ARFLAGS = cr
lib_pair_ap_a_CFLAGS = -Wall -g -DCONFIG_OPENSSL -pthread
-lib_csrp_a_CFLAGS = -pthread
lib_tinyhttp_a_CFLAGS = -pthread
lib_dbus_interface_a_CFLAGS = -pthread
lib_mpris_interface_a_CFLAGS = -pthread
if USE_AIRPLAY_2
shairport_sync_SOURCES += ptp-utilities.c plist_xml_strings.c
-shairport_sync_LDADD += lib_csrp.a lib_pair_ap.a
+shairport_sync_LDADD += lib_pair_ap.a
lib_pair_ap_a_SOURCES = pair_ap/pair.c pair_ap/pair_fruit.c pair_ap/pair_homekit.c pair_ap/pair-tlv.c
-lib_csrp_a_SOURCES = csrp/srp.c
-noinst_LIBRARIES += lib_pair_ap.a lib_csrp.a
+noinst_LIBRARIES += lib_pair_ap.a
plist_xml_strings.h: plists/get_info_response.xml
echo "// Do not edit!" > plist_xml_strings.h
echo "// This file is automatically generated from files in the plists folder." >> plist_xml_strings.h
+++ /dev/null
-The MIT License (MIT)
-
-Copyright (c) 2013 Tom Cocagne
-
-Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
-this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
-the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
-use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
-of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
-so, subject to the following conditions:
-
-The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
-copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-
-THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
-IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
-FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
-LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
-OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
-SOFTWARE.
+++ /dev/null
-csrp
-====
-Tom Cocagne <tom.cocagne@gmail.com>
-
-csrp is a minimal C implementation of the [Secure Remote Password
-protocol](http://srp.stanford.edu/). The project consists of a single
-C file and is intended for direct inclusion into utilizing programs.
-It's only dependency is OpenSSL.
-
-*NOTE* This SRP implementation was created before the hashing algoritim specified
-in RFC 5054 became the de-facto standard for interoperable SRP implementations.
-The rfc5054_compat branch of this repository uses the RFC 5054 hashing algorithms
-and is known to be compatible with other SRP implementations. If this version works
-for you, please consider submitting a patch to this library that implements both the
-original default and the RFC 5054 implementation to allow a single mainline version
-of this library going forward.
-
-
-SRP Overview
-------------
-
-SRP is a cryptographically strong authentication
-protocol for password-based, mutual authentication over an insecure
-network connection.
-
-Unlike other common challenge-response autentication protocols, such
-as Kerberos and SSL, SRP does not rely on an external infrastructure
-of trusted key servers or certificate management. Instead, SRP server
-applications use verification keys derived from each user's password
-to determine the authenticity of a network connection.
-
-SRP provides mutual-authentication in that successful authentication
-requires both sides of the connection to have knowledge of the
-user's password. If the client side lacks the user's password or the
-server side lacks the proper verification key, the authentication will
-fail.
-
-Unlike SSL, SRP does not directly encrypt all data flowing through
-the authenticated connection. However, successful authentication does
-result in a cryptographically strong shared key that can be used
-for symmetric-key encryption.
-
-This library serves as the basis for a compatible Python module called
-[pysrp](https://github.com/cocagne/pysrp). The
-[pysrp](https://github.com/cocagne/pysrp) project contains complete,
-user-friendly API documentation as well as a comprehensive overview of the SRP
-protocol. As the APIs are virtually identical, the [pysrp
-documentation](http://pythonhosted.org/srp/) is an excellent reference for
-understanding this library.
-
-
-Usage Example
--------------
-
-```c
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "srp.h"
-
-
-int main( int argc, char * argv[] )
-{
- int auth_failed = 1;
-
- struct SRPVerifier * ver;
- struct SRPUser * usr;
-
- const unsigned char * bytes_s = 0;
- const unsigned char * bytes_v = 0;
- const unsigned char * bytes_A = 0;
- const unsigned char * bytes_B = 0;
-
- const unsigned char * bytes_M = 0;
- const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK = 0;
-
- int len_s = 0;
- int len_v = 0;
- int len_A = 0;
- int len_B = 0;
- int len_M = 0;
-
- const char * username = "testuser";
- const char * password = "password";
-
- const char * auth_username = 0;
-
- SRP_HashAlgorithm alg = SRP_SHA1;
- SRP_NGType ng_type = SRP_NG_2048;
-
- /* Create a salt+verification key for the user's password. The salt and
- * key need to be computed at the time the user's password is set and
- * must be stored by the server-side application for use during the
- * authentication process.
- */
- srp_create_salted_verification_key( alg, ng_type, username,
- (const unsigned char *)password,
- strlen(password),
- &bytes_s, &len_s,
- &bytes_v, &len_v,
- NULL, NULL );
-
- /* Begin authentication process */
- usr = srp_user_new( alg, ng_type, username,
- (const unsigned char *)password,
- strlen(password), NULL, NULL );
-
- srp_user_start_authentication( usr, &auth_username, &bytes_A, &len_A );
-
- /* User -> Host: (username, bytes_A) */
- ver = srp_verifier_new( alg, ng_type, username, bytes_s, len_s, bytes_v, len_v,
- bytes_A, len_A, & bytes_B, &len_B, NULL, NULL );
-
- if ( !bytes_B ) {
- printf("Verifier SRP-6a safety check violated!\n");
- goto auth_failed;
- }
-
- /* Host -> User: (bytes_s, bytes_B) */
- srp_user_process_challenge( usr, bytes_s, len_s, bytes_B, len_B, &bytes_M, &len_M );
-
- if ( !bytes_M ) {
- printf("User SRP-6a safety check violation!\n");
- goto auth_failed;
- }
-
- /* User -> Host: (bytes_M) */
- srp_verifier_verify_session( ver, bytes_M, &bytes_HAMK );
-
- if ( !bytes_HAMK ) {
- printf("User authentication failed!\n");
- goto auth_failed;
- }
-
- /* Host -> User: (HAMK) */
- srp_user_verify_session( usr, bytes_HAMK );
-
- if ( !srp_user_is_authenticated(usr) ) {
- printf("Server authentication failed!\n");
- goto auth_failed;
- }
-
- auth_failed = 0; /* auth success! */
-
-auth_failed:
- srp_verifier_delete( ver );
- srp_user_delete( usr );
-
- free( (char *)bytes_s );
- free( (char *)bytes_v );
-
- return auth_failed;
-}
-```
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Secure Remote Password 6a implementation
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Tom Cocagne. All rights reserved.
- * https://github.com/cocagne/csrp
- *
- * The MIT License (MIT)
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Tom Cocagne
- *
- * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
- * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
- * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
- * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
- * of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
- * so, subject to the following conditions:
- *
- * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
- * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
- * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
- * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
- * SOFTWARE.
- *
- */
-
-#ifdef WIN32
- #include <Wincrypt.h>
-#else
- #include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-
-#include "srp.h"
-
-static int g_initialized = 0;
-
-typedef struct
-{
- BIGNUM * N;
- BIGNUM * g;
-} NGConstant;
-
-struct NGHex
-{
- const char * n_hex;
- const char * g_hex;
-};
-
-/* All constants here were pulled from Appendix A of RFC 5054 */
-static struct NGHex global_Ng_constants[] = {
- { /* 1024 */
- "EEAF0AB9ADB38DD69C33F80AFA8FC5E86072618775FF3C0B9EA2314C9C256576D674DF7496"
- "EA81D3383B4813D692C6E0E0D5D8E250B98BE48E495C1D6089DAD15DC7D7B46154D6B6CE8E"
- "F4AD69B15D4982559B297BCF1885C529F566660E57EC68EDBC3C05726CC02FD4CBF4976EAA"
- "9AFD5138FE8376435B9FC61D2FC0EB06E3",
- "2"
- },
- { /* 2048 */
- "AC6BDB41324A9A9BF166DE5E1389582FAF72B6651987EE07FC3192943DB56050A37329CBB4"
- "A099ED8193E0757767A13DD52312AB4B03310DCD7F48A9DA04FD50E8083969EDB767B0CF60"
- "95179A163AB3661A05FBD5FAAAE82918A9962F0B93B855F97993EC975EEAA80D740ADBF4FF"
- "747359D041D5C33EA71D281E446B14773BCA97B43A23FB801676BD207A436C6481F1D2B907"
- "8717461A5B9D32E688F87748544523B524B0D57D5EA77A2775D2ECFA032CFBDBF52FB37861"
- "60279004E57AE6AF874E7303CE53299CCC041C7BC308D82A5698F3A8D0C38271AE35F8E9DB"
- "FBB694B5C803D89F7AE435DE236D525F54759B65E372FCD68EF20FA7111F9E4AFF73",
- "2"
- },
- { /* 4096 */
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08"
- "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B"
- "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9"
- "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6"
- "49286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8"
- "FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D"
- "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3BE39E772C"
- "180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF695581718"
- "3995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D"
- "04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7D"
- "B3970F85A6E1E4C7ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D226"
- "1AD2EE6BF12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C"
- "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB3143DB5BFC"
- "E0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D788719A10BDBA5B26"
- "99C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB"
- "04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2"
- "233BA186515BE7ED1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127"
- "D5B05AA993B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199"
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
- "5"
- },
- { /* 8192 */
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08"
- "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B"
- "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9"
- "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6"
- "49286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8"
- "FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D"
- "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3BE39E772C"
- "180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF695581718"
- "3995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D"
- "04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7D"
- "B3970F85A6E1E4C7ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D226"
- "1AD2EE6BF12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C"
- "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB3143DB5BFC"
- "E0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D788719A10BDBA5B26"
- "99C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB"
- "04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2"
- "233BA186515BE7ED1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127"
- "D5B05AA993B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934028492"
- "36C3FAB4D27C7026C1D4DCB2602646DEC9751E763DBA37BDF8FF9406"
- "AD9E530EE5DB382F413001AEB06A53ED9027D831179727B0865A8918"
- "DA3EDBEBCF9B14ED44CE6CBACED4BB1BDB7F1447E6CC254B33205151"
- "2BD7AF426FB8F401378CD2BF5983CA01C64B92ECF032EA15D1721D03"
- "F482D7CE6E74FEF6D55E702F46980C82B5A84031900B1C9E59E7C97F"
- "BEC7E8F323A97A7E36CC88BE0F1D45B7FF585AC54BD407B22B4154AA"
- "CC8F6D7EBF48E1D814CC5ED20F8037E0A79715EEF29BE32806A1D58B"
- "B7C5DA76F550AA3D8A1FBFF0EB19CCB1A313D55CDA56C9EC2EF29632"
- "387FE8D76E3C0468043E8F663F4860EE12BF2D5B0B7474D6E694F91E"
- "6DBE115974A3926F12FEE5E438777CB6A932DF8CD8BEC4D073B931BA"
- "3BC832B68D9DD300741FA7BF8AFC47ED2576F6936BA424663AAB639C"
- "5AE4F5683423B4742BF1C978238F16CBE39D652DE3FDB8BEFC848AD9"
- "22222E04A4037C0713EB57A81A23F0C73473FC646CEA306B4BCBC886"
- "2F8385DDFA9D4B7FA2C087E879683303ED5BDD3A062B3CF5B3A278A6"
- "6D2A13F83F44F82DDF310EE074AB6A364597E899A0255DC164F31CC5"
- "0846851DF9AB48195DED7EA1B1D510BD7EE74D73FAF36BC31ECFA268"
- "359046F4EB879F924009438B481C6CD7889A002ED5EE382BC9190DA6"
- "FC026E479558E4475677E9AA9E3050E2765694DFC81F56E880B96E71"
- "60C980DD98EDD3DFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
- "13"
- },
- {0,0} /* null sentinel */
-};
-
-
-static NGConstant * new_ng( SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex )
-{
- NGConstant * ng = (NGConstant *) malloc( sizeof(NGConstant) );
- ng->N = BN_new();
- ng->g = BN_new();
-
- if( !ng || !ng->N || !ng->g )
- return 0;
-
- if ( ng_type != SRP_NG_CUSTOM )
- {
- n_hex = global_Ng_constants[ ng_type ].n_hex;
- g_hex = global_Ng_constants[ ng_type ].g_hex;
- }
-
- BN_hex2bn( &ng->N, n_hex );
- BN_hex2bn( &ng->g, g_hex );
-
- return ng;
-}
-
-static void delete_ng( NGConstant * ng )
-{
- if (ng)
- {
- BN_free( ng->N );
- BN_free( ng->g );
- ng->N = 0;
- ng->g = 0;
- free(ng);
- }
-}
-
-
-
-typedef union
-{
- SHA_CTX sha;
- SHA256_CTX sha256;
- SHA512_CTX sha512;
-} HashCTX;
-
-
-struct SRPVerifier
-{
- SRP_HashAlgorithm hash_alg;
- NGConstant *ng;
-
- const char * username;
- const unsigned char * bytes_B;
- int authenticated;
-
- unsigned char M [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char H_AMK [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char session_key [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-};
-
-
-struct SRPUser
-{
- SRP_HashAlgorithm hash_alg;
- NGConstant *ng;
-
- BIGNUM *a;
- BIGNUM *A;
- BIGNUM *S;
-
- const unsigned char * bytes_A;
- int authenticated;
-
- const char * username;
- const unsigned char * password;
- int password_len;
-
- unsigned char M [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char H_AMK [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char session_key [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-};
-
-
-static int hash_init( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, HashCTX *c )
-{
- switch (alg)
- {
- case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA1_Init( &c->sha );
- case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224_Init( &c->sha256 );
- case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256_Init( &c->sha256 );
- case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384_Init( &c->sha512 );
- case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512_Init( &c->sha512 );
- default:
- return -1;
- };
-}
-static int hash_update( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, HashCTX *c, const void *data, size_t len )
-{
- switch (alg)
- {
- case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA1_Update( &c->sha, data, len );
- case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224_Update( &c->sha256, data, len );
- case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256_Update( &c->sha256, data, len );
- case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384_Update( &c->sha512, data, len );
- case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512_Update( &c->sha512, data, len );
- default:
- return -1;
- };
-}
-static int hash_final( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, HashCTX *c, unsigned char *md )
-{
- switch (alg)
- {
- case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA1_Final( md, &c->sha );
- case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224_Final( md, &c->sha256 );
- case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256_Final( md, &c->sha256 );
- case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384_Final( md, &c->sha512 );
- case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512_Final( md, &c->sha512 );
- default:
- return -1;
- };
-}
-static unsigned char * hash( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md )
-{
- switch (alg)
- {
- case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA1( d, n, md );
- case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224( d, n, md );
- case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256( d, n, md );
- case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384( d, n, md );
- case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512( d, n, md );
- default:
- return 0;
- };
-}
-static int hash_length( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg )
-{
- switch (alg)
- {
- case SRP_SHA1 : return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- case SRP_SHA224: return SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- case SRP_SHA256: return SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- case SRP_SHA384: return SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- case SRP_SHA512: return SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- default:
- return -1;
- };
-}
-
-
-static BIGNUM * H_nn( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * n1, const BIGNUM * n2 )
-{
- unsigned char buff[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
- int len_n1 = BN_num_bytes(n1);
- int len_n2 = BN_num_bytes(n2);
- int nbytes = len_n1 + len_n2;
- unsigned char * bin = (unsigned char *) malloc( nbytes );
- if (!bin)
- return 0;
- BN_bn2bin(n1, bin);
- BN_bn2bin(n2, bin + len_n1);
- hash( alg, bin, nbytes, buff );
- free(bin);
- return BN_bin2bn(buff, hash_length(alg), NULL);
-}
-
-static BIGNUM * H_nn_pad( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * n1, const BIGNUM * n2 )
-{
- unsigned char * bin;
- unsigned char buff[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
- int len_n1 = BN_num_bytes(n1);
- int len_n2 = BN_num_bytes(n2);
- int nbytes = 2 * len_n1;
-
- if ((len_n2 < 1) || (len_n2 > len_n1))
- return 0;
- bin = (unsigned char *) calloc( 1, nbytes );
- if (!bin)
- return 0;
- BN_bn2bin(n1, bin);
- BN_bn2bin(n2, bin + nbytes - len_n2);
- hash( alg, bin, nbytes, buff );
- free(bin);
- return BN_bin2bn(buff, hash_length(alg), NULL);
-}
-
-static BIGNUM * H_ns( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * n, const unsigned char * bytes, int len_bytes )
-{
- unsigned char buff[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
- int len_n = BN_num_bytes(n);
- int nbytes = len_n + len_bytes;
- unsigned char * bin = (unsigned char *) malloc( nbytes );
- if (!bin)
- return 0;
- BN_bn2bin(n, bin);
- memcpy( bin + len_n, bytes, len_bytes );
- hash( alg, bin, nbytes, buff );
- free(bin);
- return BN_bin2bn(buff, hash_length(alg), NULL);
-}
-
-static BIGNUM * calculate_x( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * salt, const char * username, const unsigned char * password, int password_len )
-{
- unsigned char ucp_hash[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- HashCTX ctx;
-
- hash_init( alg, &ctx );
-
- hash_update( alg, &ctx, username, strlen(username) );
- hash_update( alg, &ctx, ":", 1 );
- hash_update( alg, &ctx, password, password_len );
-
- hash_final( alg, &ctx, ucp_hash );
-
- return H_ns( alg, salt, ucp_hash, hash_length(alg) );
-}
-
-static void update_hash_n( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, HashCTX *ctx, const BIGNUM * n )
-{
- unsigned long len = BN_num_bytes(n);
- unsigned char * n_bytes = (unsigned char *) malloc( len );
- if (!n_bytes)
- return;
- BN_bn2bin(n, n_bytes);
- hash_update(alg, ctx, n_bytes, len);
- free(n_bytes);
-}
-
-static void hash_num( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const BIGNUM * n, unsigned char * dest )
-{
- int nbytes = BN_num_bytes(n);
- unsigned char * bin = (unsigned char *) malloc( nbytes );
- if(!bin)
- return;
- BN_bn2bin(n, bin);
- hash( alg, bin, nbytes, dest );
- free(bin);
-}
-
-static void calculate_M( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, NGConstant *ng, unsigned char * dest, const char * I, const BIGNUM * s,
- const BIGNUM * A, const BIGNUM * B, const unsigned char * K )
-{
- unsigned char H_N[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
- unsigned char H_g[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
- unsigned char H_I[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
- unsigned char H_xor[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
- HashCTX ctx;
- int i = 0;
- int hash_len = hash_length(alg);
-
- hash_num( alg, ng->N, H_N );
- hash_num( alg, ng->g, H_g );
-
- hash(alg, (const unsigned char *)I, strlen(I), H_I);
-
-
- for (i=0; i < hash_len; i++ )
- H_xor[i] = H_N[i] ^ H_g[i];
-
- hash_init( alg, &ctx );
-
- hash_update( alg, &ctx, H_xor, hash_len );
- hash_update( alg, &ctx, H_I, hash_len );
- update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, s );
- update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, A );
- update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, B );
- hash_update( alg, &ctx, K, hash_len );
-
- hash_final( alg, &ctx, dest );
-}
-
-static void calculate_H_AMK( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, unsigned char *dest, const BIGNUM * A, const unsigned char * M, const unsigned char * K )
-{
- HashCTX ctx;
-
- hash_init( alg, &ctx );
-
- update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, A );
- hash_update( alg, &ctx, M, hash_length(alg) );
- hash_update( alg, &ctx, K, hash_length(alg) );
-
- hash_final( alg, &ctx, dest );
-}
-
-
-static void init_random()
-{
-#ifdef WIN32
- HCRYPTPROV wctx;
-#else
- FILE *fp = 0;
-#endif
-
- unsigned char buff[64];
-
- if (g_initialized)
- return;
-
-#ifdef WIN32
-
- CryptAcquireContext(&wctx, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT);
-
- CryptGenRandom(wctx, sizeof(buff), (BYTE*) buff);
-
- CryptReleaseContext(wctx, 0);
-
- g_initialized = 1;
-
-#else
- fp = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r");
-
- if (fp)
- {
- size_t read = fread(buff, sizeof(buff), 1, fp);
- g_initialized = read == 1;
- fclose(fp);
- }
-#endif
-
- if (g_initialized)
- RAND_seed( buff, sizeof(buff) );
-}
-
-
-/***********************************************************************************************************
- *
- * Exported Functions
- *
- ***********************************************************************************************************/
-
-void srp_random_seed( const unsigned char * random_data, int data_length )
-{
- g_initialized = 1;
-
- if (random_data)
- RAND_seed( random_data, data_length );
-}
-
-
-void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
- SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
- const unsigned char * password, int len_password,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_s, int * len_s,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_v, int * len_v,
- const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex )
-{
- BIGNUM * s = BN_new();
- BIGNUM * v = BN_new();
- BIGNUM * x = 0;
- BN_CTX * ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- NGConstant * ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
-
- if( !s || !v || !ctx || !ng )
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
-
- init_random(); /* Only happens once */
-
- BN_rand(s, 4*32, -1, 0); // MODIFIED!!!
-
- x = calculate_x( alg, s, username, password, len_password );
-
- if( !x )
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
-
- BN_mod_exp(v, ng->g, x, ng->N, ctx);
-
- *len_s = BN_num_bytes(s);
- *len_v = BN_num_bytes(v);
-
- *bytes_s = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_s );
- *bytes_v = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_v );
-
- if (!bytes_s || !bytes_v)
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
-
- BN_bn2bin(s, (unsigned char *) *bytes_s);
- BN_bn2bin(v, (unsigned char *) *bytes_v);
-
- cleanup_and_exit:
- delete_ng( ng );
- BN_free(s);
- BN_free(v);
- BN_free(x);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-}
-
-void
-srp_verifier_get_B(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
- const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_b, int * len_b,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B,
- const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex)
-{
- BIGNUM *v = BN_bin2bn(bytes_v, len_v, NULL);
- BIGNUM *k = 0;
- BIGNUM *b = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *B = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *tmp1 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *tmp2 = BN_new();
- BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- NGConstant *ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
-
- *len_b = 0;
- *bytes_b = 0;
- *len_B = 0;
- *bytes_B = 0;
-
- init_random(); /* Only happens once */
-
- BN_rand(b, 256, -1, 0);
-
- k = H_nn_pad(alg, ng->N, ng->g); //MODIFIED
-
- /* B = kv + g^b */
- BN_mul(tmp1, k, v, ctx);
- BN_mod_exp(tmp2, ng->g, b, ng->N, ctx);
- BN_mod_add(B, tmp1, tmp2, ng->N, ctx);
-
- *len_B = BN_num_bytes(B);
- *bytes_B = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_B );
- BN_bn2bin( B, (unsigned char *) *bytes_B );
-
- *len_b = BN_num_bytes(b);
- *bytes_b = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_b );
- BN_bn2bin( b, (unsigned char *) *bytes_b );
-
- BN_free(b); // Added -- not sure about these, but they look necessary
- BN_free(B); // Added -- not sure about these, but they look necessary
- BN_free(v);
- BN_free(k);
- BN_free(tmp1);
- BN_free(tmp2);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- delete_ng(ng);
-}
-
-/* Out: bytes_B, len_B.
- *
- * On failure, bytes_B will be set to NULL and len_B will be set to 0
- */
-
-struct SRPVerifier * srp_verifier_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
- const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
- const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
- const unsigned char * bytes_A, int len_A,
- const unsigned char * bytes_b, int len_b,
- const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
- const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex )
-{
- BIGNUM *s = BN_bin2bn(bytes_s, len_s, NULL);
- BIGNUM *v = BN_bin2bn(bytes_v, len_v, NULL);
- BIGNUM *A = BN_bin2bn(bytes_A, len_A, NULL);
- BIGNUM *u = 0;
- BIGNUM *b = BN_bin2bn(bytes_b, len_b, NULL);;
- BIGNUM *B = BN_bin2bn(bytes_B, len_B, NULL);;
- BIGNUM *S = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *k = 0;
- BIGNUM *tmp1 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *tmp2 = BN_new();
- BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- int ulen = strlen(username) + 1;
- NGConstant *ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
- struct SRPVerifier *ver = 0;
-
- if( !s || !v || !A || !B || !S || !b || !tmp1 || !tmp2 || !ctx || !ng )
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
-
- ver = (struct SRPVerifier *) malloc( sizeof(struct SRPVerifier) );
-
- if (!ver)
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
-
- init_random(); /* Only happens once */
-
- ver->username = (char *) malloc( ulen );
- ver->hash_alg = alg;
- ver->ng = ng;
-
- if (!ver->username)
- {
- free(ver);
- ver = 0;
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
- }
-
- memcpy( (char*)ver->username, username, ulen );
-
- ver->authenticated = 0;
-
- /* SRP-6a safety check */
- BN_mod(tmp1, A, ng->N, ctx);
- if ( !BN_is_zero(tmp1) )
- {
- k = H_nn_pad(alg, ng->N, ng->g); //MODIFIED
-
- u = H_nn(alg, A, B);
-
- /* S = (A *(v^u)) ^ b */
- BN_mod_exp(tmp1, v, u, ng->N, ctx);
- BN_mul(tmp2, A, tmp1, ctx);
- BN_mod_exp(S, tmp2, b, ng->N, ctx);
-
- hash_num(alg, S, ver->session_key);
-
- calculate_M( alg, ng, ver->M, username, s, A, B, ver->session_key );
- calculate_H_AMK( alg, ver->H_AMK, A, ver->M, ver->session_key );
-
- ver->bytes_B = bytes_B;
- }
-
- cleanup_and_exit:
- BN_free(s);
- BN_free(v);
- BN_free(A);
- if (u) BN_free(u);
- if (k) BN_free(k);
- BN_free(B);
- BN_free(S);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(tmp1);
- BN_free(tmp2);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- return ver;
-}
-
-
-
-
-void srp_verifier_delete( struct SRPVerifier * ver )
-{
- if (ver)
- {
- delete_ng( ver->ng );
- free( (char *) ver->username );
- free( (unsigned char *) ver->bytes_B );
- memset(ver, 0, sizeof(*ver));
- free( ver );
- }
-}
-
-
-
-int srp_verifier_is_authenticated( struct SRPVerifier * ver )
-{
- return ver->authenticated;
-}
-
-
-const char * srp_verifier_get_username( struct SRPVerifier * ver )
-{
- return ver->username;
-}
-
-
-const unsigned char * srp_verifier_get_session_key( struct SRPVerifier * ver, int * key_length )
-{
- if (key_length)
- *key_length = hash_length( ver->hash_alg );
- return ver->session_key;
-}
-
-
-int srp_verifier_get_session_key_length( struct SRPVerifier * ver )
-{
- return hash_length( ver->hash_alg );
-}
-
-
-/* user_M must be exactly SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes in size */
-void srp_verifier_verify_session( struct SRPVerifier * ver, const unsigned char * user_M, const unsigned char ** bytes_HAMK )
-{
- if ( memcmp( ver->M, user_M, hash_length(ver->hash_alg) ) == 0 )
- {
- ver->authenticated = 1;
- *bytes_HAMK = ver->H_AMK;
- }
- else
- *bytes_HAMK = NULL;
-}
-
-/*******************************************************************************/
-
-struct SRPUser * srp_user_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
- const unsigned char * bytes_password, int len_password,
- const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex )
-{
- struct SRPUser *usr = (struct SRPUser *) malloc( sizeof(struct SRPUser) );
- int ulen = strlen(username) + 1;
-
- if (!usr)
- goto err_exit;
-
- init_random(); /* Only happens once */
-
- usr->hash_alg = alg;
- usr->ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
-
- usr->a = BN_new();
- usr->A = BN_new();
- usr->S = BN_new();
-
- if (!usr->ng || !usr->a || !usr->A || !usr->S)
- goto err_exit;
-
- usr->username = (const char *) malloc(ulen);
- usr->password = (const unsigned char *) malloc(len_password);
- usr->password_len = len_password;
-
- if (!usr->username || !usr->password)
- goto err_exit;
-
- memcpy((char *)usr->username, username, ulen);
- memcpy((char *)usr->password, bytes_password, len_password);
-
- usr->authenticated = 0;
-
- usr->bytes_A = 0;
-
- return usr;
-
- err_exit:
- if (usr)
- {
- BN_free(usr->a);
- BN_free(usr->A);
- BN_free(usr->S);
- if (usr->username)
- free((void*)usr->username);
- if (usr->password)
- {
- memset((void*)usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
- free((void*)usr->password);
- }
- free(usr);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-void srp_user_delete( struct SRPUser * usr )
-{
- if( usr )
- {
- BN_free( usr->a );
- BN_free( usr->A );
- BN_free( usr->S );
-
- delete_ng( usr->ng );
-
- memset((void*)usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
-
- free((char *)usr->username);
- free((char *)usr->password);
-
- if (usr->bytes_A)
- free( (char *)usr->bytes_A );
-
- memset(usr, 0, sizeof(*usr));
- free( usr );
- }
-}
-
-
-
-int srp_user_is_authenticated( struct SRPUser * usr)
-{
- return usr->authenticated;
-}
-
-
-const char * srp_user_get_username( struct SRPUser * usr )
-{
- return usr->username;
-}
-
-
-
-const unsigned char * srp_user_get_session_key( struct SRPUser * usr, int * key_length )
-{
- if (key_length)
- *key_length = hash_length( usr->hash_alg );
- return usr->session_key;
-}
-
-
-int srp_user_get_session_key_length( struct SRPUser * usr )
-{
- return hash_length( usr->hash_alg );
-}
-
-
-
-/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */
-void srp_user_start_authentication( struct SRPUser * usr, const char ** username,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_A, int * len_A )
-{
- BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-
- BN_rand(usr->a, 256, -1, 0);
-
- BN_mod_exp(usr->A, usr->ng->g, usr->a, usr->ng->N, ctx);
-
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- *len_A = BN_num_bytes(usr->A);
- *bytes_A = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_A );
-
- if (!*bytes_A)
- {
- *len_A = 0;
- *bytes_A = 0;
- *username = 0;
- return;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin( usr->A, (unsigned char *) *bytes_A );
-
- usr->bytes_A = *bytes_A;
- *username = usr->username;
-}
-
-
-/* Output: bytes_M. Buffer length is SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH */
-void srp_user_process_challenge( struct SRPUser * usr,
- const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
- const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_M, int * len_M )
-{
- BIGNUM *s = BN_bin2bn(bytes_s, len_s, NULL);
- BIGNUM *B = BN_bin2bn(bytes_B, len_B, NULL);
- BIGNUM *u = 0;
- BIGNUM *x = 0;
- BIGNUM *k = 0;
- BIGNUM *v = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *tmp1 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *tmp2 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *tmp3 = BN_new();
- BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-
- *len_M = 0;
- *bytes_M = 0;
-
- if( !s || !B || !v || !tmp1 || !tmp2 || !tmp3 || !ctx )
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
-
- u = H_nn_pad(usr->hash_alg, usr->A, B); //MODIFIED
-
- if (!u)
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
-
- x = calculate_x( usr->hash_alg, s, usr->username, usr->password, usr->password_len );
-
- if (!x)
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
-
- k = H_nn_pad(usr->hash_alg, usr->ng->N, usr->ng->g); //MODIFIED
-
- if (!k)
- goto cleanup_and_exit;
-
- /* SRP-6a safety check */
- if ( !BN_is_zero(B) && !BN_is_zero(u) )
- {
- BN_mod_exp(v, usr->ng->g, x, usr->ng->N, ctx);
-
- /* S = (B - k*(g^x)) ^ (a + ux) */
- BN_mul(tmp1, u, x, ctx);
- BN_add(tmp2, usr->a, tmp1); /* tmp2 = (a + ux) */
- BN_mod_exp(tmp1, usr->ng->g, x, usr->ng->N, ctx);
- BN_mul(tmp3, k, tmp1, ctx); /* tmp3 = k*(g^x) */
- BN_sub(tmp1, B, tmp3); /* tmp1 = (B - K*(g^x)) */
- BN_mod_exp(usr->S, tmp1, tmp2, usr->ng->N, ctx);
-
- hash_num(usr->hash_alg, usr->S, usr->session_key);
-
- calculate_M( usr->hash_alg, usr->ng, usr->M, usr->username, s, usr->A, B, usr->session_key );
- calculate_H_AMK( usr->hash_alg, usr->H_AMK, usr->A, usr->M, usr->session_key );
-
- *bytes_M = usr->M;
- if (len_M)
- *len_M = hash_length( usr->hash_alg );
- }
- else
- {
- *bytes_M = NULL;
- if (len_M)
- *len_M = 0;
- }
-
- cleanup_and_exit:
-
- BN_free(s);
- BN_free(B);
- BN_free(u);
- BN_free(x);
- BN_free(k);
- BN_free(v);
- BN_free(tmp1);
- BN_free(tmp2);
- BN_free(tmp3);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-}
-
-
-void srp_user_verify_session( struct SRPUser * usr, const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK )
-{
- if ( memcmp( usr->H_AMK, bytes_HAMK, hash_length(usr->hash_alg) ) == 0 )
- usr->authenticated = 1;
-}
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Secure Remote Password 6a implementation
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Tom Cocagne. All rights reserved.
- * https://github.com/cocagne/csrp
- *
- * The MIT License (MIT)
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Tom Cocagne
- *
- * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
- * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
- * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
- * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
- * of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
- * so, subject to the following conditions:
- *
- * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
- * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
- * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
- * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
- * SOFTWARE.
- *
- */
-
-/*
- *
- * Purpose: This is a direct implementation of the Secure Remote Password
- * Protocol version 6a as described by
- * http://srp.stanford.edu/design.html
- *
- * Author: tom.cocagne@gmail.com (Tom Cocagne)
- *
- * Dependencies: OpenSSL (and Advapi32.lib on Windows)
- *
- * Usage: Refer to test_srp.c for a demonstration
- *
- * Notes:
- * This library allows multiple combinations of hashing algorithms and
- * prime number constants. For authentication to succeed, the hash and
- * prime number constants must match between
- * srp_create_salted_verification_key(), srp_user_new(),
- * and srp_verifier_new(). A recommended approach is to determine the
- * desired level of security for an application and globally define the
- * hash and prime number constants to the predetermined values.
- *
- * As one might suspect, more bits means more security. As one might also
- * suspect, more bits also means more processing time. The test_srp.c
- * program can be easily modified to profile various combinations of
- * hash & prime number pairings.
- */
-
-#ifndef SRP_H
-#define SRP_H
-
-
-struct SRPVerifier;
-struct SRPUser;
-
-typedef enum
-{
- SRP_NG_1024,
- SRP_NG_2048,
- SRP_NG_4096,
- SRP_NG_8192,
- SRP_NG_CUSTOM
-} SRP_NGType;
-
-typedef enum
-{
- SRP_SHA1,
- SRP_SHA224,
- SRP_SHA256,
- SRP_SHA384,
- SRP_SHA512
-} SRP_HashAlgorithm;
-
-
-/* This library will automatically seed the OpenSSL random number generator
- * using cryptographically sound random data on Windows & Linux. If this is
- * undesirable behavior or the host OS does not provide a /dev/urandom file,
- * this function may be called to seed the random number generator with
- * alternate data.
- *
- * The random data should include at least as many bits of entropy as the
- * largest hash function used by the application. So, for example, if a
- * 512-bit hash function is used, the random data requies at least 512
- * bits of entropy.
- *
- * Passing a null pointer to this function will cause this library to skip
- * seeding the random number generator. This is only legitimate if it is
- * absolutely known that the OpenSSL random number generator has already
- * been sufficiently seeded within the running application.
- *
- * Notes:
- * * This function is optional on Windows & Linux and mandatory on all
- * other platforms.
- */
-void srp_random_seed( const unsigned char * random_data, int data_length );
-
-
-/* Out: bytes_s, len_s, bytes_v, len_v
- *
- * The caller is responsible for freeing the memory allocated for bytes_s and bytes_v
- *
- * The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type.
- * If provided, they must contain ASCII text of the hexidecimal notation.
- */
-void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
- SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
- const unsigned char * password, int len_password,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_s, int * len_s,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_v, int * len_v,
- const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
-
-
-/* Out: bytes_B, len_B.
- */
-
-void
-srp_verifier_get_B(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
- const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_b, int * len_b,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B,
- const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex);
-
-struct SRPVerifier * srp_verifier_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
- const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
- const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
- const unsigned char * bytes_A, int len_A,
- const unsigned char * bytes_b, int len_b,
- const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
- const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
-
-
-void srp_verifier_delete( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
-
-
-int srp_verifier_is_authenticated( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
-
-
-const char * srp_verifier_get_username( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
-
-/* key_length may be null */
-const unsigned char * srp_verifier_get_session_key( struct SRPVerifier * ver, int * key_length );
-
-
-int srp_verifier_get_session_key_length( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
-
-
-/* user_M must be exactly srp_verifier_get_session_key_length() bytes in size */
-void srp_verifier_verify_session( struct SRPVerifier * ver,
- const unsigned char * user_M,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_HAMK );
-
-/*******************************************************************************/
-
-/* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type */
-struct SRPUser * srp_user_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
- const unsigned char * bytes_password, int len_password,
- const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
-
-void srp_user_delete( struct SRPUser * usr );
-
-int srp_user_is_authenticated( struct SRPUser * usr);
-
-
-const char * srp_user_get_username( struct SRPUser * usr );
-
-/* key_length may be null */
-const unsigned char * srp_user_get_session_key( struct SRPUser * usr, int * key_length );
-
-int srp_user_get_session_key_length( struct SRPUser * usr );
-
-/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */
-void srp_user_start_authentication( struct SRPUser * usr, const char ** username,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_A, int * len_A );
-
-/* Output: bytes_M, len_M (len_M may be null and will always be
- * srp_user_get_session_key_length() bytes in size) */
-void srp_user_process_challenge( struct SRPUser * usr,
- const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
- const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
- const unsigned char ** bytes_M, int * len_M );
-
-/* bytes_HAMK must be exactly srp_user_get_session_key_length() bytes in size */
-void srp_user_verify_session( struct SRPUser * usr, const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK );
-
-#endif /* Include Guard */
-Subproject commit ad2bc75edaf09816a484c39dfebf6de016247db4
+Subproject commit 1b9954cba18631c9671595fca85565308e8b0972
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
-#include "pair_ap/pair-internal.h"
+#include "pair_ap/pair.h"
#include "plist/plist.h"
#endif
typedef enum { ts_ntp, ts_ptp } timing_t;
typedef enum { ap_1, ap_2 } airplay_t;
+typedef struct {
+ uint8_t *data;
+ size_t len;
+ size_t size;
+} ap2_buffer;
+
+typedef struct {
+ int is_encrypted;
+ struct pair_setup_context *setup_ctx;
+ struct pair_verify_context *verify_ctx;
+ struct pair_cipher_context *cipher_ctx;
+
+ ap2_buffer encrypted_buf;
+ ap2_buffer plain_buf;
+} ap2_pairing;
+
+/*
typedef struct file_cipher_context {
struct pair_cipher_context *cipher_context;
int active; // can be created during a pair setup but not activated until next read
void *input_plaintext_buffer_toq;
size_t input_plaintext_buffer_bytes_occupied;
} file_cipher_context;
+*/
#endif
typedef struct {
pthread_t rtp_realtime_audio_thread;
pthread_t rtp_buffered_audio_thread;
- int pairing_mode;
- file_cipher_context control_cipher_context;
- struct verifier_setup_context *server_setup_ctx;
-
int last_anchor_info_is_valid;
uint64_t last_anchor_clock_offset;
uint64_t last_anchor_time_of_update;
int ap2_rate; // protect with flush mutex, 0 means don't play, 1 means play
int ap2_play_enabled; // protect with flush mutex
+ ap2_pairing ap2_control_pairing;
+
int event_socket;
SOCKADDR ap2_remote_control_socket_addr; // a socket pointing to the control port of the client
socklen_t ap2_remote_control_socket_addr_length;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
-#include "csrp/srp.h"
-#include "pair_ap/pair-tlv.h"
#include "pair_ap/pair.h"
#include "plist/plist.h"
-#include <sodium.h>
-// #include "proxy_ap/server.h"
#include "plist_xml_strings.h"
#include "ptp-utilities.h"
#endif
}
}
-// this will read a block of the size specified to the buffer
-// and will return either with the block or on error
-ssize_t read_sized_block(int fd, void *buf, size_t count) {
- ssize_t response, nread;
- size_t inbuf = 0; // bytes already in the buffer
- int keep_trying = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
+static void buf_add(ap2_buffer *buf, uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+ if (buf->len + in_len > buf->size) {
+ buf->size = buf->len + in_len + 2048; // Extra legroom to avoid future memcpy's
+ uint8_t *new = malloc(buf->size);
+ memcpy(new, buf->data, buf->len);
+ free(buf->data);
+ buf->data = new;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, in_len);
+ buf->len += in_len;
+}
- do {
- nread = read(fd, buf + inbuf, count - inbuf);
- if (nread == 0) {
- // a blocking read that returns zero means eof -- implies connection closed
- debug(3, "read_sized_block connection closed.");
- keep_trying = 0;
- } else if (nread < 0) {
- if (errno == EAGAIN) {
- debug(1, "read_sized_block getting Error 11 -- EAGAIN from a blocking read!");
- }
- if ((errno != ECONNRESET) && (errno != EAGAIN) && (errno != EINTR)) {
- char errorstring[1024];
- strerror_r(errno, (char *)errorstring, sizeof(errorstring));
- debug(1, "read_sized_block read error %d: \"%s\".", errno, (char *)errorstring);
- keep_trying = 0;
- }
- } else {
- inbuf += (size_t)nread;
- }
- } while ((keep_trying != 0) && (inbuf < count));
- if (nread <= 0)
- response = nread;
- else
- response = inbuf;
- return response;
+static void buf_drain(ap2_buffer *buf, ssize_t len) {
+ if (len < 0 || (size_t)len >= buf->len) {
+ free(buf->data);
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(ap2_buffer));
+ return;
+ }
+ memmove(buf->data, buf->data + len, buf->len - len);
+ buf->len -= len;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
+static size_t buf_remove(ap2_buffer *buf, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
+ size_t bytes = (buf->len > out_len) ? out_len : buf->len;
+ memcpy(out, buf->data, bytes);
+ buf_drain(buf, bytes);
+ return bytes;
+}
-/* ----------------------------- DEFINES ETC ------------------------------- */
+static ssize_t read_encrypted(int fd, ap2_pairing *ctx, void *buf, size_t count) {
+ uint8_t in[4096];
+ uint8_t *plain;
+ size_t plain_len;
-#define USERNAME "Pair-Setup"
-#define AUTHTAG_LENGTH 16
-#define NONCE_LENGTH 12 // 96 bits according to chacha poly1305
-#define RESPONSE_BUFSIZE 8192
-#define ENCRYPTED_LEN_MAX 0x400
-#define PASSWORD "3939"
+ // If there is leftover decoded content from the last pass just return that
+ if (ctx->plain_buf.len > 0) {
+ return buf_remove(&ctx->plain_buf, buf, count);
+ }
-#define RTSP_VERSION "RTSP/1.0"
-#define POST_PAIR_SETUP "POST /pair-setup"
-#define OPTIONS "OPTIONS *"
-#define GET_INFO "GET /info"
-#define POST_AUTH_SETUP "POST /auth-setup"
-#define POST_FP_SETUP "POST /fp-setup"
+ do {
+ ssize_t got = read(fd, in, sizeof(in));
+ if (got <= 0)
+ return got;
+ buf_add(&ctx->encrypted_buf, in, got);
-/* Fairplay magic */
-/*
-static uint8_t server_fp_reply1[] =
- "\x46\x50\x4c\x59\x03\x01\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x82\x02\x00\x0f\x9f\x3f\x9e\x0a"
- "\x25\x21\xdb\xdf\x31\x2a\xb2\xbf\xb2\x9e\x8d\x23\x2b\x63\x76\xa8\xc8\x18\x70"
- "\x1d\x22\xae\x93\xd8\x27\x37\xfe\xaf\x9d\xb4\xfd\xf4\x1c\x2d\xba\x9d\x1f\x49"
- "\xca\xaa\xbf\x65\x91\xac\x1f\x7b\xc6\xf7\xe0\x66\x3d\x21\xaf\xe0\x15\x65\x95"
- "\x3e\xab\x81\xf4\x18\xce\xed\x09\x5a\xdb\x7c\x3d\x0e\x25\x49\x09\xa7\x98\x31"
- "\xd4\x9c\x39\x82\x97\x34\x34\xfa\xcb\x42\xc6\x3a\x1c\xd9\x11\xa6\xfe\x94\x1a"
- "\x8a\x6d\x4a\x74\x3b\x46\xc3\xa7\x64\x9e\x44\xc7\x89\x55\xe4\x9d\x81\x55\x00"
- "\x95\x49\xc4\xe2\xf7\xa3\xf6\xd5\xba";
-static uint8_t server_fp_reply2[] =
- "\x46\x50\x4c\x59\x03\x01\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x82\x02\x01\xcf\x32\xa2\x57\x14"
- "\xb2\x52\x4f\x8a\xa0\xad\x7a\xf1\x64\xe3\x7b\xcf\x44\x24\xe2\x00\x04\x7e\xfc"
- "\x0a\xd6\x7a\xfc\xd9\x5d\xed\x1c\x27\x30\xbb\x59\x1b\x96\x2e\xd6\x3a\x9c\x4d"
- "\xed\x88\xba\x8f\xc7\x8d\xe6\x4d\x91\xcc\xfd\x5c\x7b\x56\xda\x88\xe3\x1f\x5c"
- "\xce\xaf\xc7\x43\x19\x95\xa0\x16\x65\xa5\x4e\x19\x39\xd2\x5b\x94\xdb\x64\xb9"
- "\xe4\x5d\x8d\x06\x3e\x1e\x6a\xf0\x7e\x96\x56\x16\x2b\x0e\xfa\x40\x42\x75\xea"
- "\x5a\x44\xd9\x59\x1c\x72\x56\xb9\xfb\xe6\x51\x38\x98\xb8\x02\x27\x72\x19\x88"
- "\x57\x16\x50\x94\x2a\xd9\x46\x68\x8a";
-static uint8_t server_fp_reply3[] =
- "\x46\x50\x4c\x59\x03\x01\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x82\x02\x02\xc1\x69\xa3\x52\xee"
- "\xed\x35\xb1\x8c\xdd\x9c\x58\xd6\x4f\x16\xc1\x51\x9a\x89\xeb\x53\x17\xbd\x0d"
- "\x43\x36\xcd\x68\xf6\x38\xff\x9d\x01\x6a\x5b\x52\xb7\xfa\x92\x16\xb2\xb6\x54"
- "\x82\xc7\x84\x44\x11\x81\x21\xa2\xc7\xfe\xd8\x3d\xb7\x11\x9e\x91\x82\xaa\xd7"
- "\xd1\x8c\x70\x63\xe2\xa4\x57\x55\x59\x10\xaf\x9e\x0e\xfc\x76\x34\x7d\x16\x40"
- "\x43\x80\x7f\x58\x1e\xe4\xfb\xe4\x2c\xa9\xde\xdc\x1b\x5e\xb2\xa3\xaa\x3d\x2e"
- "\xcd\x59\xe7\xee\xe7\x0b\x36\x29\xf2\x2a\xfd\x16\x1d\x87\x73\x53\xdd\xb9\x9a"
- "\xdc\x8e\x07\x00\x6e\x56\xf8\x50\xce";
-static uint8_t server_fp_reply4[] =
- "\x46\x50\x4c\x59\x03\x01\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x82\x02\x03\x90\x01\xe1\x72\x7e"
- "\x0f\x57\xf9\xf5\x88\x0d\xb1\x04\xa6\x25\x7a\x23\xf5\xcf\xff\x1a\xbb\xe1\xe9"
- "\x30\x45\x25\x1a\xfb\x97\xeb\x9f\xc0\x01\x1e\xbe\x0f\x3a\x81\xdf\x5b\x69\x1d"
- "\x76\xac\xb2\xf7\xa5\xc7\x08\xe3\xd3\x28\xf5\x6b\xb3\x9d\xbd\xe5\xf2\x9c\x8a"
- "\x17\xf4\x81\x48\x7e\x3a\xe8\x63\xc6\x78\x32\x54\x22\xe6\xf7\x8e\x16\x6d\x18"
- "\xaa\x7f\xd6\x36\x25\x8b\xce\x28\x72\x6f\x66\x1f\x73\x88\x93\xce\x44\x31\x1e"
- "\x4b\xe6\xc0\x53\x51\x93\xe5\xef\x72\xe8\x68\x62\x33\x72\x9c\x22\x7d\x82\x0c"
- "\x99\x94\x45\xd8\x92\x46\xc8\xc3\x59";
-
-static uint8_t server_fp_header[] = "\x46\x50\x4c\x59\x03\x01\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14";
+ ssize_t consumed = pair_decrypt(&plain, &plain_len, ctx->encrypted_buf.data, ctx->encrypted_buf.len, ctx->cipher_ctx);
+ if (consumed < 0)
+ return -1;
+ buf_drain(&ctx->encrypted_buf, consumed);
+ } while (plain_len == 0);
+
+ // Fast path, avoids some memcpy + allocs in case of the normal, small message
+/* if (ctx->plain_buf.len == 0 && plain_len < count) {
+ memcpy(buf, plain, plain_len);
+ free(plain);
+ return plain_len;
+ }
*/
+ buf_add(&ctx->plain_buf, plain, plain_len);
+ free(plain);
-/* 3072 n and g for SRP*/
-
-const char *nl_hex = "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B"
- "139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485"
- "B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1F"
- "E649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23"
- "DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32"
- "905E462E36CE3BE39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF69558"
- "17183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521"
- "ABDF1CBA64ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7ABF5AE8CDB0933D7"
- "1E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6BF12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B1817"
- "7B200CBBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB3143DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82"
- "D120A93AD2CAFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF";
-const char *gl_hex = "5";
-
-enum pair_keys {
- PAIR_SETUP_MSG01 = 0,
- PAIR_SETUP_MSG02,
- PAIR_SETUP_MSG03,
- PAIR_SETUP_MSG04,
- PAIR_SETUP_MSG05,
- PAIR_SETUP_MSG06,
- PAIR_SETUP_SIGN,
- PAIR_VERIFY_MSG01,
- PAIR_VERIFY_MSG02,
- PAIR_VERIFY_MSG03,
- PAIR_VERIFY_MSG04,
- PAIR_CONTROL_WRITE,
- PAIR_CONTROL_READ,
- PAIR_EVENTS_WRITE,
- PAIR_EVENTS_READ,
-};
-
-struct pair_keys_map {
- uint8_t state;
- const char *salt;
- const char *info;
- const char nonce[8];
-};
-
-static struct pair_keys_map pair_keys_map[] = {
- // Used for /pair-setup
- {0x01, NULL, NULL, ""},
- {0x02, NULL, NULL, ""},
- {0x03, NULL, NULL, ""},
- {0x04, NULL, NULL, ""},
- {0x05, "Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Salt", "Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Info", "PS-Msg05"},
- {0x06, "Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Salt", "Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Info", "PS-Msg06"},
- {0, "Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Salt", "Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Info", ""},
-
- // Used for /pair-verify
- {0x01, NULL, NULL, ""},
- {0x02, "Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Salt", "Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Info", "PV-Msg02"},
- {0x03, "Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Salt", "Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Info", "PV-Msg03"},
- {0x04, NULL, NULL, ""},
-
- // Encryption/decryption of control channel
- {0, "Control-Salt", "Control-Write-Encryption-Key", ""},
- {0, "Control-Salt", "Control-Read-Encryption-Key", ""},
-
- // Encryption/decryption of event channel
- {0, "Events-Salt", "Events-Write-Encryption-Key", ""},
- {0, "Events-Salt", "Events-Read-Encryption-Key", ""},
-};
-
-enum pair_method {
- PairingMethodPairSetup = 0x00,
- PairingMethodPairSetupWithAuth = 0x01,
- PairingMethodPairVerify = 0x02,
- PairingMethodAddPairing = 0x03,
- PairingMethodRemovePairing = 0x04,
- PairingMethodListPairings = 0x05
-};
-
-enum pair_flags {
- PairingFlagsTransient = 0x10,
-};
-
-struct verifier_setup_context {
- struct pair_definition *type;
-
- struct SRPVerifier *verifier;
-
- char pin[4];
- char device_id[17]; // Incl. zero term
-
- uint8_t *pkA;
- uint64_t pkA_len;
-
- const uint8_t *pkB;
- int pkB_len;
-
- const uint8_t *b;
- int b_len;
-
- uint8_t *M1;
- uint64_t M1_len;
-
- const uint8_t *M2;
- int M2_len;
-
- const uint8_t *v;
- int v_len;
-
- const uint8_t *salt;
- int salt_len;
- uint8_t public_key[crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
- uint8_t private_key[crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES];
- // Hex-formatet concatenation of public + private, 0-terminated
- char auth_key[2 * (crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES + crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES) + 1];
-
- // We don't actually use the server's epk and authtag for anything
- uint8_t *epk;
- uint64_t epk_len;
- uint8_t *authtag;
- uint64_t authtag_len;
+ return buf_remove(&ctx->plain_buf, buf, count);
+}
- int setup_is_completed;
- const char *errmsg;
-};
+static ssize_t write_encrypted(rtsp_conn_info *conn, const void *buf, size_t count) {
+ uint8_t *encrypted;
+ size_t encrypted_len;
-// static struct verifier_setup_context server_setup_ctx;
-
-ssize_t write_encrypted(file_cipher_context *context, const void *buf, size_t count) {
- // need to make this cancellable!
- // encrypt the contents of the buffer
- ssize_t response;
- uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = {0};
- // uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
- uint8_t *plain_block;
- uint8_t *cipher_block;
- uint16_t block_len;
- int nblocks;
- int ret;
- int i;
-
- if ((count == 0) || (buf == NULL)) {
- debug(1, "encrypting a null character sequence");
- response = 0;
- } else {
- // Encryption is done in blocks, where each block consists of a short, the
- // encrypted data and an auth tag. The short is the size of the encrypted
- // data. The encrypted data in the block cannot exceed ENCRYPTED_LEN_MAX.
- nblocks = 1 + ((count - 1) / ENCRYPTED_LEN_MAX); // Ceiling of division
-
- ssize_t ctl = nblocks * (sizeof(block_len) + AUTHTAG_LENGTH) + count;
- // size_t hdh = 0;
- void *ciphertext = malloc(ctl);
- if (ciphertext != NULL) {
-
- context->cipher_context->encryption_counter_prev =
- context->cipher_context->encryption_counter;
-
- for (i = 0, plain_block = (uint8_t *)buf, cipher_block = ciphertext; i < nblocks; i++) {
- // If it is the last block we will encrypt only the remaining data
- if (i == nblocks - 1) {
- uint8_t *b = (uint8_t *)buf;
- block_len = b + count - plain_block;
- } else
- block_len = ENCRYPTED_LEN_MAX;
-
- memcpy(nonce + 4, &(context->cipher_context->encryption_counter),
- sizeof(context->cipher_context->encryption_counter)); // TODO BE or LE?
-
- // Write the ciphered block
- memcpy(cipher_block, &block_len, sizeof(block_len)); // TODO BE or LE?
-
- unsigned long long cipher_length = 0;
- ret = crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt(
- cipher_block + sizeof(block_len), // ciphertext
- &cipher_length,
- plain_block, // message
- block_len, // message length
- (unsigned char *)&block_len, // additional data
- sizeof(block_len), // additional data length
- NULL,
- nonce, // nonce
- context->cipher_context->encryption_key // key
- );
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- debug(1, "Encryption with chacha poly1305 failed");
- context->cipher_context->encryption_counter =
- context->cipher_context->encryption_counter_prev;
- free(ciphertext);
- } else {
- plain_block += block_len;
- cipher_block += block_len + sizeof(block_len) + AUTHTAG_LENGTH;
- context->cipher_context->encryption_counter++;
- }
- }
- // maybe this really should be write_sized_block, similar to read_sized_block
- ssize_t trywrite = write(context->fd, ciphertext, ctl);
- if (trywrite != ctl)
- debug(1, "write_encrypted write failure");
- free(ciphertext);
- response = count; // pretend only the plaintext number of bytes were written
- } else {
- // can't allocate memory for the cyphertext
- errno = ENOMEM;
- response = -1;
- }
+ ssize_t ret = pair_encrypt(&encrypted, &encrypted_len, buf, count, conn->ap2_control_pairing.cipher_ctx);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ debug(1, pair_cipher_errmsg(conn->ap2_control_pairing.cipher_ctx));
+ return -1;
}
- return response;
-}
-ssize_t read_encrypted(file_cipher_context *context, void *buf, size_t count) {
- // need to make this cancellable!
- // if the plaintext buffer is empty, this will
- // read an encrypted block and decipher it to plaintext
- // this will then return bytes in the plaintext buffer
- // up to the limit of the count
- ssize_t response = 0;
- if (context->input_plaintext_buffer == NULL) {
- response = -1;
- uint16_t block_len;
- if (read_sized_block(context->fd, &block_len, sizeof(block_len)) == sizeof(block_len)) {
- void *cipher_block = malloc(block_len + AUTHTAG_LENGTH);
- if (cipher_block != NULL) {
- if (read_sized_block(context->fd, cipher_block, (block_len + AUTHTAG_LENGTH)) ==
- block_len + AUTHTAG_LENGTH) {
- // here we have the encrypted block
- uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = {0};
- uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
- context->input_plaintext_buffer = malloc(block_len); // this should be more than enough
- if (context->input_plaintext_buffer != NULL) {
- memcpy(tag, cipher_block + block_len, sizeof(tag));
- memcpy(nonce + 4, &(context->cipher_context->decryption_counter),
- sizeof(context->cipher_context->decryption_counter)); // TODO BE or LE?
- unsigned long long new_payload_length = 0;
- int ret = crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt(
- context->input_plaintext_buffer, // m
- &new_payload_length, // mlen_p
- NULL, // nsec,
- cipher_block, // cipher text
- block_len + AUTHTAG_LENGTH, // length of the ciphertext
- (unsigned char *)&block_len, // authenticated additional data
- sizeof(block_len), // authenticated additional data length
- nonce, // nonce
- context->cipher_context->decryption_key // key
- );
- free(cipher_block);
- cipher_block = NULL;
- if (ret == 0) {
- response = 0; // decryption was successful
- context->cipher_context->decryption_counter++;
- context->input_plaintext_buffer_toq = context->input_plaintext_buffer;
- context->input_plaintext_buffer_bytes_occupied = block_len;
- } else {
- // decryption failed
- debug(1, "decryption failed.");
- free(context->input_plaintext_buffer);
- context->input_plaintext_buffer = NULL;
- errno = EILSEQ; // illegal byte sequence
- }
- } else {
- // failed to allocate a plaintext buffer
- debug(1, "could not allocate a plaintext buffer");
- free(cipher_block);
- cipher_block = NULL;
- errno = ENOMEM;
- }
- } else {
- // failed to read a block properly -- errno will be set
- // debug(1, "could not read a block");
- free(cipher_block);
- cipher_block = NULL;
- }
- } else {
- // failed to allocate a ciphertext buffer
- debug(1, "could not allocate a ciphertext buffer");
- errno = ENOMEM;
- }
- } else {
- debug(2, "could not read the block_len");
- // failed to read the encrypted block size -- errno will be set
+ size_t remain = encrypted_len;
+ while (remain > 0) {
+ ssize_t wrote = write(conn->fd, encrypted + (encrypted_len - remain), remain);
+ if (wrote <= 0) {
+ free(encrypted);
+ return wrote;
}
+ remain -= wrote;
}
- if (response == 0) {
- // now, transfer bytes to the output buffer up to the limit of the count requested
- if (context->input_plaintext_buffer_bytes_occupied) {
- size_t bytes_to_transfer = context->input_plaintext_buffer_bytes_occupied;
- if (bytes_to_transfer > count)
- bytes_to_transfer = count;
- if (bytes_to_transfer == 0)
- debug(1, "Shome problem -- zero bytes to transfer!");
- memcpy(buf, context->input_plaintext_buffer_toq, bytes_to_transfer);
- context->input_plaintext_buffer_bytes_occupied =
- context->input_plaintext_buffer_bytes_occupied - bytes_to_transfer;
- if (context->input_plaintext_buffer_bytes_occupied == 0) {
- free(context->input_plaintext_buffer);
- context->input_plaintext_buffer = NULL;
- } else {
- context->input_plaintext_buffer_toq =
- context->input_plaintext_buffer_toq + bytes_to_transfer;
- }
- response = bytes_to_transfer;
- }
- }
- return response;
+ free(encrypted);
+ return count;
}
#endif
ssize_t read_from_rtsp_connection(rtsp_conn_info *conn, void *buf, size_t count) {
#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
- if ((conn->control_cipher_context.cipher_context != NULL) &&
- (conn->control_cipher_context.active != 0)) {
- return read_encrypted(&conn->control_cipher_context, buf, count);
+ if (conn->ap2_control_pairing.cipher_ctx) {
+ conn->ap2_control_pairing.is_encrypted = 1;
+ return read_encrypted(conn->fd, &conn->ap2_control_pairing, buf, count);
} else {
return read(conn->fd, buf, count);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
ssize_t reply;
- if ((conn->control_cipher_context.cipher_context != NULL) &&
- (conn->control_cipher_context.active != 0)) {
- reply = write_encrypted(&conn->control_cipher_context, pkt, p - pkt);
+ if (conn->ap2_control_pairing.is_encrypted) {
+ reply = write_encrypted(conn, pkt, p - pkt);
} else {
reply = write(conn->fd, pkt, p - pkt);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
void handle_pair_setup(rtsp_conn_info *conn, rtsp_message *req, rtsp_message *resp) {
int ret;
- resp->respcode = 200; // assume everything works out okay
+ uint8_t *body;
+ size_t body_len;
+ struct pair_result *result;
debug(2, "Connection %d: pair-setup Content-Length %d", conn->connection_number,
req->contentlength);
- pair_tlv_values_t *values = pair_tlv_new();
- pair_tlv_t *state;
- pair_tlv_t *method;
- pair_tlv_t *flags;
- ret = pair_tlv_parse((const unsigned char *)req->content, req->contentlength, values);
- if (ret < 0)
- debug(1, "Could not parse TLV");
- state = pair_tlv_get_value(values, TLVType_State);
- if (!state || state->size != 1) {
- debug(1, "Missing/unexpected pairing state in TLV.");
- }
- if (state->value[0] == pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG01].state) {
- debug(2, "pair-setup part 1");
- method = pair_tlv_get_value(values, TLVType_Method);
- if (!method || method->size != 1 || method->value[0] != 0) {
- debug(1, "Missing/unexpected pairing method in TLV.");
- }
- if (method->value[0] != PairingMethodPairSetup)
- debug(1, "Unexpected method value %u.", method->value[0]);
- flags = pair_tlv_get_value(values, TLVType_Flags);
- if (!flags || flags->size != 1) {
- debug(1, "Missing/unexpected pairing flags in TLV.");
- }
- if (flags->value[0] == PairingFlagsTransient) {
- debug(2, "Transient pairing selected.");
- conn->pairing_mode =
- PairingFlagsTransient; // when pairing step 2 is finished, turn on encryption
+ if (!conn->ap2_control_pairing.setup_ctx) {
+ conn->ap2_control_pairing.setup_ctx = pair_setup_new(PAIR_SERVER_HOMEKIT, NULL, NULL, NULL, config.airplay_device_id);
+ if (!conn->ap2_control_pairing.setup_ctx) {
+ debug(1, "Error creating setup context");
+ resp->respcode = 451;
+ return;
}
+ }
- // Note this is modified to return a 16 byte salt
- srp_create_salted_verification_key(
- SRP_SHA512, SRP_NG_CUSTOM, USERNAME, (const unsigned char *)PASSWORD, strlen(PASSWORD),
- &conn->server_setup_ctx->salt, &conn->server_setup_ctx->salt_len,
- &conn->server_setup_ctx->v, &conn->server_setup_ctx->v_len, nl_hex, gl_hex);
-
- srp_verifier_get_B(SRP_SHA512, SRP_NG_CUSTOM, conn->server_setup_ctx->v,
- conn->server_setup_ctx->v_len, &conn->server_setup_ctx->b,
- &conn->server_setup_ctx->b_len, &conn->server_setup_ctx->pkB,
- &conn->server_setup_ctx->pkB_len, nl_hex, gl_hex);
-
- pair_tlv_values_t *payload = pair_tlv_new();
-
- pair_tlv_add_value(payload, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG02].state,
- sizeof(pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG02].state));
- pair_tlv_add_value(payload, TLVType_Salt, conn->server_setup_ctx->salt,
- conn->server_setup_ctx->salt_len); // 16
- pair_tlv_add_value(payload, TLVType_PublicKey, conn->server_setup_ctx->pkB,
- conn->server_setup_ctx->pkB_len); // 384
-
- // turn the tlv to binary form
-
- char *body = malloc(RESPONSE_BUFSIZE);
- size_t body_len;
- body_len = RESPONSE_BUFSIZE;
-
- ret = pair_tlv_format(payload, (uint8_t *)body, &body_len);
- if (ret < 0)
- debug(1, "Can't convert response to a binary stream");
- pair_tlv_free(payload);
- resp->content = body; // these will be freed when the data is sent
- resp->contentlength = body_len;
- msg_add_header(resp, "Content-Type", "application/octet-stream");
- debug_log_rtsp_message(2, "pair-setup part 1 response", resp);
- resp->respcode = 200; // it all worked out okay
-
- } else if (state->value[0] == pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG03].state) {
- debug(2, "pair setup part 2");
-
- // uint8_t *out;
- // size_t out_len;
- const uint8_t *key;
- int key_len;
- pair_tlv_t *pk;
- pair_tlv_t *proof;
- pair_tlv_values_t *payload;
-
- pk = pair_tlv_get_value(values, TLVType_PublicKey);
- proof = pair_tlv_get_value(values, TLVType_Proof);
-
- if ((pk != NULL) && (proof != NULL)) {
- conn->server_setup_ctx->pkA_len = pk->size; // 384
- conn->server_setup_ctx->pkA = malloc(conn->server_setup_ctx->pkA_len);
- memcpy(conn->server_setup_ctx->pkA, pk->value, conn->server_setup_ctx->pkA_len);
-
- conn->server_setup_ctx->M1_len = proof->size; // 64
- conn->server_setup_ctx->M1 = malloc(conn->server_setup_ctx->M1_len);
- memcpy(conn->server_setup_ctx->M1, proof->value, conn->server_setup_ctx->M1_len);
-
- conn->server_setup_ctx->verifier = srp_verifier_new(
- SRP_SHA512, SRP_NG_CUSTOM, USERNAME, conn->server_setup_ctx->salt,
- conn->server_setup_ctx->salt_len, conn->server_setup_ctx->v,
- conn->server_setup_ctx->v_len, conn->server_setup_ctx->pkA,
- conn->server_setup_ctx->pkA_len, conn->server_setup_ctx->b, conn->server_setup_ctx->b_len,
- conn->server_setup_ctx->pkB, conn->server_setup_ctx->pkB_len, nl_hex, gl_hex);
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx->verifier != NULL) {
- if (!conn->server_setup_ctx->verifier) {
- die("Error verifier");
- }
-
- conn->server_setup_ctx->M2_len = 64; // 512 bit hash
- srp_verifier_verify_session(conn->server_setup_ctx->verifier, conn->server_setup_ctx->M1,
- &conn->server_setup_ctx->M2);
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx->M2 != NULL) {
-
- key = srp_verifier_get_session_key(conn->server_setup_ctx->verifier, &key_len);
-
- conn->control_cipher_context.cipher_context =
- pair_cipher_new(PAIR_SERVER_HOMEKIT_TRANSIENT, 2, key, key_len);
- conn->control_cipher_context.fd = conn->fd;
- conn->control_cipher_context.input_plaintext_buffer = NULL;
- conn->control_cipher_context.input_plaintext_buffer_toq = NULL;
- conn->control_cipher_context.input_plaintext_buffer_bytes_occupied = 0;
- conn->control_cipher_context.active = 0;
- payload = pair_tlv_new();
-
- pair_tlv_add_value(payload, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG04].state,
- sizeof(pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG04].state));
- pair_tlv_add_value(payload, TLVType_Proof, conn->server_setup_ctx->M2,
- conn->server_setup_ctx->M2_len); // 384
-
- char *body = malloc(RESPONSE_BUFSIZE);
- size_t body_len;
- body_len = RESPONSE_BUFSIZE;
-
- ret = pair_tlv_format(payload, (uint8_t *)body, &body_len);
- if (ret < 0)
- debug(1, "Can't convert response to a binary stream");
- pair_tlv_free(payload);
-
- // free the verifier created by srp_verifier_new()
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx->verifier != NULL) {
- srp_verifier_delete(conn->server_setup_ctx->verifier);
- }
+ ret = pair_setup(&body, &body_len, conn->ap2_control_pairing.setup_ctx, (const uint8_t *)req->content, req->contentlength);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ debug(1, pair_setup_errmsg(conn->ap2_control_pairing.setup_ctx));
+ resp->respcode = 451;
+ return;
+ }
- // free mallocs made here for pkA and M1
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx->pkA != NULL)
- free((void *)conn->server_setup_ctx->pkA);
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx->M1 != NULL)
- free((void *)conn->server_setup_ctx->M1);
-
- // free mallocs made by srp_create_salted_verification_key()
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx->salt != NULL)
- free((void *)conn->server_setup_ctx->salt);
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx->v != NULL)
- free((void *)conn->server_setup_ctx->v);
-
- // free mallocs made by srp_verifier_get_B()
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx->b != NULL)
- free((void *)conn->server_setup_ctx->b);
- // if (conn->server_setup_ctx->pkB != NULL)
- // free((void *)conn->server_setup_ctx->pkB);
-
- resp->content = body; // these will be freed when the data is sent
- resp->contentlength = body_len;
- msg_add_header(resp, "Content-Type", "application/octet-stream");
- debug_log_rtsp_message(2, "pair-setup part 2 response", resp);
- resp->respcode = 200; // it all worked out okay
- } else {
- debug(1, "Error M2");
- resp->respcode = 451; // 451 is "Parameter not understood"
- }
- } else {
- debug(1, "Error verifier");
- resp->respcode = 451;
- }
- } else {
- debug(1, "Error pkA ver");
+ ret = pair_setup_result(NULL, &result, conn->ap2_control_pairing.setup_ctx);
+ if (ret == 0 && result->shared_secret_len > 0) {
+ // Transient pairing completed (pair-setup step 2), prepare encryption, but
+ // don't activate yet, the response to this request is still plaintext
+ conn->ap2_control_pairing.cipher_ctx = pair_cipher_new(PAIR_SERVER_HOMEKIT, 2, result->shared_secret, result->shared_secret_len);
+ if (!conn->ap2_control_pairing.cipher_ctx) {
+ debug(1, "Error setting up rtsp control channel ciphering\n");
resp->respcode = 451;
+ return;
}
- } else {
- debug(1, "don't recognise pair setup message");
}
- pair_tlv_free(values);
+
+ resp->content = (char *)body; // these will be freed when the data is sent
+ resp->contentlength = body_len;
+ msg_add_header(resp, "Content-Type", "application/octet-stream");
+ debug_log_rtsp_message(2, "pair-setup response", resp);
}
void handle_fp_setup(__attribute__((unused)) rtsp_conn_info *conn, rtsp_message *req,
conn->client_setup_plist = NULL;
}
- // free the cipher context, if allocated
- if (conn->control_cipher_context.cipher_context)
- free(conn->control_cipher_context.cipher_context);
-
+ buf_drain(&conn->ap2_control_pairing.plain_buf, -1);
+ buf_drain(&conn->ap2_control_pairing.encrypted_buf, -1);
+ pair_setup_free(conn->ap2_control_pairing.setup_ctx);
+ pair_verify_free(conn->ap2_control_pairing.verify_ctx);
+ pair_cipher_free(conn->ap2_control_pairing.cipher_ctx);
#endif
rtp_terminate(conn);
debug(3, "Connection %d: Checking play lock.", conn->connection_number);
release_play_lock(conn);
-#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx)
- free(conn->server_setup_ctx);
-#endif
-
debug(1, "Connection %d: terminated.", conn->connection_number);
conn->running = 0;
pthread_setcancelstate(oldState, NULL);
#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
conn->ap2_audio_buffer_size = 1024 * 1024 * 8;
- conn->server_setup_ctx =
- (struct verifier_setup_context *)malloc(sizeof(struct verifier_setup_context));
- if (conn->server_setup_ctx != NULL)
- memset(conn->server_setup_ctx, 0, sizeof(struct verifier_setup_context));
#endif
while (conn->stop == 0) {
int debug_level = 3; // for printing the request and response
-#ifdef CONFIG_AIRPLAY_2
- // transactions should be begin to be encrypted after a read/response cycle has
- // been completed
- conn->control_cipher_context.active = 1;
-
-#endif
reply = rtsp_read_request(conn, &req);
if (reply == rtsp_read_request_response_ok) {
pthread_cleanup_push(msg_cleanup_function, (void *)&req);
projects / thirdparty / shairport-sync.git / commitdiff
