upstream commit

Replace two more arc4random() loops with
arc4random_buf().

tweaks and ok dtucker
ok deraadt

Upstream-ID: 738d3229130ccc7eac975c190276ca6fcf0208e4

diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
index 241aa3cdc58d18399576e3d33cd10833a4d48028..5d8c2a0c0490bfc12864086667ece8edc5f761b5 100644 (file)
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.352 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.353 2016/09/19 07:52:42 natano Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -4215,7 +4215,6 @@ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp,
        char *new_data;
        int screen_number;
        const char *cp;
-       u_int32_t rnd = 0;
 
        if (x11_saved_display == NULL)
                x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp);
@@ -4236,23 +4235,20 @@ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp,
        if (x11_saved_proto == NULL) {
                /* Save protocol name. */
                x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
-               /*
-                * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data
-                * of the same length.
-                */
+
+               /* Extract real authentication data. */
                x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
-               x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
                for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
                        if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
                                fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad "
                                    "authentication data: %.100s", data);
-                       if (i % 4 == 0)
-                               rnd = arc4random();
                        x11_saved_data[i] = value;
-                       x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff;
-                       rnd >>= 8;
                }
                x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
+
+               /* Generate fake data of the same length. */
+               x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+               arc4random_buf(x11_fake_data, data_len);
                x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
        }
 

diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c
index bfc523bde3176fc47615314bdda66a8948f6e257..a0453618402b1768c5104f9281aaaf4f7bf5144b 100644 (file)
--- a/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/sshconnect1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.78 2015/11/15 22:26:49 jcs Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.79 2016/09/19 07:52:42 natano Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -509,7 +509,6 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
        u_char cookie[8];
        u_int supported_ciphers;
        u_int server_flags, client_flags;
-       u_int32_t rnd = 0;
 
        debug("Waiting for server public key.");
 
@@ -568,12 +567,7 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
         * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least
         * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key.
         */
-       for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
-               if (i % 4 == 0)
-                       rnd = arc4random();
-               session_key[i] = rnd & 0xff;
-               rnd >>= 8;
-       }
+       arc4random_buf(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
 
        /*
         * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key