mm: add kvfree_sensitive() for freeing sensitive data objects

[ Upstream commit d4eaa2837851db2bfed572898bfc17f9a9f9151e ]

For kvmalloc'ed data object that contains sensitive information like
cryptographic keys, we need to make sure that the buffer is always cleared
before freeing it.  Using memset() alone for buffer clearing may not
provide certainty as the compiler may compile it away.  To be sure, the
special memzero_explicit() has to be used.

This patch introduces a new kvfree_sensitive() for freeing those sensitive
data objects allocated by kvmalloc().  The relevant places where
kvfree_sensitive() can be used are modified to use it.

Fixes: 4f0882491a14 ("KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407200318.11711-1-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 96deeecd9179705e8739453f3cbe8822cd25b702..9b9f48489576db33c68260fe344578893851c7da 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -669,6 +669,7 @@ static inline void *kvcalloc(size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 }
 
 extern void kvfree(const void *addr);
+extern void kvfree_sensitive(const void *addr, size_t len);
 
 /*
  * Mapcount of compound page as a whole, does not include mapped sub-pages.

diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index 988d11e6c17cbc1cb8b0004efafc63a9cd10b2c7..dc1c877d54816dcc8e0c65d4a03915a2a8894271 100644 (file)
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -604,6 +604,24 @@ void kvfree(const void *addr)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvfree);
 
+/**
+ * kvfree_sensitive - Free a data object containing sensitive information.
+ * @addr: address of the data object to be freed.
+ * @len: length of the data object.
+ *
+ * Use the special memzero_explicit() function to clear the content of a
+ * kvmalloc'ed object containing sensitive data to make sure that the
+ * compiler won't optimize out the data clearing.
+ */
+void kvfree_sensitive(const void *addr, size_t len)
+{
+       if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(addr))) {
+               memzero_explicit((void *)addr, len);
+               kvfree(addr);
+       }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvfree_sensitive);
+
 static inline void *__page_rmapping(struct page *page)
 {
        unsigned long mapping;

diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 6d0ca48ae9a50cfb72c1de1df6182141d4da4ea7..153d35c20d3d43c06e88207ebfe5fa5e65da3ffc 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -350,15 +350,4 @@ static inline void key_check(const struct key *key)
 #define key_check(key) do {} while(0)
 
 #endif
-
-/*
- * Helper function to clear and free a kvmalloc'ed memory object.
- */
-static inline void __kvzfree(const void *addr, size_t len)
-{
-       if (addr) {
-               memset((void *)addr, 0, len);
-               kvfree(addr);
-       }
-}
 #endif /* _INTERNAL_H */

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 5e01192e222a0b45a551f1062babcf644353cdb5..edde63a63007f62754bf69321723ad7c0f89e7b6 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -142,10 +142,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
 
        key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
  error3:
-       if (payload) {
-               memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
-               kvfree(payload);
-       }
+       kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
  error2:
        kfree(description);
  error:
@@ -360,7 +357,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
 
        key_ref_put(key_ref);
 error2:
-       __kvzfree(payload, plen);
+       kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
 error:
        return ret;
 }
@@ -914,7 +911,7 @@ can_read_key:
                 */
                if (ret > key_data_len) {
                        if (unlikely(key_data))
-                               __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len);
+                               kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len);
                        key_data_len = ret;
                        continue;       /* Allocate buffer */
                }
@@ -923,7 +920,7 @@ can_read_key:
                        ret = -EFAULT;
                break;
        }
-       __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len);
+       kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len);
 
 key_put_out:
        key_put(key);
@@ -1225,10 +1222,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
                keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
 
 error2:
-       if (payload) {
-               memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
-               kvfree(payload);
-       }
+       kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
 error:
        return ret;
 }