]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/linux.git/commitdiff
bpf, ktls: Fix data corruption when using bpf_msg_pop_data() in ktls
authorJiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Mon, 9 Jun 2025 02:08:52 +0000 (10:08 +0800)
committerDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Wed, 11 Jun 2025 14:59:42 +0000 (16:59 +0200)
When sending plaintext data, we initially calculated the corresponding
ciphertext length. However, if we later reduced the plaintext data length
via socket policy, we failed to recalculate the ciphertext length.

This results in transmitting buffers containing uninitialized data during
ciphertext transmission.

This causes uninitialized bytes to be appended after a complete
"Application Data" packet, leading to errors on the receiving end when
parsing TLS record.

Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling")
Reported-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609020910.397930-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
net/tls/tls_sw.c

index fc88e34b7f33fefed8aa3c26e1f6eed07cd20853..549d1ea01a72a7e2eca07702c5f2fa14a3985754 100644 (file)
@@ -872,6 +872,19 @@ more_data:
                delta = msg->sg.size;
                psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg);
                delta -= msg->sg.size;
+
+               if ((s32)delta > 0) {
+                       /* It indicates that we executed bpf_msg_pop_data(),
+                        * causing the plaintext data size to decrease.
+                        * Therefore the encrypted data size also needs to
+                        * correspondingly decrease. We only need to subtract
+                        * delta to calculate the new ciphertext length since
+                        * ktls does not support block encryption.
+                        */
+                       struct sk_msg *enc = &ctx->open_rec->msg_encrypted;
+
+                       sk_msg_trim(sk, enc, enc->sg.size - delta);
+               }
        }
        if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size &&
            !enospc && !full_record) {