The command_file_write() handler allocates a kernel buffer of exactly
count bytes and copies user data into it, but does not validate the
buffer against the dot command protocol before passing it to
get_dot_command_size() and get_dot_command_timeout().
Since both the allocation size (count) and the header fields (command_size,
data_size) are independently user-controlled, an attacker can cause
get_dot_command_size() to return a value exceeding the allocation,
triggering OOB reads in get_dot_command_timeout() and an out-of-bounds
memcpy_toio() that leaks kernel heap memory to the service processor.
Fix with two guards: reject writes smaller than sizeof(struct
dot_command_header) before allocation, then after copying user data
reject commands where the buffer is smaller than the total size declared
by the header (sizeof(header) + command_size + data_size). This ensures
all subsequent header and payload field accesses stay within the buffer.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu <LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260314165355.548119-1-LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
return -EINVAL;
if (count == 0 || count > IBMASM_CMD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE)
return 0;
+ if (count < sizeof(struct dot_command_header))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (*offset != 0)
return 0;
return -EFAULT;
}
+ if (count < get_dot_command_size(cmd->buffer)) {
+ command_put(cmd);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
spin_lock_irqsave(&command_data->sp->lock, flags);
if (command_data->command) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&command_data->sp->lock, flags);