tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:
tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
...
tw->idx = 0;
}
The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the
index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and
keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte
array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen
byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write.
Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when
the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do.
Fixes: 11ea3173d5f2 ("Input: add driver for Touchwin serial touchscreens")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613-b4-disp-69921bfd-v1-1-82c036899959@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
if (data) { /* touch */
tw->touched = 1;
tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
- /* verify length and that the two Y's are the same */
- if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
- input_report_abs(dev, ABS_X, tw->data[0]);
- input_report_abs(dev, ABS_Y, tw->data[1]);
- input_report_key(dev, BTN_TOUCH, 1);
- input_sync(dev);
+ /* a full packet ends the accumulation, valid or not */
+ if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH) {
+ /* report only if the two Y's are the same */
+ if (tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
+ input_report_abs(dev, ABS_X, tw->data[0]);
+ input_report_abs(dev, ABS_Y, tw->data[1]);
+ input_report_key(dev, BTN_TOUCH, 1);
+ input_sync(dev);
+ }
tw->idx = 0;
}
} else if (tw->touched) { /* untouch */