tls: fix skb_to_sgvec returning unhandled error.

[ Upstream commit 52ee6ef36ee10dd493cf2067311e56ca8015eb8d ]

The current code does not inspect the return value of skb_to_sgvec. This
can cause a nullptr kernel panic when the malformed sgvec is passed into
the crypto request.

Checking the return value of skb_to_sgvec and skipping decryption if it
is negative fixes this problem.

Fixes: c46234ebb4d1 ("tls: RX path for ktls")
Acked-by: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Doron Roberts-Kedes <doronrk@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 60708a4ebed46ab1f78d268fcc8d7f2134bedf75..237e227c97076c3d41e07961aaa19a83184d343c 100644 (file)
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -705,6 +705,10 @@ static int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
        nsg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1],
                           rxm->offset + tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size,
                           rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size);
+       if (nsg < 0) {
+               ret = nsg;
+               goto out;
+       }
 
        tls_make_aad(ctx->rx_aad_ciphertext,
                     rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size,
@@ -716,6 +720,7 @@ static int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
                                rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size,
                                skb, sk->sk_allocation);
 
+out:
        if (sgin != &sgin_arr[0])
                kfree(sgin);