commit
6f41c34d69eb005e7848716bbcafc979b35037d5 upstream.
The machine check idtentry uses an indirect branch directly from the low
level code. This evades the speculation protection.
Replace it by a direct call into C code and issue the indirect call there
so the compiler can apply the proper speculation protection.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by:Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Niced-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801181626290.1847@nanos
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Don't use dotraplinkage
- Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
dotraplinkage void do_iret_error(struct pt_regs *, long);
#endif
+void do_mce(struct pt_regs *, long);
static inline int get_si_code(unsigned long condition)
{
void (*machine_check_vector)(struct pt_regs *, long error_code) =
unexpected_machine_check;
+void do_mce(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+ machine_check_vector(regs, error_code);
+}
+
/*
* Called for each booted CPU to set up machine checks.
* Must be called with preempt off:
errorentry async_page_fault do_async_page_fault
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
-paranoidzeroentry machine_check *machine_check_vector(%rip)
+paranoidzeroentry machine_check do_mce
#endif
/*