Our crypto API already provides a function performing a validity check
on the specified ciphername. The OpenSSL counterpart also checks for the
cipher being FIPS-enabled.
This API is cipher_valid(). Extend it so that it can provide a reason
whenever the cipher is not valid and use it in crypto.c.
This way we move any OpenSSL specific bit to its own
backend and directly use the new cipher_valid_reason() API in the
generic code.
This patch fixes compilations with mbedTLS when some OpenSSL is also
installed. The issue was introduced with:
544330fe ("crypto: Fix OPENSSL_FIPS enabled builds")
Cc: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Message-Id: <
20220203193655.28791-2-a@unstable.cc>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg23714.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
#include "error.h"
#include "integer.h"
#include "platform.h"
-#include "openssl_compat.h"
#include "memdbg.h"
{
printf(", TLS client/server mode only");
}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- evp_cipher_type *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(NULL, ciphername, NULL);
- if (FIPS_mode() && cipher
- && !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS))
+ const char *reason;
+ if (!cipher_valid_reason(ciphername, &reason))
{
- printf(", disabled by FIPS mode");
+ printf(", %s", reason);
}
- EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
-#endif
printf(")\n");
}
*/
#define MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH 64
+/**
+ * Returns if the cipher is valid, based on the given cipher name and provides a
+ * reason if invalid.
+ *
+ * @param ciphername Name of the cipher to check for validity (e.g.
+ * \c AES-128-CBC). Will be translated to the library name
+ * from the openvpn config name if needed.
+ * @param reason Pointer where a static string indicating the reason
+ * for rejecting the cipher should be stored. It is set to
+ * NULL if the cipher is valid.
+ *
+ * @return if the cipher is valid
+ */
+bool cipher_valid_reason(const char *ciphername, const char **reason);
+
/**
* Returns if the cipher is valid, based on the given cipher name.
*
*
* @return if the cipher is valid
*/
-bool cipher_valid(const char *ciphername);
+static inline bool cipher_valid(const char *ciphername)
+{
+ const char *reason;
+ return cipher_valid_reason(ciphername, &reason);
+}
/**
* Checks if the cipher is defined and is not the null (none) cipher
}
bool
-cipher_valid(const char *ciphername)
+cipher_valid_reason(const char *ciphername, const char **reason)
{
+ ASSERT(reason);
+
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = cipher_get(ciphername);
if (NULL == cipher)
{
msg(D_LOW, "Cipher algorithm '%s' not found", ciphername);
- return NULL;
+ *reason = "disabled because unknown";
+ return false;
}
if (cipher->key_bitlen/8 > MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH)
msg(D_LOW, "Cipher algorithm '%s' uses a default key size (%d bytes) "
"which is larger than " PACKAGE_NAME "'s current maximum key size "
"(%d bytes)", ciphername, cipher->key_bitlen/8, MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH);
- return NULL;
+ *reason = "disabled due to key size too large";
+ return false;
}
- return cipher != NULL;
+ *reason = NULL;
+ return true;
}
const char *
}
bool
-cipher_valid(const char *ciphername)
+cipher_valid_reason(const char *ciphername, const char **reason)
{
bool ret = false;
evp_cipher_type *cipher = cipher_get(ciphername);
if (!cipher)
{
crypto_msg(D_LOW, "Cipher algorithm '%s' not found", ciphername);
+ *reason = "disabled because unknown";
goto out;
}
{
msg(D_LOW, "Cipher algorithm '%s' is known by OpenSSL library but "
"currently disabled by running in FIPS mode.", ciphername);
+ *reason = "disabled by FIPS mode";
goto out;
}
#endif
"which is larger than " PACKAGE_NAME "'s current maximum key size "
"(%d bytes)", ciphername, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher),
MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ *reason = "disabled due to key size too large";
goto out;
}
ret = true;
+ *reason = NULL;
out:
EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
return ret;