desired. Fix the default value of the SSIAccessEnable directive.
[Graham Leggett]
+ *) mod_ssl: Add the 'SSLInsecureRenegotiation' directive, which
+ allows insecure renegotiation with clients which do not yet
+ support the secure renegotiation protocol. [Joe Orton]
+
*) core: Fix potential memory leaks by making sure to not destroy
bucket brigades that have been created by earlier filters.
[Stefan Fritsch]
PATCHES ACCEPTED TO BACKPORT FROM TRUNK:
[ start all new proposals below, under PATCHES PROPOSED. ]
- * mod_ssl: Add SSLInsecureRenegotiation directive.
- Trunk version of patch:
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=906039&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=906057&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=906485&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=906491&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=908015&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=916733&view=rev
- http://svn.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi?rev=916817&view=rev
- Backport version for 2.2.x of patch:
- http://people.apache.org/~jorton/ms_reneg22_v2.diff
- +1: jorton, trawick, minfrin
- minfrin: needs docs, on the case
-
PATCHES PROPOSED TO BACKPORT FROM TRUNK:
[ New proposals should be added at the end of the list ]
</usage>
</directivesynopsis>
+<directivesynopsis>
+<name>SSLInsecureRenegotiation</name>
+<description>Option to enable support for insecure renegotiation</description>
+<syntax>SSLInsecureRenegotiation <em>flag</em></syntax>
+<default>SSLInsecureRenegotiation off</default>
+<contextlist><context>server config</context>
+<context>virtual host</context></contextlist>
+<compatibility>Available in httpd 2.3 and later, if using OpenSSL 1.0.0 Beta 5 or later</compatibility>
+
+<usage>
+<p>As originally specified, all versions of the SSL and TLS protocols
+(up to and including TLS/1.2) were vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle
+attack
+(<a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2009-3555">CVE-2009-3555</a>)
+during a renegotiation. This vulnerability allowed an attacker to
+"prefix" a chosen plaintext to the HTTP request as seen by the web
+server. A protocol extension was developed which fixed this
+vulnerability if supported by both client and server.</p>
+
+<p>If <module>mod_ssl</module> is linked against OpenSSL version 1.0.0
+Beta 5 or later, by default renegotiation is only supported with
+clients supporting the new protocol extension. If this directive is
+enabled, renegotiation will be allowed with old (unpatched) clients,
+albeit insecurely.</p>
+
+<note type="warning"><title>Security warning</title>
+<p>If this directive is enabled, SSL connections will be vulnerable to
+the Man-in-the-Middle prefix attack as described
+in <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2009-3555">CVE-2009-3555</a>.</p>
+</note>
+
+<example><title>Example</title>
+SSLInsecureRenegotiation on
+</example>
+
+<p>The <code>SSL_SECURE_RENEG</code> environment variable can be used
+from an SSI or CGI script to determine whether secure renegotiation is
+supported for a given SSL connection.</p>
+
+</usage>
+</directivesynopsis>
+
</modulesynopsis>
"(`[+-][SSLv2|SSLv3|TLSv1] ...' - see manual)")
SSL_CMD_SRV(HonorCipherOrder, FLAG,
"Use the server's cipher ordering preference")
+ SSL_CMD_SRV(InsecureRenegotiation, FLAG,
+ "Enable support for insecure renegotiation")
SSL_CMD_ALL(UserName, TAKE1,
"Set user name to SSL variable value")
SSL_CMD_SRV(StrictSNIVHostCheck, FLAG,
sc->vhost_id_len = 0; /* set during module init */
sc->session_cache_timeout = UNSET;
sc->cipher_server_pref = UNSET;
+ sc->insecure_reneg = UNSET;
sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_expire = SSL_ENABLED_UNSET;
sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn = SSL_ENABLED_UNSET;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
cfgMergeBool(proxy_enabled);
cfgMergeInt(session_cache_timeout);
cfgMergeBool(cipher_server_pref);
+ cfgMergeBool(insecure_reneg);
cfgMerge(proxy_ssl_check_peer_expire, SSL_ENABLED_UNSET);
cfgMerge(proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn, SSL_ENABLED_UNSET);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
#endif
}
+const char *ssl_cmd_SSLInsecureRenegotiation(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dcfg, int flag)
+{
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(cmd->server);
+ sc->insecure_reneg = flag?TRUE:FALSE;
+ return NULL;
+#else
+ return "The SSLInsecureRenegotiation directive is not available "
+ "with this SSL library";
+#endif
+}
+
+
static const char *ssl_cmd_check_dir(cmd_parms *parms,
const char **dir)
{
MODSSL_SSL_METHOD_CONST SSL_METHOD *method = NULL;
char *cp;
int protocol = mctx->protocol;
+ SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
/*
* Create the new per-server SSL context
}
#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
- {
- SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
- if (sc->cipher_server_pref == TRUE) {
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
- }
+ if (sc->cipher_server_pref == TRUE) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ if (sc->insecure_reneg == TRUE) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
#endif
r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
}
- /* do a full renegotiation */
+ /* Perform a full renegotiation. */
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
- "Performing full renegotiation: "
- "complete handshake protocol");
+ "Performing full renegotiation: complete handshake "
+ "protocol (%s support secure renegotiation)",
+#if defined(SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support)
+ SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) ?
+ "client does" : "client does not"
+#else
+ "server does not"
+#endif
+ );
SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl,
(unsigned char *)&id,
if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Re-negotiation request failed");
+ ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
r->connection->aborted = 1;
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
"SSL_VERSION_INTERFACE",
"SSL_VERSION_LIBRARY",
"SSL_PROTOCOL",
+ "SSL_SECURE_RENEG",
"SSL_COMPRESS_METHOD",
"SSL_CIPHER",
"SSL_CIPHER_EXPORT",
}
}
+
+#ifdef SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support
+ apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-secure-reneg",
+ SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) ? "1" : "0");
+#endif
+
return DECLINED;
}
TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name));
}
#endif
+ else if (ssl != NULL && strcEQ(var, "SECURE_RENEG")) {
+ int flag = 0;
+#ifdef SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support
+ flag = SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl);
+#endif
+ result = apr_pstrdup(p, flag ? "true" : "false");
+ }
+
return result;
}
int vhost_id_len;
int session_cache_timeout;
BOOL cipher_server_pref;
+ BOOL insecure_reneg;
modssl_ctx_t *server;
modssl_ctx_t *proxy;
ssl_enabled_t proxy_ssl_check_peer_expire;
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLUserName(cmd_parms *, void *, const char *);
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLRenegBufferSize(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dcfg, const char *arg);
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLStrictSNIVHostCheck(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dcfg, int flag);
+const char *ssl_cmd_SSLInsecureRenegotiation(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dcfg, int flag);
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLProxyEngine(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dcfg, int flag);
const char *ssl_cmd_SSLProxyProtocol(cmd_parms *, void *, const char *);