--- /dev/null
+ o Major bugfixes:
+ - Fix two instances of possible undefined behavior in channeltls.c
+ that could, under unlucky circumstances, have led to a pointer
+ overflow. Fixes bug #10363; bugfixes on 0.2.0.10-alpha and
+ 0.2.3.6-alpha. Reported by "bobnomnom".
+
channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
{
int highest_supported_version = 0;
- const uint8_t *cp, *end;
int started_here = 0;
tor_assert(cell);
}
tor_assert(chan->conn->handshake_state);
- end = cell->payload + cell->payload_len;
- for (cp = cell->payload; cp+1 < end; cp += 2) {
- uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
- if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version)
- highest_supported_version = v;
+
+ {
+ int i;
+ const uint8_t *cp = cell->payload;
+ for (i = 0; i < cell->payload_len / 2; ++i, cp += 2) {
+ uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
+ if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version)
+ highest_supported_version = v;
+ }
}
if (!highest_supported_version) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
for (i = 0; i < n_certs; ++i) {
uint8_t cert_type;
uint16_t cert_len;
- if (ptr + 3 > cell->payload + cell->payload_len) {
+ if (cell->payload_len < 3)
+ goto truncated;
+ if (ptr > cell->payload + cell->payload_len - 3) {
goto truncated;
}
cert_type = *ptr;
cert_len = ntohs(get_uint16(ptr+1));
- if (ptr + 3 + cert_len > cell->payload + cell->payload_len) {
+ if (cell->payload_len < 3 + cert_len)
+ goto truncated;
+ if (ptr > cell->payload + cell->payload_len - cert_len - 3) {
goto truncated;
}
if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK ||