upstream: sshd side of hostbound public key auth

This is identical to the standard "publickey" method, but it also includes
the initial server hostkey in the message signed by the client.

feedback / ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ea01bb7238a560c1bfb426fda0c10a8aac07862

diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index ed3e74c3f9552b9f9b0bfe7953936ecb973fcc38..9c2298fc887dde86e154d761ddd9462dfce1d341 100644 (file)
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.111 2021/12/19 22:12:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.112 2021/12/19 22:12:30 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
+#include "kex.h"
 #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
 #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
 #include "sk-api.h"
@@ -91,19 +92,34 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
        struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
        struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-       struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+       struct sshkey *key = NULL, *hostkey = NULL;
        char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
        u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig;
        size_t blen, slen;
-       int r, pktype;
+       int hostbound, r, pktype;
        int req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, authenticated = 0;
        struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
        struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
 
+       hostbound = strcmp(method, "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com") == 0;
+
        if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
-               fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+               fatal_fr(r, "parse %s packet", method);
+
+       /* hostbound auth includes the hostkey offered at initial KEX */
+       if (hostbound) {
+               if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &b)) != 0 ||
+                   (r = sshkey_fromb(b, &hostkey)) != 0)
+                       fatal_fr(r, "parse %s hostkey", method);
+               if (ssh->kex->initial_hostkey == NULL)
+                       fatal_f("internal error: initial hostkey not recorded");
+               if (!sshkey_equal(hostkey, ssh->kex->initial_hostkey))
+                       fatal_f("%s packet contained wrong host key", method);
+               sshbuf_free(b);
+               b = NULL;
+       }
 
        if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2) {
                char *keystring;
@@ -166,7 +182,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
                ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
 
        if (have_sig) {
-               debug3_f("have %s signature for %s%s%s", pkalg, key_s,
+               debug3_f("%s have %s signature for %s%s%s",
+                   method, pkalg, key_s,
                    ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
                if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
@@ -196,7 +213,10 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
                    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-                       fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct packet");
+                       fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct %s packet", method);
+               if (hostbound &&
+                   (r = sshkey_puts(ssh->kex->initial_hostkey, b)) != 0)
+                       fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct %s packet", method);
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
                sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
 #endif
@@ -246,7 +266,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
                }
                auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
        } else {
-               debug_f("test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s", pkalg, key_s,
+               debug_f("%s test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s", method, pkalg, key_s,
                    ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
 
                if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
@@ -285,6 +305,7 @@ done:
        sshbuf_free(b);
        sshauthopt_free(authopts);
        sshkey_free(key);
+       sshkey_free(hostkey);
        free(userstyle);
        free(pkalg);
        free(pkblob);
@@ -1067,7 +1088,7 @@ user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
 
 Authmethod method_pubkey = {
        "publickey",
-       NULL,
+       "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com",
        userauth_pubkey,
        &options.pubkey_authentication
 };

diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 74c803e15ad3b9f275957130a78f0181e6ed9c17..a6429852ef462a7a0c51056beb18e80f77a7c293 100644 (file)
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.228 2021/08/11 05:20:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.229 2021/12/19 22:12:30 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -1246,11 +1246,12 @@ static int
 monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
        struct sshbuf *b;
+       struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
        const u_char *p;
        char *userstyle, *cp;
        size_t len;
        u_char type;
-       int r, fail = 0;
+       int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
 
        if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
@@ -1291,19 +1292,34 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
        if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
-       if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
-               fail++;
+       if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0) {
+               if (strcmp("publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com", cp) == 0)
+                       hostbound = 1;
+               else
+                       fail++;
+       }
        free(cp);
        if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
        if (type == 0)
                fail++;
        if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
-           (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0)   /* pkblob */
+           (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkblob */
+           (hostbound && (r = sshkey_froms(b, &hostkey)) != 0))
                fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
        if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
                fail++;
        sshbuf_free(b);
+       if (hostkey != NULL) {
+               /*
+                * Ensure this is actually one of our hostkeys; unfortunately
+                * can't check ssh->kex->initial_hostkey directly at this point
+                * as packet state has not yet been exported to monitor.
+                */
+               if (get_hostkey_index(hostkey, 1, ssh) == -1)
+                       fatal_f("hostbound hostkey does not match");
+               sshkey_free(hostkey);
+       }
        return (fail == 0);
 }