pkcs11: Don't ask for a new PIN on TLS handshake failure

The only time the PIN should fail is when we initialize the TLS
connection, so it doesn't really make sense to get rid of the PIN just
because some other part of the handshake failed.

This is a followup to commit fd4fb28179a0b750dff4d38a72a7bf89a2c49813
('OpenSSL: Try to ensure we don't throw away the PIN unnecessarily').

Signed-off-by: Mike Gerow <gerow@google.com>

diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls.c
index d81b1cf1b6df5951a4a0a004cf48dcc41acc2962..66a027a626e0dba5cac6f1673689ccca25d58c69 100644 (file)
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls.c
@@ -156,20 +156,6 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_tls_failure(struct eap_sm *sm,
        ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
        ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
 
-       if (res == -1) {
-               struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
-               if (config) {
-                       /*
-                        * The TLS handshake failed. So better forget the old
-                        * PIN. It may be wrong, we cannot be sure but trying
-                        * the wrong one again might block it on the card--so
-                        * better ask the user again.
-                        */
-                       os_free(config->pin);
-                       config->pin = NULL;
-               }
-       }
-
        if (resp) {
                /*
                 * This is likely an alert message, so send it instead of just