, like !fnmatch(pat, str, 0)
+ * @pat: Shell-style pattern to match, e.g. "*.[ch]".
+@@ -39,6 +42,29 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("Dual MIT/GPL");
+ */
+ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str)
+ {
++ return glob_match_str(pat, str, NULL);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match);
++
++/**
++ * glob_match_len - glob match against a length-bounded string
++ * @pat: Shell-style pattern to match.
++ * @str: String to match. Need not be NUL-terminated.
++ * @len: Number of bytes of @str that may be read.
++ *
++ * Like glob_match(), but @str is only read up to @len bytes, so it can be
++ * used on buffers that are not NUL-terminated (e.g. trace event fields).
++ * A NUL byte within @len still terminates the string.
++ */
++bool __pure glob_match_len(char const *pat, char const *str, size_t len)
++{
++ return glob_match_str(pat, str, str + len);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match_len);
++
++static bool __pure glob_match_str(char const *pat, char const *str,
++ char const *str_end)
++{
+ /*
+ * Backtrack to previous * on mismatch and retry starting one
+ * character later in the string. Because * matches all characters
+@@ -53,9 +79,11 @@ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat,
+ * on mismatch, or true after matching the trailing nul bytes.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+- unsigned char c = *str++;
++ unsigned char c = (str_end && str >= str_end) ? '\0' : *str;
+ unsigned char d = *pat++;
+
++ str++;
++
+ switch (d) {
+ case '?': /* Wildcard: anything but nul */
+ if (c == '\0')
+@@ -120,4 +148,3 @@ backtrack:
+ }
+ }
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match);
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
