--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Secure Remote Password 6a implementation
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Tom Cocagne. All rights reserved.
+ * https://github.com/cocagne/csrp
+ *
+ * The MIT License (MIT)
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Tom Cocagne
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
+ * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
+ * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
+ * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
+ * of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
+ * so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+ #include <Wincrypt.h>
+#else
+ #include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+
+#include "srp.h"
+
+static int g_initialized = 0;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ BIGNUM * N;
+ BIGNUM * g;
+} NGConstant;
+
+struct NGHex
+{
+ const char * n_hex;
+ const char * g_hex;
+};
+
+/* All constants here were pulled from Appendix A of RFC 5054 */
+static struct NGHex global_Ng_constants[] = {
+ { /* 1024 */
+ "EEAF0AB9ADB38DD69C33F80AFA8FC5E86072618775FF3C0B9EA2314C9C256576D674DF7496"
+ "EA81D3383B4813D692C6E0E0D5D8E250B98BE48E495C1D6089DAD15DC7D7B46154D6B6CE8E"
+ "F4AD69B15D4982559B297BCF1885C529F566660E57EC68EDBC3C05726CC02FD4CBF4976EAA"
+ "9AFD5138FE8376435B9FC61D2FC0EB06E3",
+ "2"
+ },
+ { /* 2048 */
+ "AC6BDB41324A9A9BF166DE5E1389582FAF72B6651987EE07FC3192943DB56050A37329CBB4"
+ "A099ED8193E0757767A13DD52312AB4B03310DCD7F48A9DA04FD50E8083969EDB767B0CF60"
+ "95179A163AB3661A05FBD5FAAAE82918A9962F0B93B855F97993EC975EEAA80D740ADBF4FF"
+ "747359D041D5C33EA71D281E446B14773BCA97B43A23FB801676BD207A436C6481F1D2B907"
+ "8717461A5B9D32E688F87748544523B524B0D57D5EA77A2775D2ECFA032CFBDBF52FB37861"
+ "60279004E57AE6AF874E7303CE53299CCC041C7BC308D82A5698F3A8D0C38271AE35F8E9DB"
+ "FBB694B5C803D89F7AE435DE236D525F54759B65E372FCD68EF20FA7111F9E4AFF73",
+ "2"
+ },
+ { /* 4096 */
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08"
+ "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B"
+ "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9"
+ "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6"
+ "49286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8"
+ "FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D"
+ "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3BE39E772C"
+ "180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF695581718"
+ "3995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D"
+ "04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7D"
+ "B3970F85A6E1E4C7ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D226"
+ "1AD2EE6BF12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C"
+ "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB3143DB5BFC"
+ "E0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D788719A10BDBA5B26"
+ "99C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB"
+ "04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2"
+ "233BA186515BE7ED1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127"
+ "D5B05AA993B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199"
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ "5"
+ },
+ { /* 8192 */
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08"
+ "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B"
+ "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9"
+ "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6"
+ "49286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8"
+ "FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D"
+ "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3BE39E772C"
+ "180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF695581718"
+ "3995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D"
+ "04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7D"
+ "B3970F85A6E1E4C7ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D226"
+ "1AD2EE6BF12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C"
+ "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB3143DB5BFC"
+ "E0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D788719A10BDBA5B26"
+ "99C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB"
+ "04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2"
+ "233BA186515BE7ED1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127"
+ "D5B05AA993B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934028492"
+ "36C3FAB4D27C7026C1D4DCB2602646DEC9751E763DBA37BDF8FF9406"
+ "AD9E530EE5DB382F413001AEB06A53ED9027D831179727B0865A8918"
+ "DA3EDBEBCF9B14ED44CE6CBACED4BB1BDB7F1447E6CC254B33205151"
+ "2BD7AF426FB8F401378CD2BF5983CA01C64B92ECF032EA15D1721D03"
+ "F482D7CE6E74FEF6D55E702F46980C82B5A84031900B1C9E59E7C97F"
+ "BEC7E8F323A97A7E36CC88BE0F1D45B7FF585AC54BD407B22B4154AA"
+ "CC8F6D7EBF48E1D814CC5ED20F8037E0A79715EEF29BE32806A1D58B"
+ "B7C5DA76F550AA3D8A1FBFF0EB19CCB1A313D55CDA56C9EC2EF29632"
+ "387FE8D76E3C0468043E8F663F4860EE12BF2D5B0B7474D6E694F91E"
+ "6DBE115974A3926F12FEE5E438777CB6A932DF8CD8BEC4D073B931BA"
+ "3BC832B68D9DD300741FA7BF8AFC47ED2576F6936BA424663AAB639C"
+ "5AE4F5683423B4742BF1C978238F16CBE39D652DE3FDB8BEFC848AD9"
+ "22222E04A4037C0713EB57A81A23F0C73473FC646CEA306B4BCBC886"
+ "2F8385DDFA9D4B7FA2C087E879683303ED5BDD3A062B3CF5B3A278A6"
+ "6D2A13F83F44F82DDF310EE074AB6A364597E899A0255DC164F31CC5"
+ "0846851DF9AB48195DED7EA1B1D510BD7EE74D73FAF36BC31ECFA268"
+ "359046F4EB879F924009438B481C6CD7889A002ED5EE382BC9190DA6"
+ "FC026E479558E4475677E9AA9E3050E2765694DFC81F56E880B96E71"
+ "60C980DD98EDD3DFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ "13"
+ },
+ {0,0} /* null sentinel */
+};
+
+
+static NGConstant * new_ng( SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex )
+{
+ NGConstant * ng = (NGConstant *) malloc( sizeof(NGConstant) );
+ ng->N = BN_new();
+ ng->g = BN_new();
+
+ if( !ng || !ng->N || !ng->g )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( ng_type != SRP_NG_CUSTOM )
+ {
+ n_hex = global_Ng_constants[ ng_type ].n_hex;
+ g_hex = global_Ng_constants[ ng_type ].g_hex;
+ }
+
+ BN_hex2bn( &ng->N, n_hex );
+ BN_hex2bn( &ng->g, g_hex );
+
+ return ng;
+}
+
+static void delete_ng( NGConstant * ng )
+{
+ if (ng)
+ {
+ BN_free( ng->N );
+ BN_free( ng->g );
+ ng->N = 0;
+ ng->g = 0;
+ free(ng);
+ }
+}
+
+
+
+typedef union
+{
+ SHA_CTX sha;
+ SHA256_CTX sha256;
+ SHA512_CTX sha512;
+} HashCTX;
+
+
+struct SRPVerifier
+{
+ SRP_HashAlgorithm hash_alg;
+ NGConstant *ng;
+
+ const char * username;
+ const unsigned char * bytes_B;
+ int authenticated;
+
+ unsigned char M [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char H_AMK [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char session_key [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+};
+
+
+struct SRPUser
+{
+ SRP_HashAlgorithm hash_alg;
+ NGConstant *ng;
+
+ BIGNUM *a;
+ BIGNUM *A;
+ BIGNUM *S;
+
+ const unsigned char * bytes_A;
+ int authenticated;
+
+ const char * username;
+ const unsigned char * password;
+ int password_len;
+
+ unsigned char M [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char H_AMK [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char session_key [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+};
+
+
+static int hash_init( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, HashCTX *c )
+{
+ switch (alg)
+ {
+ case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA1_Init( &c->sha );
+ case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224_Init( &c->sha256 );
+ case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256_Init( &c->sha256 );
+ case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384_Init( &c->sha512 );
+ case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512_Init( &c->sha512 );
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ };
+}
+static int hash_update( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, HashCTX *c, const void *data, size_t len )
+{
+ switch (alg)
+ {
+ case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA1_Update( &c->sha, data, len );
+ case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224_Update( &c->sha256, data, len );
+ case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256_Update( &c->sha256, data, len );
+ case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384_Update( &c->sha512, data, len );
+ case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512_Update( &c->sha512, data, len );
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ };
+}
+static int hash_final( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, HashCTX *c, unsigned char *md )
+{
+ switch (alg)
+ {
+ case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA1_Final( md, &c->sha );
+ case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224_Final( md, &c->sha256 );
+ case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256_Final( md, &c->sha256 );
+ case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384_Final( md, &c->sha512 );
+ case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512_Final( md, &c->sha512 );
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ };
+}
+static unsigned char * hash( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md )
+{
+ switch (alg)
+ {
+ case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA1( d, n, md );
+ case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224( d, n, md );
+ case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256( d, n, md );
+ case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384( d, n, md );
+ case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512( d, n, md );
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ };
+}
+static int hash_length( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg )
+{
+ switch (alg)
+ {
+ case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ };
+}
+
+
+static BIGNUM * H_nn( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * n1, const BIGNUM * n2 )
+{
+ unsigned char buff[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
+ int len_n1 = BN_num_bytes(n1);
+ int len_n2 = BN_num_bytes(n2);
+ int nbytes = len_n1 + len_n2;
+ unsigned char * bin = (unsigned char *) malloc( nbytes );
+ if (!bin)
+ return 0;
+ BN_bn2bin(n1, bin);
+ BN_bn2bin(n2, bin + len_n1);
+ hash( alg, bin, nbytes, buff );
+ free(bin);
+ return BN_bin2bn(buff, hash_length(alg), NULL);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM * H_nn_pad( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * n1, const BIGNUM * n2 )
+{
+ unsigned char * bin;
+ unsigned char buff[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
+ int len_n1 = BN_num_bytes(n1);
+ int len_n2 = BN_num_bytes(n2);
+ int nbytes = 2 * len_n1;
+
+ if ((len_n2 < 1) || (len_n2 > len_n1))
+ return 0;
+ bin = (unsigned char *) calloc( 1, nbytes );
+ if (!bin)
+ return 0;
+ BN_bn2bin(n1, bin);
+ BN_bn2bin(n2, bin + nbytes - len_n2);
+ hash( alg, bin, nbytes, buff );
+ free(bin);
+ return BN_bin2bn(buff, hash_length(alg), NULL);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM * H_ns( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * n, const unsigned char * bytes, int len_bytes )
+{
+ unsigned char buff[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
+ int len_n = BN_num_bytes(n);
+ int nbytes = len_n + len_bytes;
+ unsigned char * bin = (unsigned char *) malloc( nbytes );
+ if (!bin)
+ return 0;
+ BN_bn2bin(n, bin);
+ memcpy( bin + len_n, bytes, len_bytes );
+ hash( alg, bin, nbytes, buff );
+ free(bin);
+ return BN_bin2bn(buff, hash_length(alg), NULL);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM * calculate_x( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * salt, const char * username, const unsigned char * password, int password_len )
+{
+ unsigned char ucp_hash[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ HashCTX ctx;
+
+ hash_init( alg, &ctx );
+
+ hash_update( alg, &ctx, username, strlen(username) );
+ hash_update( alg, &ctx, ":", 1 );
+ hash_update( alg, &ctx, password, password_len );
+
+ hash_final( alg, &ctx, ucp_hash );
+
+ return H_ns( alg, salt, ucp_hash, hash_length(alg) );
+}
+
+static void update_hash_n( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, HashCTX *ctx, const BIGNUM * n )
+{
+ unsigned long len = BN_num_bytes(n);
+ unsigned char * n_bytes = (unsigned char *) malloc( len );
+ if (!n_bytes)
+ return;
+ BN_bn2bin(n, n_bytes);
+ hash_update(alg, ctx, n_bytes, len);
+ free(n_bytes);
+}
+
+static void hash_num( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * n, unsigned char * dest )
+{
+ int nbytes = BN_num_bytes(n);
+ unsigned char * bin = (unsigned char *) malloc( nbytes );
+ if(!bin)
+ return;
+ BN_bn2bin(n, bin);
+ hash( alg, bin, nbytes, dest );
+ free(bin);
+}
+
+static void calculate_M( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, NGConstant *ng, unsigned char * dest, const char * I, const BIGNUM * s,
+ const BIGNUM * A, const BIGNUM * B, const unsigned char * K )
+{
+ unsigned char H_N[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
+ unsigned char H_g[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
+ unsigned char H_I[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
+ unsigned char H_xor[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
+ HashCTX ctx;
+ int i = 0;
+ int hash_len = hash_length(alg);
+
+ hash_num( alg, ng->N, H_N );
+ hash_num( alg, ng->g, H_g );
+
+ hash(alg, (const unsigned char *)I, strlen(I), H_I);
+
+
+ for (i=0; i < hash_len; i++ )
+ H_xor[i] = H_N[i] ^ H_g[i];
+
+ hash_init( alg, &ctx );
+
+ hash_update( alg, &ctx, H_xor, hash_len );
+ hash_update( alg, &ctx, H_I, hash_len );
+ update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, s );
+ update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, A );
+ update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, B );
+ hash_update( alg, &ctx, K, hash_len );
+
+ hash_final( alg, &ctx, dest );
+}
+
+static void calculate_H_AMK( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, unsigned char *dest, const BIGNUM * A, const unsigned char * M, const unsigned char * K )
+{
+ HashCTX ctx;
+
+ hash_init( alg, &ctx );
+
+ update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, A );
+ hash_update( alg, &ctx, M, hash_length(alg) );
+ hash_update( alg, &ctx, K, hash_length(alg) );
+
+ hash_final( alg, &ctx, dest );
+}
+
+
+static void init_random()
+{
+#ifdef WIN32
+ HCRYPTPROV wctx;
+#else
+ FILE *fp = 0;
+#endif
+
+ unsigned char buff[64];
+
+ if (g_initialized)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+
+ CryptAcquireContext(&wctx, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT);
+
+ CryptGenRandom(wctx, sizeof(buff), (BYTE*) buff);
+
+ CryptReleaseContext(wctx, 0);
+
+ g_initialized = 1;
+
+#else
+ fp = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r");
+
+ if (fp)
+ {
+ size_t read = fread(buff, sizeof(buff), 1, fp);
+ g_initialized = read == 1;
+ fclose(fp);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (g_initialized)
+ RAND_seed( buff, sizeof(buff) );
+}
+
+
+/***********************************************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Exported Functions
+ *
+ ***********************************************************************************************************/
+
+void srp_random_seed( const unsigned char * random_data, int data_length )
+{
+ g_initialized = 1;
+
+ if (random_data)
+ RAND_seed( random_data, data_length );
+}
+
+
+void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
+ SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
+ const unsigned char * password, int len_password,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_s, int * len_s,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_v, int * len_v,
+ const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex )
+{
+ BIGNUM * s = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM * v = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM * x = 0;
+ BN_CTX * ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ NGConstant * ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
+
+ if( !s || !v || !ctx || !ng )
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+
+ init_random(); /* Only happens once */
+
+ BN_rand(s, 4*32, -1, 0); // MODIFIED!!!
+
+ x = calculate_x( alg, s, username, password, len_password );
+
+ if( !x )
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+
+ BN_mod_exp(v, ng->g, x, ng->N, ctx);
+
+ *len_s = BN_num_bytes(s);
+ *len_v = BN_num_bytes(v);
+
+ *bytes_s = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_s );
+ *bytes_v = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_v );
+
+ if (!bytes_s || !bytes_v)
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+
+ BN_bn2bin(s, (unsigned char *) *bytes_s);
+ BN_bn2bin(v, (unsigned char *) *bytes_v);
+
+ cleanup_and_exit:
+ delete_ng( ng );
+ BN_free(s);
+ BN_free(v);
+ BN_free(x);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+void
+srp_verifier_get_B(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_b, int * len_b,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B,
+ const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex)
+{
+ BIGNUM *v = BN_bin2bn(bytes_v, len_v, NULL);
+ BIGNUM *k = 0;
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *B = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *tmp1 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *tmp2 = BN_new();
+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ NGConstant *ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
+
+ *len_b = 0;
+ *bytes_b = 0;
+ *len_B = 0;
+ *bytes_B = 0;
+
+ init_random(); /* Only happens once */
+
+ BN_rand(b, 256, -1, 0);
+
+ k = H_nn_pad(alg, ng->N, ng->g); //MODIFIED
+
+ /* B = kv + g^b */
+ BN_mul(tmp1, k, v, ctx);
+ BN_mod_exp(tmp2, ng->g, b, ng->N, ctx);
+ BN_mod_add(B, tmp1, tmp2, ng->N, ctx);
+
+ *len_B = BN_num_bytes(B);
+ *bytes_B = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_B );
+ BN_bn2bin( B, (unsigned char *) *bytes_B );
+
+ *len_b = BN_num_bytes(b);
+ *bytes_b = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_b );
+ BN_bn2bin( b, (unsigned char *) *bytes_b );
+
+ BN_free(b); // Added -- not sure about these, but they look necessary
+ BN_free(B); // Added -- not sure about these, but they look necessary
+ BN_free(v);
+ BN_free(k);
+ BN_free(tmp1);
+ BN_free(tmp2);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ delete_ng(ng);
+}
+
+/* Out: bytes_B, len_B.
+ *
+ * On failure, bytes_B will be set to NULL and len_B will be set to 0
+ */
+
+struct SRPVerifier * srp_verifier_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_A, int len_A,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_b, int len_b,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
+ const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex )
+{
+ BIGNUM *s = BN_bin2bn(bytes_s, len_s, NULL);
+ BIGNUM *v = BN_bin2bn(bytes_v, len_v, NULL);
+ BIGNUM *A = BN_bin2bn(bytes_A, len_A, NULL);
+ BIGNUM *u = 0;
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_bin2bn(bytes_b, len_b, NULL);;
+ BIGNUM *B = BN_bin2bn(bytes_B, len_B, NULL);;
+ BIGNUM *S = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *k = 0;
+ BIGNUM *tmp1 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *tmp2 = BN_new();
+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ int ulen = strlen(username) + 1;
+ NGConstant *ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
+ struct SRPVerifier *ver = 0;
+
+ if( !s || !v || !A || !B || !S || !b || !tmp1 || !tmp2 || !ctx || !ng )
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+
+ ver = (struct SRPVerifier *) malloc( sizeof(struct SRPVerifier) );
+
+ if (!ver)
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+
+ init_random(); /* Only happens once */
+
+ ver->username = (char *) malloc( ulen );
+ ver->hash_alg = alg;
+ ver->ng = ng;
+
+ if (!ver->username)
+ {
+ free(ver);
+ ver = 0;
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+ }
+
+ memcpy( (char*)ver->username, username, ulen );
+
+ ver->authenticated = 0;
+
+ /* SRP-6a safety check */
+ BN_mod(tmp1, A, ng->N, ctx);
+ if ( !BN_is_zero(tmp1) )
+ {
+ k = H_nn_pad(alg, ng->N, ng->g); //MODIFIED
+
+ u = H_nn(alg, A, B);
+
+ /* S = (A *(v^u)) ^ b */
+ BN_mod_exp(tmp1, v, u, ng->N, ctx);
+ BN_mul(tmp2, A, tmp1, ctx);
+ BN_mod_exp(S, tmp2, b, ng->N, ctx);
+
+ hash_num(alg, S, ver->session_key);
+
+ calculate_M( alg, ng, ver->M, username, s, A, B, ver->session_key );
+ calculate_H_AMK( alg, ver->H_AMK, A, ver->M, ver->session_key );
+
+ ver->bytes_B = bytes_B;
+ }
+
+ cleanup_and_exit:
+ BN_free(s);
+ BN_free(v);
+ BN_free(A);
+ if (u) BN_free(u);
+ if (k) BN_free(k);
+ BN_free(B);
+ BN_free(S);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(tmp1);
+ BN_free(tmp2);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return ver;
+}
+
+
+
+
+void srp_verifier_delete( struct SRPVerifier * ver )
+{
+ if (ver)
+ {
+ delete_ng( ver->ng );
+ free( (char *) ver->username );
+ free( (unsigned char *) ver->bytes_B );
+ memset(ver, 0, sizeof(*ver));
+ free( ver );
+ }
+}
+
+
+
+int srp_verifier_is_authenticated( struct SRPVerifier * ver )
+{
+ return ver->authenticated;
+}
+
+
+const char * srp_verifier_get_username( struct SRPVerifier * ver )
+{
+ return ver->username;
+}
+
+
+const unsigned char * srp_verifier_get_session_key( struct SRPVerifier * ver, int * key_length )
+{
+ if (key_length)
+ *key_length = hash_length( ver->hash_alg );
+ return ver->session_key;
+}
+
+
+int srp_verifier_get_session_key_length( struct SRPVerifier * ver )
+{
+ return hash_length( ver->hash_alg );
+}
+
+
+/* user_M must be exactly SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes in size */
+void srp_verifier_verify_session( struct SRPVerifier * ver, const unsigned char * user_M, const unsigned char ** bytes_HAMK )
+{
+ if ( memcmp( ver->M, user_M, hash_length(ver->hash_alg) ) == 0 )
+ {
+ ver->authenticated = 1;
+ *bytes_HAMK = ver->H_AMK;
+ }
+ else
+ *bytes_HAMK = NULL;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************/
+
+struct SRPUser * srp_user_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_password, int len_password,
+ const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex )
+{
+ struct SRPUser *usr = (struct SRPUser *) malloc( sizeof(struct SRPUser) );
+ int ulen = strlen(username) + 1;
+
+ if (!usr)
+ goto err_exit;
+
+ init_random(); /* Only happens once */
+
+ usr->hash_alg = alg;
+ usr->ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
+
+ usr->a = BN_new();
+ usr->A = BN_new();
+ usr->S = BN_new();
+
+ if (!usr->ng || !usr->a || !usr->A || !usr->S)
+ goto err_exit;
+
+ usr->username = (const char *) malloc(ulen);
+ usr->password = (const unsigned char *) malloc(len_password);
+ usr->password_len = len_password;
+
+ if (!usr->username || !usr->password)
+ goto err_exit;
+
+ memcpy((char *)usr->username, username, ulen);
+ memcpy((char *)usr->password, bytes_password, len_password);
+
+ usr->authenticated = 0;
+
+ usr->bytes_A = 0;
+
+ return usr;
+
+ err_exit:
+ if (usr)
+ {
+ BN_free(usr->a);
+ BN_free(usr->A);
+ BN_free(usr->S);
+ if (usr->username)
+ free((void*)usr->username);
+ if (usr->password)
+ {
+ memset((void*)usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
+ free((void*)usr->password);
+ }
+ free(usr);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+void srp_user_delete( struct SRPUser * usr )
+{
+ if( usr )
+ {
+ BN_free( usr->a );
+ BN_free( usr->A );
+ BN_free( usr->S );
+
+ delete_ng( usr->ng );
+
+ memset((void*)usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
+
+ free((char *)usr->username);
+ free((char *)usr->password);
+
+ if (usr->bytes_A)
+ free( (char *)usr->bytes_A );
+
+ memset(usr, 0, sizeof(*usr));
+ free( usr );
+ }
+}
+
+
+
+int srp_user_is_authenticated( struct SRPUser * usr)
+{
+ return usr->authenticated;
+}
+
+
+const char * srp_user_get_username( struct SRPUser * usr )
+{
+ return usr->username;
+}
+
+
+
+const unsigned char * srp_user_get_session_key( struct SRPUser * usr, int * key_length )
+{
+ if (key_length)
+ *key_length = hash_length( usr->hash_alg );
+ return usr->session_key;
+}
+
+
+int srp_user_get_session_key_length( struct SRPUser * usr )
+{
+ return hash_length( usr->hash_alg );
+}
+
+
+
+/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */
+void srp_user_start_authentication( struct SRPUser * usr, const char ** username,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_A, int * len_A )
+{
+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+
+ BN_rand(usr->a, 256, -1, 0);
+
+ BN_mod_exp(usr->A, usr->ng->g, usr->a, usr->ng->N, ctx);
+
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ *len_A = BN_num_bytes(usr->A);
+ *bytes_A = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_A );
+
+ if (!*bytes_A)
+ {
+ *len_A = 0;
+ *bytes_A = 0;
+ *username = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin( usr->A, (unsigned char *) *bytes_A );
+
+ usr->bytes_A = *bytes_A;
+ *username = usr->username;
+}
+
+
+/* Output: bytes_M. Buffer length is SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+void srp_user_process_challenge( struct SRPUser * usr,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_M, int * len_M )
+{
+ BIGNUM *s = BN_bin2bn(bytes_s, len_s, NULL);
+ BIGNUM *B = BN_bin2bn(bytes_B, len_B, NULL);
+ BIGNUM *u = 0;
+ BIGNUM *x = 0;
+ BIGNUM *k = 0;
+ BIGNUM *v = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *tmp1 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *tmp2 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *tmp3 = BN_new();
+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+
+ *len_M = 0;
+ *bytes_M = 0;
+
+ if( !s || !B || !v || !tmp1 || !tmp2 || !tmp3 || !ctx )
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+
+ u = H_nn_pad(usr->hash_alg, usr->A, B); //MODIFIED
+
+ if (!u)
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+
+ x = calculate_x( usr->hash_alg, s, usr->username, usr->password, usr->password_len );
+
+ if (!x)
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+
+ k = H_nn_pad(usr->hash_alg, usr->ng->N, usr->ng->g); //MODIFIED
+
+ if (!k)
+ goto cleanup_and_exit;
+
+ /* SRP-6a safety check */
+ if ( !BN_is_zero(B) && !BN_is_zero(u) )
+ {
+ BN_mod_exp(v, usr->ng->g, x, usr->ng->N, ctx);
+
+ /* S = (B - k*(g^x)) ^ (a + ux) */
+ BN_mul(tmp1, u, x, ctx);
+ BN_add(tmp2, usr->a, tmp1); /* tmp2 = (a + ux) */
+ BN_mod_exp(tmp1, usr->ng->g, x, usr->ng->N, ctx);
+ BN_mul(tmp3, k, tmp1, ctx); /* tmp3 = k*(g^x) */
+ BN_sub(tmp1, B, tmp3); /* tmp1 = (B - K*(g^x)) */
+ BN_mod_exp(usr->S, tmp1, tmp2, usr->ng->N, ctx);
+
+ hash_num(usr->hash_alg, usr->S, usr->session_key);
+
+ calculate_M( usr->hash_alg, usr->ng, usr->M, usr->username, s, usr->A, B, usr->session_key );
+ calculate_H_AMK( usr->hash_alg, usr->H_AMK, usr->A, usr->M, usr->session_key );
+
+ *bytes_M = usr->M;
+ if (len_M)
+ *len_M = hash_length( usr->hash_alg );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *bytes_M = NULL;
+ if (len_M)
+ *len_M = 0;
+ }
+
+ cleanup_and_exit:
+
+ BN_free(s);
+ BN_free(B);
+ BN_free(u);
+ BN_free(x);
+ BN_free(k);
+ BN_free(v);
+ BN_free(tmp1);
+ BN_free(tmp2);
+ BN_free(tmp3);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+
+void srp_user_verify_session( struct SRPUser * usr, const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK )
+{
+ if ( memcmp( usr->H_AMK, bytes_HAMK, hash_length(usr->hash_alg) ) == 0 )
+ usr->authenticated = 1;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Secure Remote Password 6a implementation
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Tom Cocagne. All rights reserved.
+ * https://github.com/cocagne/csrp
+ *
+ * The MIT License (MIT)
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Tom Cocagne
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
+ * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
+ * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
+ * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
+ * of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
+ * so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Purpose: This is a direct implementation of the Secure Remote Password
+ * Protocol version 6a as described by
+ * http://srp.stanford.edu/design.html
+ *
+ * Author: tom.cocagne@gmail.com (Tom Cocagne)
+ *
+ * Dependencies: OpenSSL (and Advapi32.lib on Windows)
+ *
+ * Usage: Refer to test_srp.c for a demonstration
+ *
+ * Notes:
+ * This library allows multiple combinations of hashing algorithms and
+ * prime number constants. For authentication to succeed, the hash and
+ * prime number constants must match between
+ * srp_create_salted_verification_key(), srp_user_new(),
+ * and srp_verifier_new(). A recommended approach is to determine the
+ * desired level of security for an application and globally define the
+ * hash and prime number constants to the predetermined values.
+ *
+ * As one might suspect, more bits means more security. As one might also
+ * suspect, more bits also means more processing time. The test_srp.c
+ * program can be easily modified to profile various combinations of
+ * hash & prime number pairings.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SRP_H
+#define SRP_H
+
+
+struct SRPVerifier;
+struct SRPUser;
+
+typedef enum
+{
+ SRP_NG_1024,
+ SRP_NG_2048,
+ SRP_NG_4096,
+ SRP_NG_8192,
+ SRP_NG_CUSTOM
+} SRP_NGType;
+
+typedef enum
+{
+ SRP_SHA1,
+ SRP_SHA224,
+ SRP_SHA256,
+ SRP_SHA384,
+ SRP_SHA512
+} SRP_HashAlgorithm;
+
+
+/* This library will automatically seed the OpenSSL random number generator
+ * using cryptographically sound random data on Windows & Linux. If this is
+ * undesirable behavior or the host OS does not provide a /dev/urandom file,
+ * this function may be called to seed the random number generator with
+ * alternate data.
+ *
+ * The random data should include at least as many bits of entropy as the
+ * largest hash function used by the application. So, for example, if a
+ * 512-bit hash function is used, the random data requies at least 512
+ * bits of entropy.
+ *
+ * Passing a null pointer to this function will cause this library to skip
+ * seeding the random number generator. This is only legitimate if it is
+ * absolutely known that the OpenSSL random number generator has already
+ * been sufficiently seeded within the running application.
+ *
+ * Notes:
+ * * This function is optional on Windows & Linux and mandatory on all
+ * other platforms.
+ */
+void srp_random_seed( const unsigned char * random_data, int data_length );
+
+
+/* Out: bytes_s, len_s, bytes_v, len_v
+ *
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the memory allocated for bytes_s and bytes_v
+ *
+ * The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type.
+ * If provided, they must contain ASCII text of the hexidecimal notation.
+ */
+void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
+ SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
+ const unsigned char * password, int len_password,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_s, int * len_s,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_v, int * len_v,
+ const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
+
+
+/* Out: bytes_B, len_B.
+ */
+
+void
+srp_verifier_get_B(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_b, int * len_b,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B,
+ const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex);
+
+struct SRPVerifier * srp_verifier_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_A, int len_A,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_b, int len_b,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
+ const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
+
+
+void srp_verifier_delete( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
+
+
+int srp_verifier_is_authenticated( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
+
+
+const char * srp_verifier_get_username( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
+
+/* key_length may be null */
+const unsigned char * srp_verifier_get_session_key( struct SRPVerifier * ver, int * key_length );
+
+
+int srp_verifier_get_session_key_length( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
+
+
+/* user_M must be exactly srp_verifier_get_session_key_length() bytes in size */
+void srp_verifier_verify_session( struct SRPVerifier * ver,
+ const unsigned char * user_M,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_HAMK );
+
+/*******************************************************************************/
+
+/* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type */
+struct SRPUser * srp_user_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_password, int len_password,
+ const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
+
+void srp_user_delete( struct SRPUser * usr );
+
+int srp_user_is_authenticated( struct SRPUser * usr);
+
+
+const char * srp_user_get_username( struct SRPUser * usr );
+
+/* key_length may be null */
+const unsigned char * srp_user_get_session_key( struct SRPUser * usr, int * key_length );
+
+int srp_user_get_session_key_length( struct SRPUser * usr );
+
+/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */
+void srp_user_start_authentication( struct SRPUser * usr, const char ** username,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_A, int * len_A );
+
+/* Output: bytes_M, len_M (len_M may be null and will always be
+ * srp_user_get_session_key_length() bytes in size) */
+void srp_user_process_challenge( struct SRPUser * usr,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
+ const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
+ const unsigned char ** bytes_M, int * len_M );
+
+/* bytes_HAMK must be exactly srp_user_get_session_key_length() bytes in size */
+void srp_user_verify_session( struct SRPUser * usr, const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK );
+
+#endif /* Include Guard */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * This file is part of Shairport Sync.
+ * Copyright (c) Mike Brady 2020 -- 2021
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
+ * obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
+ * files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without
+ * restriction, including without limitation the rights to use,
+ * copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
+ * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
+ * Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
+ * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
+ * OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#define __STDC_FORMAT_MACROS
+#include "common.h"
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "../nqptp/nqptp-shm-structures.h"
+#include "ptp-utilities.h"
+
+int shm_fd;
+void *mapped_addr = NULL;
+
+int failure_message_sent = 0;
+
+static pthread_mutex_t ptp_access_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+
+// returns a copy of the shared memory data from the nqptp
+// shared memory interface, so long as it's open.
+int get_nqptp_data(struct shm_structure *nqptp_data) {
+ int response = -1; // presume the worst. Fix it on success
+ // the first part of the shared memory is a mutex lock, so use it to get
+ // exclusive access while copying
+
+ if ((mapped_addr != MAP_FAILED) && (mapped_addr != NULL)) {
+ pthread_cleanup_debug_mutex_lock((pthread_mutex_t *)mapped_addr, 100000, 1);
+ memcpy(nqptp_data, (char *)mapped_addr, sizeof(struct shm_structure));
+ pthread_cleanup_pop(1); // release the mutex
+ response = 0;
+ }
+ return response;
+}
+
+int ptp_get_clock_info(uint64_t *actual_clock_id, uint64_t *raw_offset) {
+ int response = -1;
+ pthread_cleanup_debug_mutex_lock(&ptp_access_mutex, 10000, 1);
+ // 0 -> valid and working; -1 -> can't connect to nqptp
+ if (actual_clock_id != NULL)
+ *actual_clock_id = 0;
+ if (raw_offset != NULL)
+ *raw_offset = 0;
+
+ if (ptp_shm_interface_open() == 0) {
+ struct shm_structure nqptp_data;
+ if (get_nqptp_data(&nqptp_data) == 0) {
+ if (nqptp_data.version == NQPTP_SHM_STRUCTURES_VERSION) {
+ if (actual_clock_id != NULL)
+ *actual_clock_id = nqptp_data.master_clock_id;
+ if (raw_offset != NULL)
+ *raw_offset = nqptp_data.local_to_master_time_offset;
+ response = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (failure_message_sent == 0) {
+ warn("This version of Shairport Sync requires an NQPTP with a Shared Memory Interface Version %u, but the installed version is %u. Please install the correct version of NQPTP.", NQPTP_SHM_STRUCTURES_VERSION, nqptp_data.version);
+ failure_message_sent = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (response != -1)
+ response = ptp_shm_interface_close();
+ } else {
+ if (failure_message_sent == 0) {
+ warn("Can't open the interface to nqptp. Is the service running?");
+ failure_message_sent = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ pthread_cleanup_pop(1); // release the mutex
+ if (response == 0)
+ failure_message_sent = 0;
+ return response;
+}
+
+int ptp_shm_interface_open() {
+ mapped_addr = NULL;
+ int shared_memory_file_descriptor = shm_open("/nqptp", O_RDWR, 0);
+ int response = -1;
+ if (shared_memory_file_descriptor >= 0) {
+ mapped_addr =
+ // needs to be PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE to allow the mapped memory to be writable for the
+ // mutex to lock and unlock
+ mmap(NULL, sizeof(struct shm_structure), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED,
+ shared_memory_file_descriptor, 0);
+ if (mapped_addr == MAP_FAILED) {
+ if (failure_message_sent == 0) {
+ debug(1, "unable to open the shared memory interface with nqptp. Is the service running?");
+ failure_message_sent = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (close(shared_memory_file_descriptor) == -1) {
+ if (failure_message_sent == 0) {
+ debug(1, "error closing \"/nqptp\" after mapping it.");
+ failure_message_sent = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ response = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return response;
+}
+
+int ptp_shm_interface_close() {
+ int response = -1;
+ if ((mapped_addr != MAP_FAILED) && (mapped_addr != NULL)) {
+ response = munmap(mapped_addr, sizeof(struct shm_structure));
+ if (response != 0)
+ debug(1, "error unmapping shared memory.");
+ }
+ mapped_addr = NULL;
+ return response;
+}
+
+void ptp_send_control_message_string(const char *msg) {
+ debug(2, "Send control message to NQPTP: \"%s\"", msg);
+ int s;
+ unsigned short port = htons(NQPTP_CONTROL_PORT);
+ struct sockaddr_in server;
+
+ /* Create a datagram socket in the internet domain and use the
+ * default protocol (UDP).
+ */
+ if ((s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0) {
+ die("Can't open a socket to NQPTP");
+ }
+
+ /* Set up the server name */
+ server.sin_family = AF_INET; /* Internet Domain */
+ server.sin_port = port; /* Server Port */
+ server.sin_addr.s_addr = 0; /* Server's Address */
+
+ /* Send the message in buf to the server */
+ if (sendto(s, msg, (strlen(msg) + 1), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof(server)) < 0) {
+ die("error sending timing_peer_list to NQPTP");
+ }
+ /* Deallocate the socket */
+ close(s);
+}
projects / thirdparty / shairport-sync.git / commitdiff
