]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commitdiff
libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds reads in handle_auth_done()
authorziming zhang <ezrakiez@gmail.com>
Thu, 11 Dec 2025 08:52:58 +0000 (16:52 +0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Mon, 19 Jan 2026 12:10:14 +0000 (13:10 +0100)
commit 818156caffbf55cb4d368f9c3cac64e458fb49c9 upstream.

Perform an explicit bounds check on payload_len to avoid a possible
out-of-bounds access in the callout.

[ idryomov: changelog ]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: ziming zhang <ezrakiez@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c

index c3d105e59d25156a84acf5a0847150e6f6fe8ed9..d7c61058fa0f815bb58783be4f93f26909f551d3 100644 (file)
@@ -2068,7 +2068,9 @@ static int process_auth_done(struct ceph_connection *con, void *p, void *end)
 
        ceph_decode_64_safe(&p, end, global_id, bad);
        ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, con->v2.con_mode, bad);
+
        ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, payload_len, bad);
+       ceph_decode_need(&p, end, payload_len, bad);
 
        dout("%s con %p global_id %llu con_mode %d payload_len %d\n",
             __func__, con, global_id, con->v2.con_mode, payload_len);