Always clear username/password from memory on error

This issue was found by Quarkslab during the OSTIF-founded security audit
(issue 5.4), we are with their analysis:

"There’s a special case where the client username and password are not
erased when the server is launched without an external script or
authentication plugin. While being invalid, this configuration does not
raise any error. If the client transmits its credentials and the session
is not established (for instance if the certificates chain has not been
verified), these credentials are not erased from memory by the server.

The likelihood of an occurrence of this issue in real life is
exceptionally low since an attacker needs elevated privileges on the
server to exploit this kind of information leak. The severity of this
issue is rated as very low."

Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Message-Id: <1494354764-19354-1-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=1494354764-19354-1-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
index b1f0f6b9e8780eb1aac8ca37836243016cf0e404..5f290fefdd4fade9ea8bc491f2d463d30e2218d0 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
@@ -2492,7 +2492,7 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessio
 
     struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
     char *options;
-    struct user_pass *up;
+    struct user_pass *up = NULL;
 
     /* allocate temporary objects */
     ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC(options, char, TLS_OPTIONS_LEN, &gc);
@@ -2654,6 +2654,10 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessio
 
 error:
     secure_memzero(ks->key_src, sizeof(*ks->key_src));
+    if (up)
+    {
+        secure_memzero(up, sizeof(*up));
+    }
     buf_clear(buf);
     gc_free(&gc);
     return false;