s/web server/webserver/

svn:r772

diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex
index e1192f0c67241d539408a47bb05b31b682a857d5..c0bf9e88424e1bce031252984a21e53bd2a513b4 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/tor-design.tex
+++ b/doc/tor-design.tex
@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor deployment. Anonymity
 presents would-be vandals and abusers with an opportunity to hide
 the origins of their activities. Attackers can harm the Tor network by
 implicating exit servers for their abuse. Also, applications that commonly
-use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or web servers)
+use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or webservers)
 can be fooled by the fact that anonymous connections appear to originate
 at the exit OR.
 
@@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ need for this approach, when
 the German government successfully ordered them to add a backdoor to
 all of their nodes \cite{jap-backdoor}.
 
-\emph{Run a recipient.} By running a Web server, an adversary
+\emph{Run a recipient.} By running a webserver, an adversary
 trivially learns the timing patterns of users connecting to it, and
 can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses.  This can greatly
 facilitate end-to-end attacks: If the adversary can induce