--- /dev/null
+From 29aedf7c685dd6ad45a20870cef9bb6771b2c0a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 17:22:36 +0000
+Subject: afs: Hide silly-rename files from userspace
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 57e9d49c54528c49b8bffe6d99d782ea051ea534 ]
+
+There appears to be a race between silly-rename files being created/removed
+and various userspace tools iterating over the contents of a directory,
+leading to such errors as:
+
+ find: './kernel/.tmp_cpio_dir/include/dt-bindings/reset/.__afs2080': No such file or directory
+ tar: ./include/linux/greybus/.__afs3C95: File removed before we read it
+
+when building a kernel.
+
+Fix afs_readdir() so that it doesn't return .__afsXXXX silly-rename files
+to userspace. This doesn't stop them being looked up directly by name as
+we need to be able to look them up from within the kernel as part of the
+silly-rename algorithm.
+
+Fixes: 79ddbfa500b3 ("afs: Implement sillyrename for unlink and rename")
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ fs/afs/dir.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/fs/afs/dir.c b/fs/afs/dir.c
+index 43f5b972fcea..8bed9df09230 100644
+--- a/fs/afs/dir.c
++++ b/fs/afs/dir.c
+@@ -421,6 +421,14 @@ static int afs_dir_iterate_block(struct afs_vnode *dvnode,
+ continue;
+ }
+
++ /* Don't expose silly rename entries to userspace. */
++ if (nlen > 6 &&
++ dire->u.name[0] == '.' &&
++ ctx->actor != afs_lookup_filldir &&
++ ctx->actor != afs_lookup_one_filldir &&
++ memcmp(dire->u.name, ".__afs", 6) == 0)
++ continue;
++
+ /* found the next entry */
+ if (!dir_emit(ctx, dire->u.name, nlen,
+ ntohl(dire->u.vnode),
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 24a2c482d30e6f39358f59fe19b58883c228b50c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 01:24:42 +0800
+Subject: fjes: fix memleaks in fjes_hw_setup
+
+From: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn>
+
+[ Upstream commit f6cc4b6a3ae53df425771000e9c9540cce9b7bb1 ]
+
+In fjes_hw_setup, it allocates several memory and delay the deallocation
+to the fjes_hw_exit in fjes_probe through the following call chain:
+
+fjes_probe
+ |-> fjes_hw_init
+ |-> fjes_hw_setup
+ |-> fjes_hw_exit
+
+However, when fjes_hw_setup fails, fjes_hw_exit won't be called and thus
+all the resources allocated in fjes_hw_setup will be leaked. In this
+patch, we free those resources in fjes_hw_setup and prevents such leaks.
+
+Fixes: 2fcbca687702 ("fjes: platform_driver's .probe and .remove routine")
+Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240122172445.3841883-1-alexious@zju.edu.cn
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/fjes/fjes_hw.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/fjes/fjes_hw.c b/drivers/net/fjes/fjes_hw.c
+index 8a4fbfacad7e..a4d3c7fa9ad3 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/fjes/fjes_hw.c
++++ b/drivers/net/fjes/fjes_hw.c
+@@ -220,21 +220,25 @@ static int fjes_hw_setup(struct fjes_hw *hw)
+
+ mem_size = FJES_DEV_REQ_BUF_SIZE(hw->max_epid);
+ hw->hw_info.req_buf = kzalloc(mem_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+- if (!(hw->hw_info.req_buf))
+- return -ENOMEM;
++ if (!(hw->hw_info.req_buf)) {
++ result = -ENOMEM;
++ goto free_ep_info;
++ }
+
+ hw->hw_info.req_buf_size = mem_size;
+
+ mem_size = FJES_DEV_RES_BUF_SIZE(hw->max_epid);
+ hw->hw_info.res_buf = kzalloc(mem_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+- if (!(hw->hw_info.res_buf))
+- return -ENOMEM;
++ if (!(hw->hw_info.res_buf)) {
++ result = -ENOMEM;
++ goto free_req_buf;
++ }
+
+ hw->hw_info.res_buf_size = mem_size;
+
+ result = fjes_hw_alloc_shared_status_region(hw);
+ if (result)
+- return result;
++ goto free_res_buf;
+
+ hw->hw_info.buffer_share_bit = 0;
+ hw->hw_info.buffer_unshare_reserve_bit = 0;
+@@ -245,11 +249,11 @@ static int fjes_hw_setup(struct fjes_hw *hw)
+
+ result = fjes_hw_alloc_epbuf(&buf_pair->tx);
+ if (result)
+- return result;
++ goto free_epbuf;
+
+ result = fjes_hw_alloc_epbuf(&buf_pair->rx);
+ if (result)
+- return result;
++ goto free_epbuf;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&hw->rx_status_lock, flags);
+ fjes_hw_setup_epbuf(&buf_pair->tx, mac,
+@@ -272,6 +276,25 @@ static int fjes_hw_setup(struct fjes_hw *hw)
+ fjes_hw_init_command_registers(hw, ¶m);
+
+ return 0;
++
++free_epbuf:
++ for (epidx = 0; epidx < hw->max_epid ; epidx++) {
++ if (epidx == hw->my_epid)
++ continue;
++ fjes_hw_free_epbuf(&hw->ep_shm_info[epidx].tx);
++ fjes_hw_free_epbuf(&hw->ep_shm_info[epidx].rx);
++ }
++ fjes_hw_free_shared_status_region(hw);
++free_res_buf:
++ kfree(hw->hw_info.res_buf);
++ hw->hw_info.res_buf = NULL;
++free_req_buf:
++ kfree(hw->hw_info.req_buf);
++ hw->hw_info.req_buf = NULL;
++free_ep_info:
++ kfree(hw->ep_shm_info);
++ hw->ep_shm_info = NULL;
++ return result;
+ }
+
+ static void fjes_hw_cleanup(struct fjes_hw *hw)
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From f7c2a1f40acc30c85e1bb76a3a47c31cc12f8386 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 17:55:15 -0800
+Subject: llc: Drop support for ETH_P_TR_802_2.
+
+From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit e3f9bed9bee261e3347131764e42aeedf1ffea61 ]
+
+syzbot reported an uninit-value bug below. [0]
+
+llc supports ETH_P_802_2 (0x0004) and used to support ETH_P_TR_802_2
+(0x0011), and syzbot abused the latter to trigger the bug.
+
+ write$tun(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={@val={0x0, 0x11}, @val, @mpls={[], @llc={@snap={0xaa, 0x1, ')', "90e5dd"}}}}, 0x16)
+
+llc_conn_handler() initialises local variables {saddr,daddr}.mac
+based on skb in llc_pdu_decode_sa()/llc_pdu_decode_da() and passes
+them to __llc_lookup().
+
+However, the initialisation is done only when skb->protocol is
+htons(ETH_P_802_2), otherwise, __llc_lookup_established() and
+__llc_lookup_listener() will read garbage.
+
+The missing initialisation existed prior to commit 211ed865108e
+("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring").
+
+It removed the part to kick out the token ring stuff but forgot to
+close the door allowing ETH_P_TR_802_2 packets to sneak into llc_rcv().
+
+Let's remove llc_tr_packet_type and complete the deprecation.
+
+[0]:
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90
+ __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90
+ __llc_lookup net/llc/llc_conn.c:611 [inline]
+ llc_conn_handler+0x4bd/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:791
+ llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206
+ __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5527 [inline]
+ __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5641
+ netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5727 [inline]
+ netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5786
+ tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555
+ tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
+ tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
+ call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline]
+ new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
+ vfs_write+0x8ef/0x1490 fs/read_write.c:584
+ ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637
+ __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline]
+ __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
+
+Local variable daddr created at:
+ llc_conn_handler+0x53/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:783
+ llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206
+
+CPU: 1 PID: 5004 Comm: syz-executor994 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-14500-g1c41041124bd #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023
+
+Fixes: 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring")
+Reported-by: syzbot+b5ad66046b913bc04c6f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b5ad66046b913bc04c6f
+Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119015515.61898-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ include/net/llc_pdu.h | 6 ++----
+ net/llc/llc_core.c | 7 -------
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/net/llc_pdu.h b/include/net/llc_pdu.h
+index 49aa79c7b278..581cd37aa98b 100644
+--- a/include/net/llc_pdu.h
++++ b/include/net/llc_pdu.h
+@@ -262,8 +262,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_header_init(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type,
+ */
+ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa)
+ {
+- if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2))
+- memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN);
++ memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN);
+ }
+
+ /**
+@@ -275,8 +274,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa)
+ */
+ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_da(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *da)
+ {
+- if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2))
+- memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN);
++ memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN);
+ }
+
+ /**
+diff --git a/net/llc/llc_core.c b/net/llc/llc_core.c
+index 64d4bef04e73..4900a27b5176 100644
+--- a/net/llc/llc_core.c
++++ b/net/llc/llc_core.c
+@@ -135,22 +135,15 @@ static struct packet_type llc_packet_type __read_mostly = {
+ .func = llc_rcv,
+ };
+
+-static struct packet_type llc_tr_packet_type __read_mostly = {
+- .type = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_TR_802_2),
+- .func = llc_rcv,
+-};
+-
+ static int __init llc_init(void)
+ {
+ dev_add_pack(&llc_packet_type);
+- dev_add_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ static void __exit llc_exit(void)
+ {
+ dev_remove_pack(&llc_packet_type);
+- dev_remove_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type);
+ }
+
+ module_init(llc_init);
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From f6c83195b1e612882b2b11b4109f87271265db88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 18:36:25 +0000
+Subject: llc: make llc_ui_sendmsg() more robust against bonding changes
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit dad555c816a50c6a6a8a86be1f9177673918c647 ]
+
+syzbot was able to trick llc_ui_sendmsg(), allocating an skb with no
+headroom, but subsequently trying to push 14 bytes of Ethernet header [1]
+
+Like some others, llc_ui_sendmsg() releases the socket lock before
+calling sock_alloc_send_skb().
+Then it acquires it again, but does not redo all the sanity checks
+that were performed.
+
+This fix:
+
+- Uses LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to reserve space.
+- Check all conditions again after socket lock is held again.
+- Do not account Ethernet header for mtu limitation.
+
+[1]
+
+skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800088baa334 len:1514 put:14 head:ffff0000c9c37000 data:ffff0000c9c36ff2 tail:0x5dc end:0x6c0 dev:bond0
+
+ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:193 !
+Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
+Modules linked in:
+CPU: 0 PID: 6875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00101-g0802e17d9aca-dirty #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
+pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
+ pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]
+ pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203
+ lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]
+ lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203
+sp : ffff800096f97000
+x29: ffff800096f97010 x28: ffff80008cc8d668 x27: dfff800000000000
+x26: ffff0000cb970c90 x25: 00000000000005dc x24: ffff0000c9c36ff2
+x23: ffff0000c9c37000 x22: 00000000000005ea x21: 00000000000006c0
+x20: 000000000000000e x19: ffff800088baa334 x18: 1fffe000368261ce
+x17: ffff80008e4ed000 x16: ffff80008a8310f8 x15: 0000000000000001
+x14: 1ffff00012df2d58 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
+x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : e28a51f1087e8400
+x8 : e28a51f1087e8400 x7 : ffff80008028f8d0 x6 : 0000000000000000
+x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800082b78714
+x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089
+Call trace:
+ skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]
+ skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203
+ skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2451
+ eth_header+0x44/0x1f8 net/ethernet/eth.c:83
+ dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3188 [inline]
+ llc_mac_hdr_init+0x110/0x17c net/llc/llc_output.c:33
+ llc_sap_action_send_xid_c+0x170/0x344 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:85
+ llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline]
+ llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline]
+ llc_sap_state_process+0x1ec/0x774 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209
+ llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt+0x12c/0x1c0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:270
+ llc_ui_sendmsg+0x7bc/0xb1c net/llc/af_llc.c:997
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
+ __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg+0x194/0x274 net/socket.c:767
+ splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:881
+ do_splice_from fs/splice.c:933 [inline]
+ direct_splice_actor+0xe4/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1142
+ splice_direct_to_actor+0x2a0/0x7e4 fs/splice.c:1088
+ do_splice_direct+0x20c/0x348 fs/splice.c:1194
+ do_sendfile+0x4bc/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:1254
+ __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1322 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1308 [inline]
+ __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1308
+ __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
+ invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
+ el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
+ do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
+ el0_svc+0x54/0x158 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678
+ el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696
+ el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:595
+Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94792f6a (d4210000)
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2a7024e9502df538e8ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118183625.4007013-1-edumazet@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/llc/af_llc.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c
+index 3b1ea89a340e..4ef5896abd06 100644
+--- a/net/llc/af_llc.c
++++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c
+@@ -925,14 +925,15 @@ static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
+ */
+ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
+ {
++ DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name);
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
+- DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name);
+ int flags = msg->msg_flags;
+ int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
++ int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen, hh_len;
+ struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
++ struct net_device *dev;
+ size_t size = 0;
+- int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen;
+
+ dprintk("%s: sending from %02X to %02X\n", __func__,
+ llc->laddr.lsap, llc->daddr.lsap);
+@@ -952,22 +953,29 @@ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+- hdrlen = llc->dev->hard_header_len + llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr);
++ dev = llc->dev;
++ hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
++ hdrlen = llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr);
+ size = hdrlen + len;
+- if (size > llc->dev->mtu)
+- size = llc->dev->mtu;
++ size = min_t(size_t, size, READ_ONCE(dev->mtu));
+ copied = size - hdrlen;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (copied < 0)
+ goto out;
+ release_sock(sk);
+- skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size, noblock, &rc);
++ skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, hh_len + size, noblock, &rc);
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ if (!skb)
+ goto out;
+- skb->dev = llc->dev;
++ if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) ||
++ llc->dev != dev ||
++ hdrlen != llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr) ||
++ hh_len != LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) ||
++ size > READ_ONCE(dev->mtu))
++ goto out;
++ skb->dev = dev;
+ skb->protocol = llc_proto_type(addr->sllc_arphrd);
+- skb_reserve(skb, hdrlen);
++ skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + hdrlen);
+ rc = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, copied), msg, copied);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 87a3ea065eb40f16c7bb8c8927b3cce55d8680ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 10:51:41 -0600
+Subject: net: fec: fix the unhandled context fault from smmu
+
+From: Shenwei Wang <shenwei.wang@nxp.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 5e344807735023cd3a67c37a1852b849caa42620 ]
+
+When repeatedly changing the interface link speed using the command below:
+
+ethtool -s eth0 speed 100 duplex full
+ethtool -s eth0 speed 1000 duplex full
+
+The following errors may sometimes be reported by the ARM SMMU driver:
+
+[ 5395.035364] fec 5b040000.ethernet eth0: Link is Down
+[ 5395.039255] arm-smmu 51400000.iommu: Unhandled context fault:
+fsr=0x402, iova=0x00000000, fsynr=0x100001, cbfrsynra=0x852, cb=2
+[ 5398.108460] fec 5b040000.ethernet eth0: Link is Up - 100Mbps/Full -
+flow control off
+
+It is identified that the FEC driver does not properly stop the TX queue
+during the link speed transitions, and this results in the invalid virtual
+I/O address translations from the SMMU and causes the context faults.
+
+Fixes: dbc64a8ea231 ("net: fec: move calls to quiesce/resume packet processing out of fec_restart()")
+Signed-off-by: Shenwei Wang <shenwei.wang@nxp.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123165141.2008104-1-shenwei.wang@nxp.com
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
+index f67f104049db..b55d6ed9aa13 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
+@@ -1795,6 +1795,7 @@ static void fec_enet_adjust_link(struct net_device *ndev)
+
+ /* if any of the above changed restart the FEC */
+ if (status_change) {
++ netif_stop_queue(ndev);
+ napi_disable(&fep->napi);
+ netif_tx_lock_bh(ndev);
+ fec_restart(ndev);
+@@ -1804,6 +1805,7 @@ static void fec_enet_adjust_link(struct net_device *ndev)
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (fep->link) {
++ netif_stop_queue(ndev);
+ napi_disable(&fep->napi);
+ netif_tx_lock_bh(ndev);
+ fec_stop(ndev);
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 2190b0fab979b8dce743b054a989304d4518cac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:24:08 +0200
+Subject: net/mlx5: DR, Use the right GVMI number for drop action
+
+From: Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@nvidia.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 5665954293f13642f9c052ead83c1e9d8cff186f ]
+
+When FW provides ICM addresses for drop RX/TX, the provided capability
+is 64 bits that contain its GVMI as well as the ICM address itself.
+In case of TX DROP this GVMI is different from the GVMI that the
+domain is operating on.
+
+This patch fixes the action to use these GVMI IDs, as provided by FW.
+
+Fixes: 9db810ed2d37 ("net/mlx5: DR, Expose steering action functionality")
+Signed-off-by: Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@nvidia.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_action.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_action.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_action.c
+index b2dfa2b5366f..dccb4f6c14e7 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_action.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_action.c
+@@ -667,6 +667,7 @@ int mlx5dr_actions_build_ste_arr(struct mlx5dr_matcher *matcher,
+ switch (action_type) {
+ case DR_ACTION_TYP_DROP:
+ attr.final_icm_addr = nic_dmn->drop_icm_addr;
++ attr.hit_gvmi = nic_dmn->drop_icm_addr >> 48;
+ break;
+ case DR_ACTION_TYP_FT:
+ dest_action = action;
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From e34dc60f10f932622444f905120b6630a23595c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 22:22:35 +0300
+Subject: net/mlx5: Use kfree(ft->g) in arfs_create_groups()
+
+From: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 360000b26e37a75b3000bf0585b263809d96ffd3 ]
+
+Use kfree() instead of kvfree() on ft->g in arfs_create_groups() because
+the memory is allocated with kcalloc().
+
+Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
+Stable-dep-of: 3c6d5189246f ("net/mlx5e: fix a double-free in arfs_create_groups")
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c
+index 2c75b2752f58..b75074d8d22b 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c
+@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int arfs_create_groups(struct mlx5e_flow_table *ft,
+ sizeof(*ft->g), GFP_KERNEL);
+ in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!in || !ft->g) {
+- kvfree(ft->g);
++ kfree(ft->g);
+ kvfree(in);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 92b8795078133e8e81ed56b1acb4c1091a9ebbd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:17:36 +0800
+Subject: net/mlx5e: fix a double-free in arfs_create_groups
+
+From: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn>
+
+[ Upstream commit 3c6d5189246f590e4e1f167991558bdb72a4738b ]
+
+When `in` allocated by kvzalloc fails, arfs_create_groups will free
+ft->g and return an error. However, arfs_create_table, the only caller of
+arfs_create_groups, will hold this error and call to
+mlx5e_destroy_flow_table, in which the ft->g will be freed again.
+
+Fixes: 1cabe6b0965e ("net/mlx5e: Create aRFS flow tables")
+Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c | 26 +++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c
+index b75074d8d22b..18c2abbe0b7e 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c
+@@ -227,11 +227,13 @@ static int arfs_create_groups(struct mlx5e_flow_table *ft,
+
+ ft->g = kcalloc(MLX5E_ARFS_NUM_GROUPS,
+ sizeof(*ft->g), GFP_KERNEL);
+- in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+- if (!in || !ft->g) {
+- kfree(ft->g);
+- kvfree(in);
++ if (!ft->g)
+ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!in) {
++ err = -ENOMEM;
++ goto err_free_g;
+ }
+
+ mc = MLX5_ADDR_OF(create_flow_group_in, in, match_criteria);
+@@ -251,7 +253,7 @@ static int arfs_create_groups(struct mlx5e_flow_table *ft,
+ break;
+ default:
+ err = -EINVAL;
+- goto out;
++ goto err_free_in;
+ }
+
+ switch (type) {
+@@ -273,7 +275,7 @@ static int arfs_create_groups(struct mlx5e_flow_table *ft,
+ break;
+ default:
+ err = -EINVAL;
+- goto out;
++ goto err_free_in;
+ }
+
+ MLX5_SET_CFG(in, match_criteria_enable, MLX5_MATCH_OUTER_HEADERS);
+@@ -282,7 +284,7 @@ static int arfs_create_groups(struct mlx5e_flow_table *ft,
+ MLX5_SET_CFG(in, end_flow_index, ix - 1);
+ ft->g[ft->num_groups] = mlx5_create_flow_group(ft->t, in);
+ if (IS_ERR(ft->g[ft->num_groups]))
+- goto err;
++ goto err_clean_group;
+ ft->num_groups++;
+
+ memset(in, 0, inlen);
+@@ -291,18 +293,20 @@ static int arfs_create_groups(struct mlx5e_flow_table *ft,
+ MLX5_SET_CFG(in, end_flow_index, ix - 1);
+ ft->g[ft->num_groups] = mlx5_create_flow_group(ft->t, in);
+ if (IS_ERR(ft->g[ft->num_groups]))
+- goto err;
++ goto err_clean_group;
+ ft->num_groups++;
+
+ kvfree(in);
+ return 0;
+
+-err:
++err_clean_group:
+ err = PTR_ERR(ft->g[ft->num_groups]);
+ ft->g[ft->num_groups] = NULL;
+-out:
++err_free_in:
+ kvfree(in);
+-
++err_free_g:
++ kfree(ft->g);
++ ft->g = NULL;
+ return err;
+ }
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 6c6619995abacac0bfba31983d9b6db3608ffb1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 17:48:39 -0800
+Subject: net/rds: Fix UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in rds_cmsg_recv
+
+From: Sharath Srinivasan <sharath.srinivasan@oracle.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 13e788deb7348cc88df34bed736c3b3b9927ea52 ]
+
+Syzcaller UBSAN crash occurs in rds_cmsg_recv(),
+which reads inc->i_rx_lat_trace[j + 1] with index 4 (3 + 1),
+but with array size of 4 (RDS_RX_MAX_TRACES).
+Here 'j' is assigned from rs->rs_rx_trace[i] and in-turn from
+trace.rx_trace_pos[i] in rds_recv_track_latency(),
+with both arrays sized 3 (RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX). So fix the
+off-by-one bounds check in rds_recv_track_latency() to prevent
+a potential crash in rds_cmsg_recv().
+
+Found by syzcaller:
+=================================================================
+UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/rds/recv.c:585:39
+index 4 is out of range for type 'u64 [4]'
+CPU: 1 PID: 8058 Comm: syz-executor228 Not tainted 6.6.0-gd2f51b3516da #1
+Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
+BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
+Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x136/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
+ ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline]
+ __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd5/0x130 lib/ubsan.c:348
+ rds_cmsg_recv+0x60d/0x700 net/rds/recv.c:585
+ rds_recvmsg+0x3fb/0x1610 net/rds/recv.c:716
+ sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
+ sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1066
+ __sys_recvfrom+0x1b6/0x2f0 net/socket.c:2246
+ __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2264 [inline]
+ __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2260
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
+==================================================================
+
+Fixes: 3289025aedc0 ("RDS: add receive message trace used by application")
+Reported-by: Chenyuan Yang <chenyuan0y@gmail.com>
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rdma/CALGdzuoVdq-wtQ4Az9iottBqC5cv9ZhcE5q8N7LfYFvkRsOVcw@mail.gmail.com/
+Signed-off-by: Sharath Srinivasan <sharath.srinivasan@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/rds/af_rds.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/rds/af_rds.c b/net/rds/af_rds.c
+index 1a5bf3fa4578..af22f47c8612 100644
+--- a/net/rds/af_rds.c
++++ b/net/rds/af_rds.c
+@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static int rds_recv_track_latency(struct rds_sock *rs, char __user *optval,
+
+ rs->rs_rx_traces = trace.rx_traces;
+ for (i = 0; i < rs->rs_rx_traces; i++) {
+- if (trace.rx_trace_pos[i] > RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX) {
++ if (trace.rx_trace_pos[i] >= RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX) {
+ rs->rs_rx_traces = 0;
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From ac1404e49da3e35b8da7a77a488b7ffca5642ecf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 12:32:10 +0800
+Subject: net/smc: fix illegal rmb_desc access in SMC-D connection dump
+
+From: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit dbc153fd3c142909e564bb256da087e13fbf239c ]
+
+A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced
+by following steps:
+
+- run nginx/wrk test:
+ smc_run nginx
+ smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL>
+
+- continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel:
+ watch -n 1 'smcss -D'
+
+ BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
+ CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0+ #55
+ RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ ? __die+0x24/0x70
+ ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150
+ ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140
+ ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
+ ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
+ ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430
+ ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170
+ smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]
+ smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]
+ netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320
+ __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300
+ smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]
+ ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]
+ sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140
+ ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110
+ sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
+ netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420
+ __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0
+ ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300
+ ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
+ ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160
+ ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100
+ ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110
+ ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0
+ __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80
+ do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
+
+It is possible that the connection is in process of being established
+when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a
+link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been
+initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to
+conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.
+
+Fixes: 4b1b7d3b30a6 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support")
+Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
+Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
+Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/smc/smc_diag.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/smc/smc_diag.c b/net/smc/smc_diag.c
+index da9ba6d1679b..3d8f551cec30 100644
+--- a/net/smc/smc_diag.c
++++ b/net/smc/smc_diag.c
+@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int __smc_diag_dump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ }
+ if (smc->conn.lgr && smc->conn.lgr->is_smcd &&
+ (req->diag_ext & (1 << (SMC_DIAG_DMBINFO - 1))) &&
+- !list_empty(&smc->conn.lgr->list)) {
++ !list_empty(&smc->conn.lgr->list) && smc->conn.rmb_desc) {
+ struct smc_connection *conn = &smc->conn;
+ struct smcd_diag_dmbinfo dinfo;
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 31d13217434c0fd801bdf8b34060780076fcf3ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 13:34:32 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: restrict anonymous set and map names to 16
+ bytes
+
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+
+[ Upstream commit b462579b2b86a8f5230543cadd3a4836be27baf7 ]
+
+nftables has two types of sets/maps, one where userspace defines the
+name, and anonymous sets/maps, where userspace defines a template name.
+
+For the latter, kernel requires presence of exactly one "%d".
+nftables uses "__set%d" and "__map%d" for this. The kernel will
+expand the format specifier and replaces it with the smallest unused
+number.
+
+As-is, userspace could define a template name that allows to move
+the set name past the 256 bytes upperlimit (post-expansion).
+
+I don't see how this could be a problem, but I would prefer if userspace
+cannot do this, so add a limit of 16 bytes for the '%d' template name.
+
+16 bytes is the old total upper limit for set names that existed when
+nf_tables was merged initially.
+
+Fixes: 387454901bd6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow set names of up to 255 chars")
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+index 534126f3687b..49e4ffa33a4e 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+
+ #define NFT_MODULE_AUTOLOAD_LIMIT (MODULE_NAME_LEN - sizeof("nft-expr-255-"))
++#define NFT_SET_MAX_ANONLEN 16
+
+ unsigned int nf_tables_net_id __read_mostly;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_tables_net_id);
+@@ -3395,6 +3396,9 @@ static int nf_tables_set_alloc_name(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
+ if (p[1] != 'd' || strchr(p + 2, '%'))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (strnlen(name, NFT_SET_MAX_ANONLEN) >= NFT_SET_MAX_ANONLEN)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ inuse = (unsigned long *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (inuse == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 9086357890f3cb240f01c54991a617c5db3e598c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 16:38:25 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFPROTO_* family
+
+From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit d0009effa8862c20a13af4cb7475d9771b905693 ]
+
+Several expressions explicitly refer to NF_INET_* hook definitions
+from expr->ops->validate, however, family is not validated.
+
+Bail out with EOPNOTSUPP in case they are used from unsupported
+families.
+
+Fixes: 0ca743a55991 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add compatibility layer for x_tables")
+Fixes: a3c90f7a2323 ("netfilter: nf_tables: flow offload expression")
+Fixes: 2fa841938c64 ("netfilter: nf_tables: introduce routing expression")
+Fixes: 554ced0a6e29 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add support for native socket matching")
+Fixes: ad49d86e07a4 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add synproxy support")
+Fixes: 4ed8eb6570a4 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add native tproxy support")
+Fixes: 6c47260250fc ("netfilter: nf_tables: add xfrm expression")
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nft_compat.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c | 5 +++++
+ net/netfilter/nft_nat.c | 5 +++++
+ net/netfilter/nft_rt.c | 5 +++++
+ net/netfilter/nft_socket.c | 5 +++++
+ net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c | 7 +++++--
+ net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c | 5 +++++
+ net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c | 5 +++++
+ 8 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c
+index 1c975e1d3fea..f01f3cf4f8f5 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c
+@@ -327,6 +327,12 @@ static int nft_target_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
+ unsigned int hook_mask = 0;
+ int ret;
+
++ if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_BRIDGE &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_ARP)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ if (nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain)) {
+ const struct nft_base_chain *basechain =
+ nft_base_chain(ctx->chain);
+@@ -569,6 +575,12 @@ static int nft_match_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
+ unsigned int hook_mask = 0;
+ int ret;
+
++ if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_BRIDGE &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_ARP)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ if (nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain)) {
+ const struct nft_base_chain *basechain =
+ nft_base_chain(ctx->chain);
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c b/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c
+index ca5d55a1d7d9..850d4e92702e 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c
+@@ -147,6 +147,11 @@ static int nft_flow_offload_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
+ {
+ unsigned int hook_mask = (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD);
+
++ if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, hook_mask);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c
+index 50fbd3c1d9f1..69fcea16218b 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c
+@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ static int nft_nat_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
+ struct nft_nat *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr);
+ int err;
+
++ if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ err = nft_chain_validate_dependency(ctx->chain, NFT_CHAIN_T_NAT);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c b/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c
+index bcd01a63e38f..f4a96164a5a1 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c
+@@ -166,6 +166,11 @@ static int nft_rt_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *exp
+ const struct nft_rt *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr);
+ unsigned int hooks;
+
++ if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ switch (priv->key) {
+ case NFT_RT_NEXTHOP4:
+ case NFT_RT_NEXTHOP6:
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c b/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c
+index 7e4f7063f481..c7b78e4ef459 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c
+@@ -139,6 +139,11 @@ static int nft_socket_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
+ const struct nft_expr *expr,
+ const struct nft_data **data)
+ {
++ if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain,
+ (1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) |
+ (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) |
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c b/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c
+index 15abb0e49603..2e026f903a4c 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c
+@@ -186,7 +186,6 @@ static int nft_synproxy_do_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
+ break;
+ #endif
+ case NFPROTO_INET:
+- case NFPROTO_BRIDGE:
+ err = nf_synproxy_ipv4_init(snet, ctx->net);
+ if (err)
+ goto nf_ct_failure;
+@@ -219,7 +218,6 @@ static void nft_synproxy_do_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx)
+ break;
+ #endif
+ case NFPROTO_INET:
+- case NFPROTO_BRIDGE:
+ nf_synproxy_ipv4_fini(snet, ctx->net);
+ nf_synproxy_ipv6_fini(snet, ctx->net);
+ break;
+@@ -253,6 +251,11 @@ static int nft_synproxy_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
+ const struct nft_expr *expr,
+ const struct nft_data **data)
+ {
++ if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) |
+ (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD));
+ }
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c b/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c
+index db780b5985ab..d9604a316600 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c
+@@ -293,6 +293,11 @@ static int nft_tproxy_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
+ const struct nft_expr *expr,
+ const struct nft_data **data)
+ {
++ if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, 1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c b/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c
+index cbbbc4ecad3a..7f762fc42891 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c
+@@ -233,6 +233,11 @@ static int nft_xfrm_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *e
+ const struct nft_xfrm *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr);
+ unsigned int hooks;
+
++ if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 &&
++ ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ switch (priv->dir) {
+ case XFRM_POLICY_IN:
+ hooks = (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD) |
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 6bb1a9a9f368e31a190c9739be75e8c3a3a18456 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 09:18:07 +0800
+Subject: netlink: fix potential sleeping issue in mqueue_flush_file
+
+From: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 234ec0b6034b16869d45128b8cd2dc6ffe596f04 ]
+
+I analyze the potential sleeping issue of the following processes:
+Thread A Thread B
+... netlink_create //ref = 1
+do_mq_notify ...
+ sock = netlink_getsockbyfilp ... //ref = 2
+ info->notify_sock = sock; ...
+... netlink_sendmsg
+... skb = netlink_alloc_large_skb //skb->head is vmalloced
+... netlink_unicast
+... sk = netlink_getsockbyportid //ref = 3
+... netlink_sendskb
+... __netlink_sendskb
+... skb_queue_tail //put skb to sk_receive_queue
+... sock_put //ref = 2
+... ...
+... netlink_release
+... deferred_put_nlk_sk //ref = 1
+mqueue_flush_file
+ spin_lock
+ remove_notification
+ netlink_sendskb
+ sock_put //ref = 0
+ sk_free
+ ...
+ __sk_destruct
+ netlink_sock_destruct
+ skb_queue_purge //get skb from sk_receive_queue
+ ...
+ __skb_queue_purge_reason
+ kfree_skb_reason
+ __kfree_skb
+ ...
+ skb_release_all
+ skb_release_head_state
+ netlink_skb_destructor
+ vfree(skb->head) //sleeping while holding spinlock
+
+In netlink_sendmsg, if the memory pointed to by skb->head is allocated by
+vmalloc, and is put to sk_receive_queue queue, also the skb is not freed.
+When the mqueue executes flush, the sleeping bug will occur. Use
+vfree_atomic instead of vfree in netlink_skb_destructor to solve the issue.
+
+Fixes: c05cdb1b864f ("netlink: allow large data transfers from user-space")
+Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240122011807.2110357-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+index 3cb27a27b420..bd9b3cd25a76 100644
+--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
++++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static void netlink_skb_destructor(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (is_vmalloc_addr(skb->head)) {
+ if (!skb->cloned ||
+ !atomic_dec_return(&(skb_shinfo(skb)->dataref)))
+- vfree(skb->head);
++ vfree_atomic(skb->head);
+
+ skb->head = NULL;
+ }
+--
+2.43.0
+
fs-move-s_isgid-stripping-into-the-vfs_-helpers.patch
powerpc-use-always-instead-of-always-y-in-for-crtsavres.o.patch
x86-cpu-amd-fix-disabling-xsaves-on-amd-family-0x17-due-to-erratum.patch
+net-smc-fix-illegal-rmb_desc-access-in-smc-d-connect.patch
+vlan-skip-nested-type-that-is-not-ifla_vlan_qos_mapp.patch
+llc-make-llc_ui_sendmsg-more-robust-against-bonding-.patch
+llc-drop-support-for-eth_p_tr_802_2.patch
+net-rds-fix-ubsan-array-index-out-of-bounds-in-rds_c.patch
+tracing-ensure-visibility-when-inserting-an-element-.patch
+afs-hide-silly-rename-files-from-userspace.patch
+tcp-add-memory-barrier-to-tcp_push.patch
+netlink-fix-potential-sleeping-issue-in-mqueue_flush.patch
+net-mlx5-dr-use-the-right-gvmi-number-for-drop-actio.patch
+net-mlx5-use-kfree-ft-g-in-arfs_create_groups.patch
+net-mlx5e-fix-a-double-free-in-arfs_create_groups.patch
+netfilter-nf_tables-restrict-anonymous-set-and-map-n.patch
+netfilter-nf_tables-validate-nfproto_-family.patch
+fjes-fix-memleaks-in-fjes_hw_setup.patch
+net-fec-fix-the-unhandled-context-fault-from-smmu.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 9f1b8a85e74d25a2b726e813a1deb30bfc518652 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 11:01:33 -0800
+Subject: tcp: Add memory barrier to tcp_push()
+
+From: Salvatore Dipietro <dipiets@amazon.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 7267e8dcad6b2f9fce05a6a06335d7040acbc2b6 ]
+
+On CPUs with weak memory models, reads and updates performed by tcp_push
+to the sk variables can get reordered leaving the socket throttled when
+it should not. The tasklet running tcp_wfree() may also not observe the
+memory updates in time and will skip flushing any packets throttled by
+tcp_push(), delaying the sending. This can pathologically cause 40ms
+extra latency due to bad interactions with delayed acks.
+
+Adding a memory barrier in tcp_push removes the bug, similarly to the
+previous commit bf06200e732d ("tcp: tsq: fix nonagle handling").
+smp_mb__after_atomic() is used to not incur in unnecessary overhead
+on x86 since not affected.
+
+Patch has been tested using an AWS c7g.2xlarge instance with Ubuntu
+22.04 and Apache Tomcat 9.0.83 running the basic servlet below:
+
+import java.io.IOException;
+import java.io.OutputStreamWriter;
+import java.io.PrintWriter;
+import javax.servlet.ServletException;
+import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
+import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
+import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
+
+public class HelloWorldServlet extends HttpServlet {
+ @Override
+ protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
+ throws ServletException, IOException {
+ response.setContentType("text/html;charset=utf-8");
+ OutputStreamWriter osw = new OutputStreamWriter(response.getOutputStream(),"UTF-8");
+ String s = "a".repeat(3096);
+ osw.write(s,0,s.length());
+ osw.flush();
+ }
+}
+
+Load was applied using wrk2 (https://github.com/kinvolk/wrk2) from an AWS
+c6i.8xlarge instance. Before the patch an additional 40ms latency from P99.99+
+values is observed while, with the patch, the extra latency disappears.
+
+No patch and tcp_autocorking=1
+./wrk -t32 -c128 -d40s --latency -R10000 http://172.31.60.173:8080/hello/hello
+ ...
+ 50.000% 0.91ms
+ 75.000% 1.13ms
+ 90.000% 1.46ms
+ 99.000% 1.74ms
+ 99.900% 1.89ms
+ 99.990% 41.95ms <<< 40+ ms extra latency
+ 99.999% 48.32ms
+100.000% 48.96ms
+
+With patch and tcp_autocorking=1
+./wrk -t32 -c128 -d40s --latency -R10000 http://172.31.60.173:8080/hello/hello
+ ...
+ 50.000% 0.90ms
+ 75.000% 1.13ms
+ 90.000% 1.45ms
+ 99.000% 1.72ms
+ 99.900% 1.83ms
+ 99.990% 2.11ms <<< no 40+ ms extra latency
+ 99.999% 2.53ms
+100.000% 2.62ms
+
+Patch has been also tested on x86 (m7i.2xlarge instance) which it is not
+affected by this issue and the patch doesn't introduce any additional
+delay.
+
+Fixes: 7aa5470c2c09 ("tcp: tsq: move tsq_flags close to sk_wmem_alloc")
+Signed-off-by: Salvatore Dipietro <dipiets@amazon.com>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119190133.43698-1-dipiets@amazon.com
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+index 647cb664c2ad..53a8522adf68 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+@@ -723,6 +723,7 @@ static void tcp_push(struct sock *sk, int flags, int mss_now,
+ if (!test_bit(TSQ_THROTTLED, &sk->sk_tsq_flags)) {
+ NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTOCORKING);
+ set_bit(TSQ_THROTTLED, &sk->sk_tsq_flags);
++ smp_mb__after_atomic();
+ }
+ /* It is possible TX completion already happened
+ * before we set TSQ_THROTTLED.
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 3fb012c0a17f6e82f8bb906529b37a69cfdd806d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:09:28 +0100
+Subject: tracing: Ensure visibility when inserting an element into tracing_map
+
+From: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 2b44760609e9eaafc9d234a6883d042fc21132a7 ]
+
+Running the following two commands in parallel on a multi-processor
+AArch64 machine can sporadically produce an unexpected warning about
+duplicate histogram entries:
+
+ $ while true; do
+ echo hist:key=id.syscall:val=hitcount > \
+ /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/trigger
+ cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/hist
+ sleep 0.001
+ done
+ $ stress-ng --sysbadaddr $(nproc)
+
+The warning looks as follows:
+
+[ 2911.172474] ------------[ cut here ]------------
+[ 2911.173111] Duplicates detected: 1
+[ 2911.173574] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 12247 at kernel/trace/tracing_map.c:983 tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
+[ 2911.174702] Modules linked in: iscsi_ibft(E) iscsi_boot_sysfs(E) rfkill(E) af_packet(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) nls_cp437(E) vfat(E) fat(E) ena(E) tiny_power_button(E) qemu_fw_cfg(E) button(E) fuse(E) efi_pstore(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) aes_ce_blk(E) aes_ce_cipher(E) crct10dif_ce(E) polyval_ce(E) polyval_generic(E) ghash_ce(E) gf128mul(E) sm4_ce_gcm(E) sm4_ce_ccm(E) sm4_ce(E) sm4_ce_cipher(E) sm4(E) sm3_ce(E) sm3(E) sha3_ce(E) sha512_ce(E) sha512_arm64(E) sha2_ce(E) sha256_arm64(E) nvme(E) sha1_ce(E) nvme_core(E) nvme_auth(E) t10_pi(E) sg(E) scsi_mod(E) scsi_common(E) efivarfs(E)
+[ 2911.174738] Unloaded tainted modules: cppc_cpufreq(E):1
+[ 2911.180985] CPU: 2 PID: 12247 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0-default #2 1b58bbb22c97e4399dc09f92d309344f69c44a01
+[ 2911.182398] Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c7g.8xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 11/1/2018
+[ 2911.183208] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
+[ 2911.184038] pc : tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
+[ 2911.184667] lr : tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
+[ 2911.185310] sp : ffff8000a1513900
+[ 2911.185750] x29: ffff8000a1513900 x28: ffff0003f272fe80 x27: 0000000000000001
+[ 2911.186600] x26: ffff0003f272fe80 x25: 0000000000000030 x24: 0000000000000008
+[ 2911.187458] x23: ffff0003c5788000 x22: ffff0003c16710c8 x21: ffff80008017f180
+[ 2911.188310] x20: ffff80008017f000 x19: ffff80008017f180 x18: ffffffffffffffff
+[ 2911.189160] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff8000a15134b8
+[ 2911.190015] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d373432323154 x12: 5b5d313131333731
+[ 2911.190844] x11: 00000000fffeffff x10: 00000000fffeffff x9 : ffffd1b78274a13c
+[ 2911.191716] x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 000000000057ffa8
+[ 2911.192554] x5 : ffff0012f6c24ec0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff2e5b72b5d000
+[ 2911.193404] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0003ff254480
+[ 2911.194259] Call trace:
+[ 2911.194626] tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
+[ 2911.195220] hist_show+0x124/0x800
+[ 2911.195692] seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8
+[ 2911.196193] seq_read+0xe8/0x138
+[ 2911.196638] vfs_read+0xc8/0x300
+[ 2911.197078] ksys_read+0x70/0x108
+[ 2911.197534] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38
+[ 2911.198046] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108
+[ 2911.198553] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd0/0xf8
+[ 2911.199157] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40
+[ 2911.199613] el0_svc+0x40/0x178
+[ 2911.200048] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
+[ 2911.200621] el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1b0
+[ 2911.201115] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
+
+The problem appears to be caused by CPU reordering of writes issued from
+__tracing_map_insert().
+
+The check for the presence of an element with a given key in this
+function is:
+
+ val = READ_ONCE(entry->val);
+ if (val && keys_match(key, val->key, map->key_size)) ...
+
+The write of a new entry is:
+
+ elt = get_free_elt(map);
+ memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);
+ entry->val = elt;
+
+The "memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);" and "entry->val = elt;"
+stores may become visible in the reversed order on another CPU. This
+second CPU might then incorrectly determine that a new key doesn't match
+an already present val->key and subsequently insert a new element,
+resulting in a duplicate.
+
+Fix the problem by adding a write barrier between
+"memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);" and "entry->val = elt;", and for
+good measure, also use WRITE_ONCE(entry->val, elt) for publishing the
+element. The sequence pairs with the mentioned "READ_ONCE(entry->val);"
+and the "val->key" check which has an address dependency.
+
+The barrier is placed on a path executed when adding an element for
+a new key. Subsequent updates targeting the same key remain unaffected.
+
+From the user's perspective, the issue was introduced by commit
+c193707dde77 ("tracing: Remove code which merges duplicates"), which
+followed commit cbf4100efb8f ("tracing: Add support to detect and avoid
+duplicates"). The previous code operated differently; it inherently
+expected potential races which result in duplicates but merged them
+later when they occurred.
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240122150928.27725-1-petr.pavlu@suse.com
+
+Fixes: c193707dde77 ("tracing: Remove code which merges duplicates")
+Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ kernel/trace/tracing_map.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/trace/tracing_map.c b/kernel/trace/tracing_map.c
+index 83c2a0598c64..33c463967bb3 100644
+--- a/kernel/trace/tracing_map.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/tracing_map.c
+@@ -574,7 +574,12 @@ __tracing_map_insert(struct tracing_map *map, void *key, bool lookup_only)
+ }
+
+ memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);
+- entry->val = elt;
++ /*
++ * Ensure the initialization is visible and
++ * publish the elt.
++ */
++ smp_wmb();
++ WRITE_ONCE(entry->val, elt);
+ atomic64_inc(&map->hits);
+
+ return entry->val;
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From b544b768120a9301a9364a15b0aa51df2926dab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 21:03:06 +0800
+Subject: vlan: skip nested type that is not IFLA_VLAN_QOS_MAPPING
+
+From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6c21660fe221a15c789dee2bc2fd95516bc5aeaf ]
+
+In the vlan_changelink function, a loop is used to parse the nested
+attributes IFLA_VLAN_EGRESS_QOS and IFLA_VLAN_INGRESS_QOS in order to
+obtain the struct ifla_vlan_qos_mapping. These two nested attributes are
+checked in the vlan_validate_qos_map function, which calls
+nla_validate_nested_deprecated with the vlan_map_policy.
+
+However, this deprecated validator applies a LIBERAL strictness, allowing
+the presence of an attribute with the type IFLA_VLAN_QOS_UNSPEC.
+Consequently, the loop in vlan_changelink may parse an attribute of type
+IFLA_VLAN_QOS_UNSPEC and believe it carries a payload of
+struct ifla_vlan_qos_mapping, which is not necessarily true.
+
+To address this issue and ensure compatibility, this patch introduces two
+type checks that skip attributes whose type is not IFLA_VLAN_QOS_MAPPING.
+
+Fixes: 07b5b17e157b ("[VLAN]: Use rtnl_link API")
+Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118130306.1644001-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c b/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c
+index 0db85aeb119b..99b277775257 100644
+--- a/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c
++++ b/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c
+@@ -118,12 +118,16 @@ static int vlan_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[],
+ }
+ if (data[IFLA_VLAN_INGRESS_QOS]) {
+ nla_for_each_nested(attr, data[IFLA_VLAN_INGRESS_QOS], rem) {
++ if (nla_type(attr) != IFLA_VLAN_QOS_MAPPING)
++ continue;
+ m = nla_data(attr);
+ vlan_dev_set_ingress_priority(dev, m->to, m->from);
+ }
+ }
+ if (data[IFLA_VLAN_EGRESS_QOS]) {
+ nla_for_each_nested(attr, data[IFLA_VLAN_EGRESS_QOS], rem) {
++ if (nla_type(attr) != IFLA_VLAN_QOS_MAPPING)
++ continue;
+ m = nla_data(attr);
+ err = vlan_dev_set_egress_priority(dev, m->from, m->to);
+ if (err)
+--
+2.43.0
+
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
