The guest maps the PF response in shared VRAM (struct ras_cmd_ctx in the
command buffer). After amdgpu_virt_send_remote_ras_cmd() returns, the code
validated rcmd->output_size against the caller buffer, then copied
rcmd->output_buff_raw using rcmd->output_size again. A malicious PF could
change output_size between those reads so the memcpy length exceeds the
caller’s output_size and overflows guest stack or heap buffers.
Snapshot output_size with READ_ONCE() once, assign cmd->output_size from
that value, and use the same snapshot for the bounds check and memcpy.
Also read cmd_res once with READ_ONCE() so the error branch and
cmd->cmd_res assignment do not observe different values from shared memory.
Signed-off-by: Chenglei Xie <Chenglei.Xie@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: YiPeng Chai <YiPeng.Chai@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
ret = amdgpu_virt_send_remote_ras_cmd(ras_core->dev,
shared_mem.gpa, mem_len);
if (!ret) {
- if (rcmd->cmd_res) {
- ret = rcmd->cmd_res;
+ uint32_t cmd_res = READ_ONCE(rcmd->cmd_res);
+ uint32_t osz;
+
+ if (cmd_res) {
+ ret = cmd_res;
goto out;
}
- cmd->cmd_res = rcmd->cmd_res;
- cmd->output_size = rcmd->output_size;
- if (rcmd->output_size && (rcmd->output_size <= output_size) && output_data)
- memcpy(output_data, rcmd->output_buff_raw, rcmd->output_size);
+ osz = READ_ONCE(rcmd->output_size);
+ cmd->cmd_res = cmd_res;
+ cmd->output_size = osz;
+ if (osz && osz <= output_size && output_data)
+ memcpy(output_data, rcmd->output_buff_raw, osz);
}
out: