break;
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_COA
+ /*
+ * This is a vendor extension. Suggested by Glen
+ * Zorn in IETF 72, and rejected by the rest of
+ * the WG. We like it, so it goes in here.
+ */
+ case RAD_LISTEN_COA:
+ dval = dict_valbyname(PW_RECV_COA_TYPE, "Status-Server");
+ if (dval) {
+ rcode = module_recv_coa(dval->value, request);
+ } else {
+ rcode = RLM_MODULE_OK;
+ }
+
+ switch (rcode) {
+ case RLM_MODULE_OK:
+ case RLM_MODULE_UPDATED:
+ request->reply->code = PW_COA_ACK;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ request->reply->code = 0; /* don't reply */
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
default:
return 0;
}
break;
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_COA
+ case RAD_LISTEN_COA:
+ name = "coa";
+ break;
+#endif
+
default:
name = "??";
break;
return RLM_MODULE_OK;
}
+
+/*
+ * Receive a CoA packet.
+ */
+static int rad_coa_recv(REQUEST *request)
+{
+ int rcode = RLM_MODULE_OK;
+ int ack, nak;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the correct response
+ */
+ switch (request->packet->code) {
+ case PW_COA_REQUEST:
+ ack = PW_COA_ACK;
+ nak = PW_COA_NAK;
+ break;
+
+ case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
+ ack = PW_DISCONNECT_ACK;
+ nak = PW_DISCONNECT_NAK;
+ break;
+
+ default: /* shouldn't happen */
+ return RLM_MODULE_FAIL;
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_PROXY
+#define WAS_PROXIED (request->proxy)
+#else
+#define WAS_PROXIED (0)
+#endif
+
+ if (!WAS_PROXIED) {
+ /*
+ * RFC 5176 Section 3.3. If we have a CoA-Request
+ * with Service-Type = Authorize-Only, it MUST
+ * have a State attribute in it.
+ */
+ vp = pairfind(request->packet->vps, PW_SERVICE_TYPE);
+ if (request->packet->code == PW_COA_REQUEST) {
+ if (vp && (vp->vp_integer == 17)) {
+ vp = pairfind(request->packet->vps, PW_STATE);
+ if (!vp || (vp->length == 0)) {
+ RDEBUG("ERROR: CoA-Request with Service-Type = Authorize-Only MUST contain a State attribute");
+ request->reply->code = PW_COA_NAK;
+ return RLM_MODULE_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (vp) {
+ /*
+ * RFC 5176, Section 3.2.
+ */
+ RDEBUG("ERROR: Disconnect-Request MUST NOT contain a Service-Type attribute");
+ request->reply->code = PW_DISCONNECT_NAK;
+ return RLM_MODULE_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ rcode = module_recv_coa(0, request);
+ switch (rcode) {
+ case RLM_MODULE_FAIL:
+ case RLM_MODULE_INVALID:
+ case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
+ case RLM_MODULE_USERLOCK:
+ default:
+ request->reply->code = nak;
+ break;
+
+ case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
+ return rcode;
+
+ case RLM_MODULE_NOOP:
+ case RLM_MODULE_NOTFOUND:
+ case RLM_MODULE_OK:
+ case RLM_MODULE_UPDATED:
+ request->reply->code = ack;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Start the reply code with the proxy reply
+ * code.
+ */
+ request->reply->code = request->proxy_reply->code;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Copy State from the request to the reply.
+ * See RFC 5176 Section 3.3.
+ */
+ vp = paircopy2(request->packet->vps, PW_STATE);
+ if (vp) pairadd(&request->reply->vps, vp);
+
+ /*
+ * We may want to over-ride the reply.
+ */
+ rcode = module_send_coa(0, request);
+ switch (rcode) {
+ /*
+ * We need to send CoA-NAK back if Service-Type
+ * is Authorize-Only. Rely on the user's policy
+ * to do that. We're not a real NAS, so this
+ * restriction doesn't (ahem) apply to us.
+ */
+ case RLM_MODULE_FAIL:
+ case RLM_MODULE_INVALID:
+ case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
+ case RLM_MODULE_USERLOCK:
+ default:
+ request->reply->code = nak;
+ break;
+
+ case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
+ return rcode;
+
+ case RLM_MODULE_NOOP:
+ case RLM_MODULE_NOTFOUND:
+ case RLM_MODULE_OK:
+ case RLM_MODULE_UPDATED:
+ request->reply->code = ack;
+ break;
+
+ }
+
+ return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check if an incoming request is "ok"
+ *
+ * It takes packets, not requests. It sees if the packet looks
+ * OK. If so, it does a number of sanity checks on it.
+ */
+static int coa_socket_recv(rad_listen_t *listener,
+ RAD_REQUEST_FUNP *pfun, REQUEST **prequest)
+{
+ ssize_t rcode;
+ int code, src_port;
+ RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
+ RAD_REQUEST_FUNP fun = NULL;
+ char buffer[128];
+ RADCLIENT *client;
+ fr_ipaddr_t src_ipaddr;
+
+ rcode = rad_recv_header(listener->fd, &src_ipaddr, &src_port, &code);
+ if (rcode < 0) return 0;
+
+ RAD_STATS_TYPE_INC(listener, total_requests);
+
+ if (rcode < 20) { /* AUTH_HDR_LEN */
+ RAD_STATS_TYPE_INC(listener, total_malformed_requests);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((client = client_listener_find(listener,
+ &src_ipaddr, src_port)) == NULL) {
+ rad_recv_discard(listener->fd);
+ RAD_STATS_TYPE_INC(listener, total_invalid_requests);
+
+ if (debug_flag > 0) {
+ char name[1024];
+
+ listener->print(listener, name, sizeof(name));
+
+ /*
+ * This is debugging rather than logging, so that
+ * DoS attacks don't affect us.
+ */
+ DEBUG("Ignoring request to %s from unknown client %s port %d",
+ name,
+ inet_ntop(src_ipaddr.af, &src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ buffer, sizeof(buffer)), src_port);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Some sanity checks, based on the packet code.
+ */
+ switch(code) {
+ case PW_COA_REQUEST:
+ case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
+ fun = rad_coa_recv;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ rad_recv_discard(listener->fd);
+ DEBUG("Invalid packet code %d sent to coa port from client %s port %d : IGNORED",
+ code, client->shortname, src_port);
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ } /* switch over packet types */
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we've sanity checked everything, receive the
+ * packet.
+ */
+ packet = rad_recv(listener->fd, client->message_authenticator);
+ if (!packet) {
+ RAD_STATS_TYPE_INC(listener, total_malformed_requests);
+ DEBUG("%s", fr_strerror());
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!received_request(listener, packet, prequest, client)) {
+ rad_free(&packet);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *pfun = fun;
+ return 1;
+}
#endif
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
return 0;
}
+#ifdef WITH_COA
+ /*
+ * Distinguish proxied CoA requests from ones we
+ * originate.
+ */
+ if ((fun == rad_coa_reply) &&
+ (request->packet->code == request->proxy->code)) {
+ fun = rad_coa_recv;
+ }
+#endif
+
rad_assert(fun != NULL);
*pfun = fun;
*prequest = request;
command_socket_print, command_socket_encode, command_socket_decode },
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_COA
+ /* Change of Authorization */
+ { common_socket_parse, NULL,
+ coa_socket_recv, auth_socket_send, /* CoA packets are same as auth */
+ socket_print, client_socket_encode, client_socket_decode },
+#endif
+
};
break;
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_COA
+ case RAD_LISTEN_COA:
+ sock->port = PW_COA_UDP_PORT;
+ break;
+#endif
+
default:
radlog(L_ERR, "ERROR: Non-fatal internal sanity check failed in bind.");
return -1;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DHCP
case RAD_LISTEN_DHCP:
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_COA
+ case RAD_LISTEN_COA:
#endif
this->data = rad_malloc(sizeof(listen_socket_t));
memset(this->data, 0, sizeof(listen_socket_t));
#endif
#ifdef WITH_COMMAND_SOCKET
{ "control", RAD_LISTEN_COMMAND },
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_COA
+ { "coa", RAD_LISTEN_COA },
#endif
{ NULL, 0 },
};