mod_proxy_ftp: NULL pointer dereference on error paths.
[Stefan Fritsch <sf fritsch.de>, Joe Orton]
+ *) SECURITY: CVE-2009-3555 (cve.mitre.org)
+ mod_ssl: Comprehensive fix of the TLS renegotiation prefix injection
+ attack when compiled against OpenSSL version 0.9.8m or later. Introduces
+ the 'SSLInsecureRenegotiation' directive to reopen this vulnerability
+ and offer unsafe legacy renegotiation with clients which do not yet
+ support the new secure renegotiation protocol, RFC 5746.
+ [Joe Orton, and with thanks to the OpenSSL Team]
+
*) SECURITY: CVE-2009-3555 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_ssl: A partial fix for the TLS renegotiation prefix injection attack
for OpenSSL versions prior to 0.9.8l; reject any client-initiated
PATCHES ACCEPTED TO BACKPORT FROM TRUNK:
[ start all new proposals below, under PATCHES PROPOSED. ]
- * mod_ssl: Implement SSLInsecureRenegotiation
- Trunk version of patch:
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=906039&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=906057&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=906485&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=906491&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=908015&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=916733&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=916817&view=rev
- Patch in 2.2.x branch:
- http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?rev=917044&view=rev
- Backport:
- http://people.apache.org/~rjung/patches/SSLInsecureRenegotiation_httpd_2_0_x-backport-r917044.patch
- +1: rjung, pgollucci (+1 2.0.64 w/ this), wrowe
-
PATCHES PROPOSED TO BACKPORT FROM TRUNK:
[ please place SVN revisions from trunk here, so it is easy to
identify exactly what the proposed changes are! Add all new
</usage>
</directivesynopsis>
+<directivesynopsis>
+<name>SSLInsecureRenegotiation</name>
+<description>Option to enable support for insecure renegotiation</description>
+<syntax>SSLInsecureRenegotiation <em>flag</em></syntax>
+<default>SSLInsecureRenegotiation off</default>
+<contextlist><context>server config</context>
+<context>virtual host</context></contextlist>
+<compatibility>Available in httpd 2.0.64 and later, if using OpenSSL 0.9.8m or later</compatibility>
+
+<usage>
+<p>As originally specified, all versions of the SSL and TLS protocols
+(up to and including TLS/1.2) were vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle
+attack
+(<a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2009-3555">CVE-2009-3555</a>)
+during a renegotiation. This vulnerability allowed an attacker to
+"prefix" a chosen plaintext to the HTTP request as seen by the web
+server. A protocol extension was developed which fixed this
+vulnerability if supported by both client and server.</p>
+
+<p>If <module>mod_ssl</module> is linked against OpenSSL version 0.9.8m
+or later, by default renegotiation is only supported with
+clients supporting the new protocol extension. If this directive is
+enabled, renegotiation will be allowed with old (unpatched) clients,
+albeit insecurely.</p>
+
+<note type="warning"><title>Security warning</title>
+<p>If this directive is enabled, SSL connections will be vulnerable to
+the Man-in-the-Middle prefix attack as described
+in <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2009-3555">CVE-2009-3555</a>.</p>
+</note>
+
+<example><title>Example</title>
+SSLInsecureRenegotiation on
+</example>
+
+<p>The <code>SSL_SECURE_RENEG</code> environment variable can be used
+from an SSI or CGI script to determine whether secure renegotiation is
+supported for a given SSL connection.</p>
+
+</usage>
+</directivesynopsis>
+
</modulesynopsis>
"(`[+-][SSLv2|SSLv3|TLSv1] ...' - see manual)")
SSL_CMD_ALL(UserName, TAKE1,
"Set user name to SSL variable value")
+ SSL_CMD_SRV(InsecureRenegotiation, FLAG,
+ "Enable support for insecure renegotiation")
/*
* Proxy configuration for remote SSL connections
const char *vhost_id;
int vhost_id_len;
int session_cache_timeout;
+ BOOL insecure_reneg;
modssl_ctx_t *server;
modssl_ctx_t *proxy;
};
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLRequireSSL(cmd_parms *, void *);
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLRequire(cmd_parms *, void *, const char *);
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLUserName(cmd_parms *, void *, const char *);
+const char *ssl_cmd_SSLInsecureRenegotiation(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dcfg, int flag);
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLProxyEngine(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dcfg, int flag);
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLProxyProtocol(cmd_parms *, void *, const char *);
sc->vhost_id = NULL; /* set during module init */
sc->vhost_id_len = 0; /* set during module init */
sc->session_cache_timeout = UNSET;
+ sc->insecure_reneg = UNSET;
modssl_ctx_init_proxy(sc, p);
cfgMergeBool(enabled);
cfgMergeBool(proxy_enabled);
cfgMergeInt(session_cache_timeout);
+ cfgMergeBool(insecure_reneg);
modssl_ctx_cfg_merge_proxy(base->proxy, add->proxy, mrg->proxy);
}
+const char *ssl_cmd_SSLInsecureRenegotiation(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dcfg, int flag)
+{
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(cmd->server);
+ sc->insecure_reneg = flag?TRUE:FALSE;
+ return NULL;
+#else
+ return "The SSLInsecureRenegotiation directive is not available "
+ "with this SSL library";
+#endif
+}
+
+
static const char *ssl_cmd_check_dir(cmd_parms *parms,
const char **dir)
{
SSL_METHOD *method = NULL;
char *cp;
int protocol = mctx->protocol;
+ SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
/*
* Create the new per-server SSL context
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1);
}
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ if (sc->insecure_reneg == TRUE) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+ }
+#endif
+
SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, s);
/*
r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
}
- /* do a full renegotiation */
- ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
- "Performing full renegotiation: "
- "complete handshake protocol");
+ /* Perform a full renegotiation. */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
+ "Performing full renegotiation: complete handshake "
+ "protocol (%s support secure renegotiation)",
+#if defined(SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support)
+ SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) ?
+ "client does" : "client does not"
+#else
+ "server does not"
+#endif
+ );
SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl,
(unsigned char *)&id,
if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
"Re-negotiation request failed");
+ ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
r->connection->aborted = 1;
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
"SSL_VERSION_INTERFACE",
"SSL_VERSION_LIBRARY",
"SSL_PROTOCOL",
+ "SSL_SECURE_RENEG",
"SSL_CIPHER",
"SSL_CIPHER_EXPORT",
"SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE",
}
}
+
+#ifdef SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support
+ apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-secure-reneg",
+ SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) ? "1" : "0");
+#endif
+
return DECLINED;
}
if ((xs = SSL_get_certificate(ssl)) != NULL)
result = ssl_var_lookup_ssl_cert(p, xs, var+7);
}
+ else if (ssl != NULL && strcEQ(var, "SECURE_RENEG")) {
+ int flag = 0;
+#ifdef SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support
+ flag = SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl);
+#endif
+ result = apr_pstrdup(p, flag ? "true" : "false");
+ }
+
return result;
}