sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes

commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb upstream.

The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by
unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to
a buffer overflow.  Because the provided "name" argument isn't
guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible
to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array.
Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via
subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege
escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels().  In
addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

diff --git a/sound/oss/soundcard.c b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
index 7d89c081a0866bfe9b7ee22696ee286007cb0a2a..3b4bd9fe70f4345e138729e7d2df4901f0adebdc 100644 (file)
--- a/sound/oss/soundcard.c
+++ b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
        int             i, n;
 
        for (i = 0; i < num_mixer_volumes; i++) {
-               if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) {
+               if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) {
                        if (present)
                                mixer_vols[i].num = i;
                        return mixer_vols[i].levels;
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
        }
        n = num_mixer_volumes++;
 
-       strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name);
+       strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32);
 
        if (present)
                mixer_vols[n].num = n;