--- /dev/null
+From a12ca6277eca6aeeccf66e840c23a2b520e24c8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 14:47:24 +0200
+Subject: bpf: Fix incorrect verifier simulation around jmp32's jeq/jne
+
+From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+
+commit a12ca6277eca6aeeccf66e840c23a2b520e24c8f upstream.
+
+Kuee reported a quirk in the jmp32's jeq/jne simulation, namely that the
+register value does not match expectations for the fall-through path. For
+example:
+
+Before fix:
+
+ 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
+ 0: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2_w=P0
+ 1: (b7) r6 = 563 ; R6_w=P563
+ 2: (87) r2 = -r2 ; R2_w=Pscalar()
+ 3: (87) r2 = -r2 ; R2_w=Pscalar()
+ 4: (4c) w2 |= w6 ; R2_w=Pscalar(umin=563,umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x233; 0xfffffdcc),s32_min=-2147483085) R6_w=P563
+ 5: (56) if w2 != 0x8 goto pc+1 ; R2_w=P571 <--- [*]
+ 6: (95) exit
+ R0 !read_ok
+
+After fix:
+
+ 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
+ 0: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2_w=P0
+ 1: (b7) r6 = 563 ; R6_w=P563
+ 2: (87) r2 = -r2 ; R2_w=Pscalar()
+ 3: (87) r2 = -r2 ; R2_w=Pscalar()
+ 4: (4c) w2 |= w6 ; R2_w=Pscalar(umin=563,umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x233; 0xfffffdcc),s32_min=-2147483085) R6_w=P563
+ 5: (56) if w2 != 0x8 goto pc+1 ; R2_w=P8 <--- [*]
+ 6: (95) exit
+ R0 !read_ok
+
+As can be seen on line 5 for the branch fall-through path in R2 [*] is that
+given condition w2 != 0x8 is false, verifier should conclude that r2 = 8 as
+upper 32 bit are known to be zero. However, verifier incorrectly concludes
+that r2 = 571 which is far off.
+
+The problem is it only marks false{true}_reg as known in the switch for JE/NE
+case, but at the end of the function, it uses {false,true}_{64,32}off to
+update {false,true}_reg->var_off and they still hold the prior value of
+{false,true}_reg->var_off before it got marked as known. The subsequent
+__reg_combine_32_into_64() then propagates this old var_off and derives new
+bounds. The information between min/max bounds on {false,true}_reg from
+setting the register to known const combined with the {false,true}_reg->var_off
+based on the old information then derives wrong register data.
+
+Fix it by detangling the BPF_JEQ/BPF_JNE cases and updating relevant
+{false,true}_{64,32}off tnums along with the register marking to known
+constant.
+
+Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
+Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a <liulin063@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
+Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220701124727.11153-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+@@ -8591,26 +8591,33 @@ static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_r
+ return;
+
+ switch (opcode) {
++ /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence.
++ *
++ * r1 = r2;
++ * if (r1 == 42) goto label;
++ * ...
++ * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42.
++ *
++ * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID.
++ */
+ case BPF_JEQ:
++ if (is_jmp32) {
++ __mark_reg32_known(true_reg, val32);
++ true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off);
++ } else {
++ ___mark_reg_known(true_reg, val);
++ true_64off = true_reg->var_off;
++ }
++ break;
+ case BPF_JNE:
+- {
+- struct bpf_reg_state *reg =
+- opcode == BPF_JEQ ? true_reg : false_reg;
+-
+- /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence.
+- * r1 = r2;
+- * if (r1 == 42) goto label;
+- * ...
+- * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42.
+- *
+- * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID.
+- */
+- if (is_jmp32)
+- __mark_reg32_known(reg, val32);
+- else
+- ___mark_reg_known(reg, val);
++ if (is_jmp32) {
++ __mark_reg32_known(false_reg, val32);
++ false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off);
++ } else {
++ ___mark_reg_known(false_reg, val);
++ false_64off = false_reg->var_off;
++ }
+ break;
+- }
+ case BPF_JSET:
+ if (is_jmp32) {
+ false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32));
--- /dev/null
+From 3844d153a41adea718202c10ae91dc96b37453b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 14:47:25 +0200
+Subject: bpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals
+
+From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+
+commit 3844d153a41adea718202c10ae91dc96b37453b5 upstream.
+
+Kuee reported a corner case where the tnum becomes constant after the call
+to __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not, that is, its
+min bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds.
+
+This in turn allows to leak pointers through turning a pointer register as
+is into an unknown scalar via adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().
+
+Before:
+
+ func#0 @0
+ 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
+ 0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
+ 1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
+ 2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
+ 3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
+ 4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
+ 5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
+ 6: (95) exit
+
+ from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
+ 7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
+ 8: (95) exit
+
+ from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
+ 9: (07) r3 += -32767 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) <--- [*]
+ 10: (95) exit
+
+What can be seen here is that R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff;
+0x8000)) after the operation R3 += -32767 results in a 'malformed' constant, that
+is, R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)). Intersecting with var_off has
+not been done at that point via __update_reg_bounds(), which would have improved
+the umax to be equal to umin.
+
+Refactor the tnum <> min/max bounds information flow into a reg_bounds_sync()
+helper and use it consistently everywhere. After the fix, bounds have been
+corrected to R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) and thus the register
+is regarded as a 'proper' constant scalar of 0.
+
+After:
+
+ func#0 @0
+ 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
+ 0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
+ 1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
+ 2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
+ 3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
+ 4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
+ 5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
+ 6: (95) exit
+
+ from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
+ 7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
+ 8: (95) exit
+
+ from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
+ 9: (07) r3 += -32767 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) <--- [*]
+ 10: (95) exit
+
+Fixes: b03c9f9fdc37 ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
+Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a <liulin063@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
+Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220701124727.11153-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 72 +++++++++++++++-----------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+@@ -1333,6 +1333,21 @@ static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bp
+ reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off);
+ }
+
++static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
++{
++ /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
++ __update_reg_bounds(reg);
++ /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
++ __reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
++ /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
++ __reg_bound_offset(reg);
++ /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
++ * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
++ * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
++ */
++ __update_reg_bounds(reg);
++}
++
+ static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a)
+ {
+ return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX;
+@@ -1374,16 +1389,8 @@ static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(str
+ * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation.
+ */
+ __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg);
+- __update_reg_bounds(reg);
+ }
+-
+- /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
+- * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
+- * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
+- */
+- __reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
+- __reg_bound_offset(reg);
+- __update_reg_bounds(reg);
++ reg_bounds_sync(reg);
+ }
+
+ static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a)
+@@ -1399,7 +1406,6 @@ static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a)
+ static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
+ {
+ __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg);
+-
+ if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) {
+ reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value;
+ reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value;
+@@ -1408,14 +1414,7 @@ static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(str
+ reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value;
+ reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value;
+ }
+-
+- /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
+- * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
+- * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
+- */
+- __reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
+- __reg_bound_offset(reg);
+- __update_reg_bounds(reg);
++ reg_bounds_sync(reg);
+ }
+
+ /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */
+@@ -6054,9 +6053,7 @@ static void do_refine_retval_range(struc
+ ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value;
+ ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
+ ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
+- __reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg);
+- __reg_bound_offset(ret_reg);
+- __update_reg_bounds(ret_reg);
++ reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg);
+ }
+
+ static int
+@@ -7216,11 +7213,7 @@ reject:
+
+ if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+-
+- __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
+- __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
+- __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
+-
++ reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
+ if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
+ return -EACCES;
+ if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+@@ -7958,10 +7951,7 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(st
+ /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */
+ if (alu32)
+ zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
+-
+- __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
+- __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
+- __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
++ reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -8150,10 +8140,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verif
+ insn->dst_reg);
+ }
+ zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
+-
+- __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
+- __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
+- __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
++ reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* case: R = imm
+@@ -8756,21 +8743,8 @@ static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct
+ dst_reg->smax_value);
+ src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off,
+ dst_reg->var_off);
+- /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
+- __update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
+- __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
+- /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
+- __reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg);
+- __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
+- /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
+- __reg_bound_offset(src_reg);
+- __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
+- /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
+- * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
+- * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
+- */
+- __update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
+- __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
++ reg_bounds_sync(src_reg);
++ reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
+ }
+
+ static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src,
--- /dev/null
+From 148ca04518070910739dfc4eeda765057856403d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 20:56:10 +0800
+Subject: net: rose: fix UAF bug caused by rose_t0timer_expiry
+
+From: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn>
+
+commit 148ca04518070910739dfc4eeda765057856403d upstream.
+
+There are UAF bugs caused by rose_t0timer_expiry(). The
+root cause is that del_timer() could not stop the timer
+handler that is running and there is no synchronization.
+One of the race conditions is shown below:
+
+ (thread 1) | (thread 2)
+ | rose_device_event
+ | rose_rt_device_down
+ | rose_remove_neigh
+rose_t0timer_expiry | rose_stop_t0timer(rose_neigh)
+ ... | del_timer(&neigh->t0timer)
+ | kfree(rose_neigh) //[1]FREE
+ neigh->dce_mode //[2]USE |
+
+The rose_neigh is deallocated in position [1] and use in
+position [2].
+
+The crash trace triggered by POC is like below:
+
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in expire_timers+0x144/0x320
+Write of size 8 at addr ffff888009b19658 by task swapper/0/0
+...
+Call Trace:
+ <IRQ>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0xbf/0xee
+ print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
+ print_report+0x101/0x230
+ ? expire_timers+0x144/0x320
+ kasan_report+0xed/0x120
+ ? expire_timers+0x144/0x320
+ expire_timers+0x144/0x320
+ __run_timers+0x3ff/0x4d0
+ run_timer_softirq+0x41/0x80
+ __do_softirq+0x233/0x544
+ ...
+
+This patch changes rose_stop_ftimer() and rose_stop_t0timer()
+in rose_remove_neigh() to del_timer_sync() in order that the
+timer handler could be finished before the resources such as
+rose_neigh and so on are deallocated. As a result, the UAF
+bugs could be mitigated.
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220705125610.77971-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rose/rose_route.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/rose/rose_route.c
++++ b/net/rose/rose_route.c
+@@ -227,8 +227,8 @@ static void rose_remove_neigh(struct ros
+ {
+ struct rose_neigh *s;
+
+- rose_stop_ftimer(rose_neigh);
+- rose_stop_t0timer(rose_neigh);
++ del_timer_sync(&rose_neigh->ftimer);
++ del_timer_sync(&rose_neigh->t0timer);
+
+ skb_queue_purge(&rose_neigh->queue);
+
--- /dev/null
+From 7e6bc1f6cabcd30aba0b11219d8e01b952eacbb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2022 04:16:30 +0200
+Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: stricter validation of element data
+
+From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+
+commit 7e6bc1f6cabcd30aba0b11219d8e01b952eacbb6 upstream.
+
+Make sure element data type and length do not mismatch the one specified
+by the set declaration.
+
+Fixes: 7d7402642eaf ("netfilter: nf_tables: variable sized set element keys / data")
+Reported-by: Hugues ANGUELKOV <hanguelkov@randorisec.fr>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+@@ -5118,13 +5118,20 @@ static int nft_setelem_parse_data(struct
+ struct nft_data *data,
+ struct nlattr *attr)
+ {
++ u32 dtype;
+ int err;
+
+ err = nft_data_init(ctx, data, NFT_DATA_VALUE_MAXLEN, desc, attr);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+- if (desc->type != NFT_DATA_VERDICT && desc->len != set->dlen) {
++ if (set->dtype == NFT_DATA_VERDICT)
++ dtype = NFT_DATA_VERDICT;
++ else
++ dtype = NFT_DATA_VALUE;
++
++ if (dtype != desc->type ||
++ set->dlen != desc->len) {
+ nft_data_release(data, desc->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 9827a0e6e23bf43003cd3d5b7fb11baf59a35e1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2022 04:16:31 +0200
+Subject: netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: release elements in clone from abort path
+
+From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+
+commit 9827a0e6e23bf43003cd3d5b7fb11baf59a35e1e upstream.
+
+New elements that reside in the clone are not released in case that the
+transaction is aborted.
+
+[16302.231754] ------------[ cut here ]------------
+[16302.231756] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 100509 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1864 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x26/0x127 [nf_tables]
+[...]
+[16302.231882] CPU: 0 PID: 100509 Comm: nft Tainted: G W 5.19.0-rc3+ #155
+[...]
+[16302.231887] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x26/0x127 [nf_tables]
+[16302.231899] Code: f3 fe ff ff 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b 6f 10 48 89 fb 48 c7 c7 82 96 d9 a0 8b 55 50 48 8b 75 58 e8 de f5 92 e0 83 7d 50 00 74 09 <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 4c 8b 65 00 48 8b 7d 08 49 39 fc 74 05
+[...]
+[16302.231917] Call Trace:
+[16302.231919] <TASK>
+[16302.231921] __nf_tables_abort.cold+0x23/0x28 [nf_tables]
+[16302.231934] nf_tables_abort+0x30/0x50 [nf_tables]
+[16302.231946] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x41a/0x840 [nfnetlink]
+[16302.231952] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x48/0x190
+[16302.231959] nfnetlink_rcv+0x110/0x129 [nfnetlink]
+[16302.231963] netlink_unicast+0x211/0x340
+[16302.231969] netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x460
+
+Add nft_set_pipapo_match_destroy() helper function to release the
+elements in the lookup tables.
+
+Stefano Brivio says: "We additionally look for elements pointers in the
+cloned matching data if priv->dirty is set, because that means that
+cloned data might point to additional elements we did not commit to the
+working copy yet (such as the abort path case, but perhaps not limited
+to it)."
+
+Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges")
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c
+@@ -2125,6 +2125,32 @@ out_scratch:
+ }
+
+ /**
++ * nft_set_pipapo_match_destroy() - Destroy elements from key mapping array
++ * @set: nftables API set representation
++ * @m: matching data pointing to key mapping array
++ */
++static void nft_set_pipapo_match_destroy(const struct nft_set *set,
++ struct nft_pipapo_match *m)
++{
++ struct nft_pipapo_field *f;
++ int i, r;
++
++ for (i = 0, f = m->f; i < m->field_count - 1; i++, f++)
++ ;
++
++ for (r = 0; r < f->rules; r++) {
++ struct nft_pipapo_elem *e;
++
++ if (r < f->rules - 1 && f->mt[r + 1].e == f->mt[r].e)
++ continue;
++
++ e = f->mt[r].e;
++
++ nft_set_elem_destroy(set, e, true);
++ }
++}
++
++/**
+ * nft_pipapo_destroy() - Free private data for set and all committed elements
+ * @set: nftables API set representation
+ */
+@@ -2132,26 +2158,13 @@ static void nft_pipapo_destroy(const str
+ {
+ struct nft_pipapo *priv = nft_set_priv(set);
+ struct nft_pipapo_match *m;
+- struct nft_pipapo_field *f;
+- int i, r, cpu;
++ int cpu;
+
+ m = rcu_dereference_protected(priv->match, true);
+ if (m) {
+ rcu_barrier();
+
+- for (i = 0, f = m->f; i < m->field_count - 1; i++, f++)
+- ;
+-
+- for (r = 0; r < f->rules; r++) {
+- struct nft_pipapo_elem *e;
+-
+- if (r < f->rules - 1 && f->mt[r + 1].e == f->mt[r].e)
+- continue;
+-
+- e = f->mt[r].e;
+-
+- nft_set_elem_destroy(set, e, true);
+- }
++ nft_set_pipapo_match_destroy(set, m);
+
+ #ifdef NFT_PIPAPO_ALIGN
+ free_percpu(m->scratch_aligned);
+@@ -2165,6 +2178,11 @@ static void nft_pipapo_destroy(const str
+ }
+
+ if (priv->clone) {
++ m = priv->clone;
++
++ if (priv->dirty)
++ nft_set_pipapo_match_destroy(set, m);
++
+ #ifdef NFT_PIPAPO_ALIGN
+ free_percpu(priv->clone->scratch_aligned);
+ #endif
can-m_can-m_can_-read_fifo-echo_tx_event-shift-timestamp-to-full-32-bits.patch
can-mcp251xfd-mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read-improve-workaround-handling-for-mcp2517fd.patch
can-mcp251xfd-mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read-update-workaround-broken-crc-on-tbc-register.patch
+bpf-fix-incorrect-verifier-simulation-around-jmp32-s-jeq-jne.patch
+bpf-fix-insufficient-bounds-propagation-from-adjust_scalar_min_max_vals.patch
+usbnet-fix-memory-leak-in-error-case.patch
+net-rose-fix-uaf-bug-caused-by-rose_t0timer_expiry.patch
+netfilter-nft_set_pipapo-release-elements-in-clone-from-abort-path.patch
+netfilter-nf_tables-stricter-validation-of-element-data.patch
--- /dev/null
+From b55a21b764c1e182014630fa5486d717484ac58f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 14:53:51 +0200
+Subject: usbnet: fix memory leak in error case
+
+From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
+
+commit b55a21b764c1e182014630fa5486d717484ac58f upstream.
+
+usbnet_write_cmd_async() mixed up which buffers
+need to be freed in which error case.
+
+v2: add Fixes tag
+v3: fix uninitialized buf pointer
+
+Fixes: 877bd862f32b8 ("usbnet: introduce usbnet 3 command helpers")
+Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220705125351.17309-1-oneukum@suse.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c
++++ b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c
+@@ -2135,7 +2135,7 @@ static void usbnet_async_cmd_cb(struct u
+ int usbnet_write_cmd_async(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype,
+ u16 value, u16 index, const void *data, u16 size)
+ {
+- struct usb_ctrlrequest *req = NULL;
++ struct usb_ctrlrequest *req;
+ struct urb *urb;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+ void *buf = NULL;
+@@ -2153,7 +2153,7 @@ int usbnet_write_cmd_async(struct usbnet
+ if (!buf) {
+ netdev_err(dev->net, "Error allocating buffer"
+ " in %s!\n", __func__);
+- goto fail_free;
++ goto fail_free_urb;
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -2177,14 +2177,21 @@ int usbnet_write_cmd_async(struct usbnet
+ if (err < 0) {
+ netdev_err(dev->net, "Error submitting the control"
+ " message: status=%d\n", err);
+- goto fail_free;
++ goto fail_free_all;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
++fail_free_all:
++ kfree(req);
+ fail_free_buf:
+ kfree(buf);
+-fail_free:
+- kfree(req);
++ /*
++ * avoid a double free
++ * needed because the flag can be set only
++ * after filling the URB
++ */
++ urb->transfer_flags = 0;
++fail_free_urb:
+ usb_free_urb(urb);
+ fail:
+ return err;
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
