- autotrust anchor file can be initialized with a ZSK key as well.

git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@2100 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9

diff --git a/doc/Changelog b/doc/Changelog
index 333181fabe8a8359285717ba978eca9bb12b4003..25321dade57b20cd4eaa069c1e6f81b84b3c1f69 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/Changelog
+++ b/doc/Changelog
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 27 April 2010: Wouter
        - unbound-control get_option domain-insecure shows config file items.
        - fix retry sequence if prime hints are recursion-lame.
+       - autotrust anchor file can be initialized with a ZSK key as well.
 
 26 April 2010: Wouter
        - Compile fix using Sun Studio 12 compiler on Solaris 5.9, use

diff --git a/testdata/autotrust_init_zsk.rpl b/testdata/autotrust_init_zsk.rpl
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..5e72f2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/autotrust_init_zsk.rpl
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+; config options
+server:
+       target-fetch-policy: "0 0 0 0 0"
+       log-time-ascii: yes
+stub-zone:
+       name: "."
+       stub-addr: 193.0.14.129         # K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
+; initial content (say from dig example.com DNSKEY > example.com.key) 
+AUTOTRUST_FILE example.com
+example.com.   10800   IN      DNSKEY  256 3 5 AQPQ41chR9DEHt/aIzIFAqanbDlRflJoRs5yz1jFsoRIT7dWf0r+PeDuewdxkszNH6wnU4QL8pfKFRh5PIYVBLK3 ;{id = 30899 (zsk), size = 512b}
+AUTOTRUST_END
+CONFIG_END
+
+SCENARIO_BEGIN Test autotrust with initial trust anchor ZSK
+
+; K-ROOT
+RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
+       ADDRESS 193.0.14.129
+ENTRY_BEGIN
+MATCH opcode qname qtype
+ADJUST copy_id copy_query
+REPLY QR AA
+SECTION QUESTION
+. IN NS
+SECTION ANSWER
+. IN NS k.root-servers.net.
+SECTION ADDITIONAL
+k.root-servers.net IN A 193.0.14.129
+ENTRY_END
+
+ENTRY_BEGIN
+MATCH opcode subdomain
+ADJUST copy_id copy_query
+REPLY QR
+SECTION QUESTION
+com. IN NS
+SECTION AUTHORITY
+com. IN NS a.gtld-servers.net.
+SECTION ADDITIONAL
+a.gtld-servers.net. IN A 192.5.6.30
+ENTRY_END
+RANGE_END
+
+; a.gtld-servers.net.
+RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
+       ADDRESS 192.5.6.30
+ENTRY_BEGIN
+MATCH opcode subdomain
+ADJUST copy_id copy_query
+REPLY QR
+SECTION QUESTION
+example.com. IN NS
+SECTION AUTHORITY
+example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
+SECTION ADDITIONAL
+ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
+ENTRY_END
+RANGE_END
+
+; ns.example.com.
+RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
+       ADDRESS 1.2.3.4
+ENTRY_BEGIN
+MATCH opcode qname qtype
+ADJUST copy_id
+REPLY QR AA
+SECTION QUESTION
+www.example.com. IN A
+SECTION ANSWER
+www.example.com.       3600    IN      A       10.20.30.40
+www.example.com.       3600    IN      RRSIG   A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. pYGxVLsWUvOp1wSf0iwPap+JnECfC5GAm1lRqy3YEqecNGld7U7x/5Imo3CerbdZrVptUQs2oH0lcjwYJXMnsw== ;{id = 30899}
+SECTION AUTHORITY
+example.com.   3600    IN      NS      ns.example.com.
+example.com.   3600    IN      RRSIG   NS 5 2 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. J5wxRq0jgwQL6yy530kvo9cHqNAUHV8IF4dvaYZL0bNraO2Oe6dVXqlJl4+cxNHI2TMsstwFPr2Zz8tv6Az2mQ== ;{id = 30899}
+SECTION ADDITIONAL
+ns.example.com.        3600    IN      A       1.2.3.4
+ns.example.com.        3600    IN      RRSIG   A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. JsXbS18oyc0zkVaOWGSFdIQuOsZKflT0GraT9afDPoWLCgH4ApF7jNgfJV7Pqy1sTBRajME5IUAhpANwGBuW4A== ;{id = 30899}
+ENTRY_END
+
+ENTRY_BEGIN
+MATCH opcode qname qtype
+ADJUST copy_id
+REPLY QR AA
+SECTION QUESTION
+example.com. IN DNSKEY
+SECTION ANSWER
+; KSK 1
+example.com.   10800   IN      DNSKEY  257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b}
+; ZSK 1
+example.com.   10800   IN      DNSKEY  256 3 5 AQPQ41chR9DEHt/aIzIFAqanbDlRflJoRs5yz1jFsoRIT7dWf0r+PeDuewdxkszNH6wnU4QL8pfKFRh5PIYVBLK3 ;{id = 30899 (ksk), size = 512b}
+; signatures
+example.com.   10800   IN      RRSIG   DNSKEY 5 2 10800 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. b/HK231jIQLX8IhlZfup3r0yhpXaasbPE6LzxoEVVvWaTZWcLmeV8jDIcn0qO7Yvs7bIJN20lwVAV0GcHH3hWQ== ;{id = 30899}
+example.com.   10800   IN      RRSIG   DNSKEY 5 2 10800 20090924111500 20090821111500 55582 example.com. PCHme1QLoULxqjhg5tMlpR0qJlBfstEUVq18TtNoKQe9le1YhJ9caheXcTWoK+boLhXxg9u6Yyvq8FboQh0OjA== ;{id = 55582}
+
+ENTRY_END
+RANGE_END
+
+; set date/time to Aug 24 09:46:40  (2009).
+STEP 5 TIME_PASSES ELAPSE 1251100000
+STEP 6 ASSIGN t0 = ${time}
+; get probe time and check it. 4800 is about 10% less than 5400. And more than
+; the 3600 that a failure timeout would have.
+STEP 7 ASSIGN probe = ${range 4800 ${timeout} 5400}
+
+
+; the auto probing should have been done now.
+STEP 8 CHECK_AUTOTRUST example.com
+FILE_BEGIN
+; autotrust trust anchor file
+;;id: example.com. 1
+;;last_queried: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
+;;last_success: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
+;;next_probe_time: ${$t0 + $probe} ;;${ctime $t0 + $probe}
+;;query_failed: 0
+;;query_interval: 5400
+;;retry_time: 3600
+example.com.   10800   IN      DNSKEY  257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} ;;state=2 [  VALID  ] ;;count=0 ;;lastchange=1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
+FILE_END
+
+
+STEP 10 QUERY
+ENTRY_BEGIN
+REPLY RD DO
+SECTION QUESTION
+www.example.com. IN A
+ENTRY_END
+
+STEP 20 CHECK_ANSWER
+ENTRY_BEGIN
+MATCH all
+REPLY QR RD RA AD NOERROR
+SECTION QUESTION
+www.example.com. IN A
+SECTION ANSWER
+www.example.com.       3600    IN      A       10.20.30.40
+www.example.com.       3600    IN      RRSIG   A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. pYGxVLsWUvOp1wSf0iwPap+JnECfC5GAm1lRqy3YEqecNGld7U7x/5Imo3CerbdZrVptUQs2oH0lcjwYJXMnsw== ;{id = 30899}
+SECTION AUTHORITY
+example.com.   3600    IN      NS      ns.example.com.
+example.com.   3600    IN      RRSIG   NS 5 2 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. J5wxRq0jgwQL6yy530kvo9cHqNAUHV8IF4dvaYZL0bNraO2Oe6dVXqlJl4+cxNHI2TMsstwFPr2Zz8tv6Az2mQ== ;{id = 30899}
+SECTION ADDITIONAL
+ns.example.com.        3600    IN      A       1.2.3.4
+ns.example.com.        3600    IN      RRSIG   A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. JsXbS18oyc0zkVaOWGSFdIQuOsZKflT0GraT9afDPoWLCgH4ApF7jNgfJV7Pqy1sTBRajME5IUAhpANwGBuW4A== ;{id = 30899}
+ENTRY_END
+
+; The autotrust anchor was probed due to the query.
+
+STEP 30 CHECK_AUTOTRUST example.com
+FILE_BEGIN
+; autotrust trust anchor file
+;;id: example.com. 1
+;;last_queried: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
+;;last_success: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
+;;next_probe_time: ${$t0 + $probe} ;;${ctime $t0 + $probe}
+;;query_failed: 0
+;;query_interval: 5400
+;;retry_time: 3600
+example.com.   10800   IN      DNSKEY  257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} ;;state=2 [  VALID  ] ;;count=0 ;;lastchange=1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
+FILE_END
+
+; wait and see if autotrust probes (the unchanged) domain again.
+STEP 40 TIME_PASSES EVAL ${$probe}
+
+STEP 50 TRAFFIC
+
+STEP 65 ASSIGN probe2 = ${range 4800 ${timeout} 5400}
+
+STEP 70 CHECK_AUTOTRUST example.com
+FILE_BEGIN
+; autotrust trust anchor file
+;;id: example.com. 1
+;;last_queried: ${time} ;;${ctime ${time}}
+;;last_success: ${time} ;;${ctime ${time}}
+;;next_probe_time: ${$t0 + $probe + $probe2} ;;${ctime $t0 + $probe + $probe2}
+;;query_failed: 0
+;;query_interval: 5400
+;;retry_time: 3600
+example.com.   10800   IN      DNSKEY  257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} ;;state=2 [  VALID  ] ;;count=0 ;;lastchange=1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
+FILE_END
+
+SCENARIO_END

diff --git a/validator/autotrust.c b/validator/autotrust.c
index 578a63f4607fbbfd766006dce2622bf8f2f594bd..0574b74b10fa6e401b968f6038dba4f28a11f33b 100644 (file)
--- a/validator/autotrust.c
+++ b/validator/autotrust.c
@@ -941,8 +941,8 @@ void autr_write_file(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp)
                        continue;
                if(ta->s == AUTR_STATE_REMOVED)
                        continue;
-               /* only store SEP keys */
-               if(!rr_is_dnskey_sep(ta->rr))
+               /* only store keys */
+               if(ldns_rr_get_type(ta->rr) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY)
                        continue;
                str = ldns_rr2str(ta->rr);
                if(!str || !str[0]) {
@@ -1578,6 +1578,37 @@ anchor_state_update(struct module_env* env, struct autr_ta* anchor, int* c)
        }
 }
 
+/** if ZSK init then trust KSKs */
+static int
+init_zsk_to_ksk(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp, int* changed)
+{
+       /* search for VALID ZSKs */
+       struct autr_ta* anchor;
+       int validzsk = 0;
+       int validksk = 0;
+       for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) {
+               /* last_change test makes sure it was manually configured */
+                if (ldns_rr_get_type(anchor->rr) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY &&
+                       anchor->last_change == 0 && 
+                       !rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr) &&
+                       anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_VALID)
+                        validzsk++;
+       }
+       if(validzsk == 0)
+               return 0;
+       for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) {
+                if (rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr) && 
+                       anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_ADDPEND) {
+                       verbose_key(anchor, VERB_ALGO, "trust KSK from "
+                               "ZSK(config)");
+                       set_trustanchor_state(env, anchor, changed, 
+                               AUTR_STATE_VALID);
+                       validksk++;
+               }
+       }
+       return validksk;
+}
+
 /** Remove missing trustanchors so the list does not grow forever */
 static void
 remove_missing_trustanchors(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp,
@@ -1586,8 +1617,6 @@ remove_missing_trustanchors(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp,
        struct autr_ta* anchor;
        int exceeded;
        int valid = 0;
-       if(env->cfg->keep_missing == 0)
-               return; /* keep forever */
        /* see if we have anchors that are valid */
        for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) {
                /* Only do KSKs */
@@ -1596,16 +1625,38 @@ remove_missing_trustanchors(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp,
                 if (anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_VALID)
                         valid++;
        }
-       if(valid == 0)
-               return;
+       /* if there are no SEP Valid anchors, see if we started out with
+        * a ZSK (last-change=0) anchor, which is VALID and there are KSKs
+        * now that can be made valid.  Do this immediately because there
+        * is no guarantee that the ZSKs get announced long enough.  Usually
+        * this is immediately after init with a ZSK trusted, unless the domain
+        * was not advertising any KSKs at all.  In which case we perfectly
+        * track the zero number of KSKs. */
+       if(valid == 0) {
+               valid = init_zsk_to_ksk(env, tp, changed);
+               if(valid == 0)
+                       return;
+       }
        
        for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) {
-               /* Only do KSKs */
-                if (!rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr))
+               /* ignore ZSKs if newly added */
+               if(anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_START)
+                       continue;
+               /* remove ZSKs if a KSK is present */
+                if (!rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr)) {
+                       if(valid > 0) {
+                               verbose_key(anchor, VERB_ALGO, "remove ZSK "
+                                       "[%d key(s) VALID]", valid);
+                               set_trustanchor_state(env, anchor, changed, 
+                                       AUTR_STATE_REMOVED);
+                       }
                         continue;
+               }
                 /* Only do MISSING keys */
                 if (anchor->s != AUTR_STATE_MISSING)
                         continue;
+               if(env->cfg->keep_missing == 0)
+                       continue; /* keep forever */
 
                exceeded = check_holddown(env, anchor, env->cfg->keep_missing);
                /* If keep_missing has exceeded and we still have more than 
@@ -1657,7 +1708,7 @@ autr_cleanup_keys(struct trust_anchor* tp)
        while(p) {
                /* do we want to remove this key? */
                if(p->s == AUTR_STATE_START || p->s == AUTR_STATE_REMOVED ||
-                       !rr_is_dnskey_sep(p->rr)) {
+                       ldns_rr_get_type(p->rr) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) {
                        struct autr_ta* np = p->next;
                        /* remove */
                        ldns_rr_free(p->rr);