NL80211_CMD_SET_WIPHY_NETNS dispatches with GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, which
verifies that the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN for the source netns. It
doesn't verify that the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN over the target netns
selected by NL80211_ATTR_NETNS_FD or NL80211_ATTR_PID.
This diverges from the convention enforced in
net/core/rtnetlink.c::rtnl_get_net_ns_capable():
/* For now, the caller is required to have CAP_NET_ADMIN in
* the user namespace owning the target net ns.
*/
if (!sk_ns_capable(sk, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
A user with CAP_NET_ADMIN in their own user namespace can therefore
push a wiphy into an arbitrary netns (including init_net) over which
they have no privilege.
Mirror the rtnetlink convention by requiring CAP_NET_ADMIN in the
target netns before calling cfg80211_switch_netns().
Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie <maoyi.xie@ntu.edu.sg>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260506064854.2207105-2-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
if (IS_ERR(net))
return PTR_ERR(net);
+ /*
+ * The caller already has CAP_NET_ADMIN over the source netns
+ * (enforced by GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM on the genl op). Mirror the
+ * convention used by net/core/rtnetlink.c::rtnl_get_net_ns_capable()
+ * and require CAP_NET_ADMIN over the target netns as well, so that
+ * a caller that is privileged in their own user namespace cannot
+ * push a wiphy into a netns where they have no privilege.
+ */
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ put_net(net);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
err = 0;
/* check if anything to do */