x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug

Add a function which defines which vulnerabilities should be mitigated
based on the selected attack vector controls.  The selections here are
based on the individual characteristics of each vulnerability.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-5-david.kaplan@amd.com

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 88769c46effba9dbd6ba21aac9481191ef846572..b083e7eabc564e9e9d337e9e39eb605044f4167c 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -332,6 +332,62 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)    "MDS: " fmt
 
+/*
+ * Returns true if vulnerability should be mitigated based on the
+ * selected attack vector controls.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
+ */
+static bool __init should_mitigate_vuln(unsigned int bug)
+{
+       switch (bug) {
+       /*
+        * The only runtime-selected spectre_v1 mitigations in the kernel are
+        * related to SWAPGS protection on kernel entry.  Therefore, protection
+        * is only required for the user->kernel attack vector.
+        */
+       case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
+               return cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL);
+
+       case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
+       case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
+       case X86_BUG_SRSO:
+       case X86_BUG_L1TF:
+       case X86_BUG_ITS:
+               return cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL) ||
+                      cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST);
+
+       case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER:
+               return cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER) ||
+                      cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST);
+
+       /*
+        * All the vulnerabilities below allow potentially leaking data
+        * across address spaces.  Therefore, mitigation is required for
+        * any of these 4 attack vectors.
+        */
+       case X86_BUG_MDS:
+       case X86_BUG_TAA:
+       case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+       case X86_BUG_RFDS:
+       case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
+               return cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL) ||
+                      cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST) ||
+                      cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER) ||
+                      cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST);
+
+       case X86_BUG_GDS:
+               return cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL) ||
+                      cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST) ||
+                      cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER) ||
+                      cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST) ||
+                      (smt_mitigations != SMT_MITIGATIONS_OFF);
+       default:
+               WARN(1, "Unknown bug %x\n", bug);
+               return false;
+       }
+}
+
 /* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
 static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
        IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;