postfix-3.5-20190221

diff --git a/postfix/src/global/mail_version.h b/postfix/src/global/mail_version.h
index 1479c94232bd02ced1b7aa7fde0664c593c8f486..654ea75f8dd3ecb04590602d299ed2bd554a198d 100644 (file)
--- a/postfix/src/global/mail_version.h
+++ b/postfix/src/global/mail_version.h
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
   * Patches change both the patchlevel and the release date. Snapshots have no
   * patchlevel; they change the release date only.
   */
-#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE      "20190219"
+#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE      "20190221"
 #define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER    "3.5"
 
 #ifdef SNAPSHOT

diff --git a/postfix/src/tls/tls_misc.c b/postfix/src/tls/tls_misc.c
index 00a8567beb2995bb5b66927f85cb1f2751a2931f..a28623af5e282ca4fde3209f74927bb4ec643eaa 100644 (file)
--- a/postfix/src/tls/tls_misc.c
+++ b/postfix/src/tls/tls_misc.c
@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ static int server_sni_callback(SSL *ssl, int *alert, void *arg)
 
        /*
         * XXX: We could lie and pretend to accept the name, but since we've
-        * previously not impemented the callback (with OpenSSL then
+        * previously not implemented the callback (with OpenSSL then
         * declining the extension), and nothing bad happened, declining it
         * explicitly should be safe.
         */

diff --git a/postfix/src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c b/postfix/src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c
index f30c0d0dbc38268fff73680a8029e635ab48b1b7..7339da6b9618832822cb2e55d23c6d53c18532fb 100644 (file)
--- a/postfix/src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c
+++ b/postfix/src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c
@@ -946,6 +946,7 @@ static int tlsp_client_start_pre_handshake(TLSP_STATE *state)
 {
     state->client_start_props->ctx = state->appl_state;
     state->client_start_props->fd = state->ciphertext_fd;
+    /* These predicates and warning belong inside tls_client_start(). */
     if (!TLS_DANE_BASED(state->client_start_props->tls_level)
        || tls_dane_avail())
        state->tls_context = tls_client_start(state->client_start_props);