This is in response to a reported Debian bug, where the connection counter overflows.
<http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=576827>
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <dazo@users.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
&& ks->n_packets >= session->opt->renegotiate_packets)
|| (packet_id_close_to_wrapping (&ks->packet_id.send))))
{
- msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS: soft reset sec=%d bytes=%d/%d pkts=%d/%d",
+ msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW,
+ "TLS: soft reset sec=%d bytes=" counter_format "/%d pkts=" counter_format "/%d",
(int)(ks->established + session->opt->renegotiate_seconds - now),
ks->n_bytes, session->opt->renegotiate_bytes,
ks->n_packets, session->opt->renegotiate_packets);
struct buffer_list *paybuf;
- int n_bytes; /* how many bytes sent/recvd since last key exchange */
- int n_packets; /* how many packets sent/recvd since last key exchange */
+ counter_type n_bytes; /* how many bytes sent/recvd since last key exchange */
+ counter_type n_packets; /* how many packets sent/recvd since last key exchange */
/*
* If bad username/password, TLS connection will come up but 'authenticated' will be false.