+++ /dev/null
-/*
- Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
-
- endpoint server for the backupkey interface
-
- Copyright (C) Matthieu Patou <mat@samba.org> 2010
-
- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
- (at your option) any later version.
-
- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
- GNU General Public License for more details.
-
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-*/
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "rpc_server/dcerpc_server.h"
-#include "rpc_server/common/common.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey.h"
-#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
-#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
-#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb_errors.h"
-#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
-#include "param/param.h"
-#include "auth/session.h"
-#include "system/network.h"
-#include <com_err.h>
-#include <hx509.h>
-#include <hcrypto/rsa.h>
-#include <hcrypto/bn.h>
-#include <hcrypto/sha.h>
-#include <hcrypto/evp.h>
-#include <hcrypto/hmac.h>
-#include <der.h>
-#include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
-#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
-#include "lib/crypto/arcfour.h"
-#include "libds/common/roles.h"
-#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
-#include <gnutls/x509.h>
-
-#define DCESRV_INTERFACE_BACKUPKEY_BIND(context, iface) \
- dcesrv_interface_backupkey_bind(context, iface)
-static NTSTATUS dcesrv_interface_backupkey_bind(struct dcesrv_connection_context *context,
- const struct dcesrv_interface *iface)
-{
- return dcesrv_interface_bind_require_privacy(context, iface);
-}
-
-static const unsigned rsa_with_var_num[] = { 1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1 };
-/* Equivalent to asn1_oid_id_pkcs1_rsaEncryption*/
-static const AlgorithmIdentifier _hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num = {
- { 7, discard_const_p(unsigned, rsa_with_var_num) }, NULL
-};
-
-static NTSTATUS set_lsa_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct ldb_context *ldb,
- const char *name,
- const DATA_BLOB *lsa_secret)
-{
- struct ldb_message *msg;
- struct ldb_result *res;
- struct ldb_dn *domain_dn;
- struct ldb_dn *system_dn;
- struct ldb_val val;
- int ret;
- char *name2;
- struct timeval now = timeval_current();
- NTTIME nt_now = timeval_to_nttime(&now);
- const char *attrs[] = {
- NULL
- };
-
- domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb);
- if (!domain_dn) {
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- msg = ldb_msg_new(mem_ctx);
- if (msg == NULL) {
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- /*
- * This function is a lot like dcesrv_lsa_CreateSecret
- * in the rpc_server/lsa directory
- * The reason why we duplicate the effort here is that:
- * * we want to keep the former function static
- * * we want to avoid the burden of doing LSA calls
- * when we can just manipulate the secrets directly
- * * taillor the function to the particular needs of backup protocol
- */
-
- system_dn = samdb_search_dn(ldb, msg, domain_dn, "(&(objectClass=container)(cn=System))");
- if (system_dn == NULL) {
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- name2 = talloc_asprintf(msg, "%s Secret", name);
- if (name2 == NULL) {
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- ret = ldb_search(ldb, mem_ctx, &res, system_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs,
- "(&(cn=%s)(objectclass=secret))",
- ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, name2));
-
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS || res->count != 0 ) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Secret %s already exists !\n", name2));
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION;
- }
-
- /*
- * We don't care about previous value as we are
- * here only if the key didn't exists before
- */
-
- msg->dn = ldb_dn_copy(mem_ctx, system_dn);
- if (msg->dn == NULL) {
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
- if (!ldb_dn_add_child_fmt(msg->dn, "cn=%s", name2)) {
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- ret = ldb_msg_add_string(msg, "cn", name2);
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
- ret = ldb_msg_add_string(msg, "objectClass", "secret");
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
- ret = samdb_msg_add_uint64(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "priorSetTime", nt_now);
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
- val.data = lsa_secret->data;
- val.length = lsa_secret->length;
- ret = ldb_msg_add_value(msg, "currentValue", &val, NULL);
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
- ret = samdb_msg_add_uint64(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "lastSetTime", nt_now);
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- /*
- * create the secret with DSDB_MODIFY_RELAX
- * otherwise dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/objectclass.c forbid
- * the create of LSA secret object
- */
- ret = dsdb_add(ldb, msg, DSDB_MODIFY_RELAX);
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- DEBUG(2,("Failed to create secret record %s: %s\n",
- ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn),
- ldb_errstring(ldb)));
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
- }
-
- talloc_free(msg);
- return NT_STATUS_OK;
-}
-
-/* This function is pretty much like dcesrv_lsa_QuerySecret */
-static NTSTATUS get_lsa_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct ldb_context *ldb,
- const char *name,
- DATA_BLOB *lsa_secret)
-{
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_mem;
- struct ldb_result *res;
- struct ldb_dn *domain_dn;
- struct ldb_dn *system_dn;
- const struct ldb_val *val;
- uint8_t *data;
- const char *attrs[] = {
- "currentValue",
- NULL
- };
- int ret;
-
- lsa_secret->data = NULL;
- lsa_secret->length = 0;
-
- domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb);
- if (!domain_dn) {
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- tmp_mem = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
- if (tmp_mem == NULL) {
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- system_dn = samdb_search_dn(ldb, tmp_mem, domain_dn, "(&(objectClass=container)(cn=System))");
- if (system_dn == NULL) {
- talloc_free(tmp_mem);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- ret = ldb_search(ldb, mem_ctx, &res, system_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs,
- "(&(cn=%s Secret)(objectclass=secret))",
- ldb_binary_encode_string(tmp_mem, name));
-
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- talloc_free(tmp_mem);
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
- }
- if (res->count == 0) {
- talloc_free(tmp_mem);
- return NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND;
- }
- if (res->count > 1) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Secret %s collision\n", name));
- talloc_free(tmp_mem);
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
- }
-
- val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(res->msgs[0], "currentValue");
- if (val == NULL) {
- /*
- * The secret object is here but we don't have the secret value
- * The most common case is a RODC
- */
- *lsa_secret = data_blob_null;
- talloc_free(tmp_mem);
- return NT_STATUS_OK;
- }
-
- data = val->data;
- lsa_secret->data = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &data);
- lsa_secret->length = val->length;
-
- talloc_free(tmp_mem);
- return NT_STATUS_OK;
-}
-
-static DATA_BLOB *reverse_and_get_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, BIGNUM *bn)
-{
- DATA_BLOB blob;
- DATA_BLOB *rev = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
- uint32_t i;
-
- blob.length = BN_num_bytes(bn);
- blob.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob.length);
-
- if (blob.data == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(bn, blob.data);
-
- rev->data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob.length);
- if (rev->data == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- for(i=0; i < blob.length; i++) {
- rev->data[i] = blob.data[blob.length - i -1];
- }
- rev->length = blob.length;
- talloc_free(blob.data);
- return rev;
-}
-
-static BIGNUM *reverse_and_get_bignum(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB *blob)
-{
- BIGNUM *ret;
- DATA_BLOB rev;
- uint32_t i;
-
- rev.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob->length);
- if (rev.data == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- for(i=0; i < blob->length; i++) {
- rev.data[i] = blob->data[blob->length - i -1];
- }
- rev.length = blob->length;
-
- ret = BN_bin2bn(rev.data, rev.length, NULL);
- talloc_free(rev.data);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static NTSTATUS get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
- struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair *keypair,
- hx509_private_key *pk)
-{
- hx509_context hctx;
- RSA *rsa;
- struct hx509_private_key_ops *ops;
- hx509_private_key privkey = NULL;
-
- hx509_context_init(&hctx);
- ops = hx509_find_private_alg(&_hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num.algorithm);
- if (ops == NULL) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Not supported algorithm\n"));
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- if (hx509_private_key_init(&privkey, ops, NULL) != 0) {
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- rsa = RSA_new();
- if (rsa ==NULL) {
- hx509_private_key_free(&privkey);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- rsa->n = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->modulus));
- if (rsa->n == NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(&privkey);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- rsa->d = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->private_exponent));
- if (rsa->d == NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(&privkey);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- rsa->p = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->prime1));
- if (rsa->p == NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(&privkey);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- rsa->q = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->prime2));
- if (rsa->q == NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(&privkey);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- rsa->dmp1 = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->exponent1));
- if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(&privkey);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- rsa->dmq1 = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->exponent2));
- if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(&privkey);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- rsa->iqmp = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->coefficient));
- if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(&privkey);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- rsa->e = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->public_exponent));
- if (rsa->e == NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(&privkey);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- *pk = privkey;
-
- hx509_private_key_assign_rsa(*pk, rsa);
-
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NT_STATUS_OK;
-}
-
-static WERROR get_and_verify_access_check(TALLOC_CTX *sub_ctx,
- uint32_t version,
- uint8_t *key_and_iv,
- uint8_t *access_check,
- uint32_t access_check_len,
- struct auth_session_info *session_info)
-{
- heim_octet_string iv;
- heim_octet_string access_check_os;
- hx509_crypto crypto;
-
- DATA_BLOB blob_us;
- uint32_t key_len;
- uint32_t iv_len;
- int res;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- hx509_context hctx;
-
- struct dom_sid *access_sid = NULL;
- struct dom_sid *caller_sid = NULL;
-
- /* This one should not be freed */
- const AlgorithmIdentifier *alg;
-
- switch (version) {
- case 2:
- key_len = 24;
- iv_len = 8;
- alg = hx509_crypto_des_rsdi_ede3_cbc();
- break;
-
- case 3:
- key_len = 32;
- iv_len = 16;
- alg =hx509_crypto_aes256_cbc();
- break;
-
- default:
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- hx509_context_init(&hctx);
- res = hx509_crypto_init(hctx, NULL,
- &(alg->algorithm),
- &crypto);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
-
- if (res != 0) {
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- res = hx509_crypto_set_key_data(crypto, key_and_iv, key_len);
-
- iv.data = talloc_memdup(sub_ctx, key_len + key_and_iv, iv_len);
- iv.length = iv_len;
-
- if (res != 0) {
- hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- hx509_crypto_set_padding(crypto, HX509_CRYPTO_PADDING_NONE);
- res = hx509_crypto_decrypt(crypto,
- access_check,
- access_check_len,
- &iv,
- &access_check_os);
-
- if (res != 0) {
- hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- blob_us.data = access_check_os.data;
- blob_us.length = access_check_os.length;
-
- hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto);
-
- switch (version) {
- case 2:
- {
- uint32_t hash_size = 20;
- uint8_t hash[hash_size];
- struct sha sctx;
- struct bkrp_access_check_v2 uncrypted_accesscheckv2;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, sub_ctx, &uncrypted_accesscheckv2,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_access_check_v2);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- /* Unable to unmarshall */
- der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
- if (uncrypted_accesscheckv2.magic != 0x1) {
- /* wrong magic */
- der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- SHA1_Init(&sctx);
- SHA1_Update(&sctx, blob_us.data, blob_us.length - hash_size);
- SHA1_Final(hash, &sctx);
- der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
- /*
- * We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data
- * point to the same area
- */
-
- if (memcmp(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv2.hash, hash_size) != 0) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Wrong hash value in the access check in backup key remote protocol\n"));
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
- access_sid = &(uncrypted_accesscheckv2.sid);
- break;
- }
- case 3:
- {
- uint32_t hash_size = 64;
- uint8_t hash[hash_size];
- struct hc_sha512state sctx;
- struct bkrp_access_check_v3 uncrypted_accesscheckv3;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, sub_ctx, &uncrypted_accesscheckv3,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_access_check_v3);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- /* Unable to unmarshall */
- der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
- if (uncrypted_accesscheckv3.magic != 0x1) {
- /* wrong magic */
- der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- SHA512_Init(&sctx);
- SHA512_Update(&sctx, blob_us.data, blob_us.length - hash_size);
- SHA512_Final(hash, &sctx);
- der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os);
- /*
- * We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data
- * point to the same area
- */
-
- if (memcmp(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv3.hash, hash_size) != 0) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Wrong hash value in the access check in backup key remote protocol\n"));
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
- access_sid = &(uncrypted_accesscheckv3.sid);
- break;
- }
- default:
- /* Never reached normally as we filtered at the switch / case level */
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- caller_sid = &session_info->security_token->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX];
-
- if (!dom_sid_equal(caller_sid, access_sid)) {
- return WERR_INVALID_ACCESS;
- }
- return WERR_OK;
-}
-
-/*
- * We have some data, such as saved website or IMAP passwords that the
- * client has in profile on-disk. This needs to be decrypted. This
- * version gives the server the data over the network (protected by
- * the X.509 certificate and public key encryption, and asks that it
- * be decrypted returned for short-term use, protected only by the
- * negotiated transport encryption.
- *
- * The data is NOT stored in the LSA, but a X.509 certificate, public
- * and private keys used to encrypt the data will be stored. There is
- * only one active encryption key pair and certificate per domain, it
- * is pointed at with G$BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED in the LSA secrets store.
- *
- * The potentially multiple valid decrypting key pairs are in turn
- * stored in the LSA secrets store as G$BCKUPKEY_keyGuidString.
- *
- */
-static WERROR bkrp_client_wrap_decrypt_data(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r,
- struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx)
-{
- struct auth_session_info *session_info =
- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call);
- struct bkrp_client_side_wrapped uncrypt_request;
- DATA_BLOB blob;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- char *guid_string;
- char *cert_secret_name;
- DATA_BLOB lsa_secret;
- DATA_BLOB *uncrypted_data = NULL;
- NTSTATUS status;
- uint32_t requested_version;
-
- blob.data = r->in.data_in;
- blob.length = r->in.data_in_len;
-
- if (r->in.data_in_len < 4 || r->in.data_in == NULL) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- /*
- * We check for the version here, so we can actually print the
- * message as we are unlikely to parse it with NDR.
- */
- requested_version = IVAL(r->in.data_in, 0);
- if ((requested_version != BACKUPKEY_CLIENT_WRAP_VERSION2)
- && (requested_version != BACKUPKEY_CLIENT_WRAP_VERSION3)) {
- DEBUG(1, ("Request for unknown BackupKey sub-protocol %d\n", requested_version));
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &uncrypt_request,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_wrapped);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- if ((uncrypt_request.version != BACKUPKEY_CLIENT_WRAP_VERSION2)
- && (uncrypt_request.version != BACKUPKEY_CLIENT_WRAP_VERSION3)) {
- DEBUG(1, ("Request for unknown BackupKey sub-protocol %d\n", uncrypt_request.version));
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- guid_string = GUID_string(mem_ctx, &uncrypt_request.guid);
- if (guid_string == NULL) {
- return WERR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
- }
-
- cert_secret_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
- "BCKUPKEY_%s",
- guid_string);
- if (cert_secret_name == NULL) {
- return WERR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
- }
-
- status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx,
- ldb_ctx,
- cert_secret_name,
- &lsa_secret);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(10, ("Error while fetching secret %s\n", cert_secret_name));
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- } else if (lsa_secret.length == 0) {
- /* we do not have the real secret attribute, like if we are an RODC */
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- } else {
- hx509_context hctx;
- struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair;
- hx509_private_key pk;
- uint32_t i, res;
- heim_octet_string reversed_secret;
- heim_octet_string uncrypted_secret;
- AlgorithmIdentifier alg;
- DATA_BLOB blob_us;
- WERROR werr;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&lsa_secret, mem_ctx, &keypair, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Unable to parse the ndr encoded cert in key %s\n", cert_secret_name));
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- }
-
- status = get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params(mem_ctx, &keypair, &pk);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- reversed_secret.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t,
- uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len);
- if (reversed_secret.data == NULL) {
- hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
- return WERR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
- }
-
- /* The secret has to be reversed ... */
- for(i=0; i< uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len; i++) {
- uint8_t *reversed = (uint8_t *)reversed_secret.data;
- uint8_t *uncrypt = uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret;
- reversed[i] = uncrypt[uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len - 1 - i];
- }
- reversed_secret.length = uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len;
-
- /*
- * Let's try to decrypt the secret now that
- * we have the private key ...
- */
- hx509_context_init(&hctx);
- res = hx509_private_key_private_decrypt(hctx, &reversed_secret,
- &alg.algorithm, pk,
- &uncrypted_secret);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
- if (res != 0) {
- /* We are not able to decrypt the secret, looks like something is wrong */
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- blob_us.data = uncrypted_secret.data;
- blob_us.length = uncrypted_secret.length;
-
- if (uncrypt_request.version == 2) {
- struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2 uncrypted_secretv2;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, mem_ctx, &uncrypted_secretv2,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2);
- der_free_octet_string(&uncrypted_secret);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- /* Unable to unmarshall */
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
- if (uncrypted_secretv2.magic != 0x20) {
- /* wrong magic */
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- werr = get_and_verify_access_check(mem_ctx, 2,
- uncrypted_secretv2.payload_key,
- uncrypt_request.access_check,
- uncrypt_request.access_check_len,
- session_info);
- if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
- return werr;
- }
- uncrypted_data = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
- if (uncrypted_data == NULL) {
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- uncrypted_data->data = uncrypted_secretv2.secret;
- uncrypted_data->length = uncrypted_secretv2.secret_len;
- }
- if (uncrypt_request.version == 3) {
- struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3 uncrypted_secretv3;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, mem_ctx, &uncrypted_secretv3,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3);
-
- der_free_octet_string(&uncrypted_secret);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- /* Unable to unmarshall */
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- if (uncrypted_secretv3.magic1 != 0x30 ||
- uncrypted_secretv3.magic2 != 0x6610 ||
- uncrypted_secretv3.magic3 != 0x800e) {
- /* wrong magic */
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- /*
- * Confirm that the caller is permitted to
- * read this particular data. Because one key
- * pair is used per domain, the caller could
- * have stolen the profile data on-disk and
- * would otherwise be able to read the
- * passwords.
- */
-
- werr = get_and_verify_access_check(mem_ctx, 3,
- uncrypted_secretv3.payload_key,
- uncrypt_request.access_check,
- uncrypt_request.access_check_len,
- session_info);
- if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
- return werr;
- }
-
- uncrypted_data = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
- if (uncrypted_data == NULL) {
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- uncrypted_data->data = uncrypted_secretv3.secret;
- uncrypted_data->length = uncrypted_secretv3.secret_len;
- }
-
- /*
- * Yeah if we are here all looks pretty good:
- * - hash is ok
- * - user sid is the same as the one in access check
- * - we were able to decrypt the whole stuff
- */
- }
-
- if (uncrypted_data->data == NULL) {
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- /* There is a magic value a the beginning of the data
- * we can use an adhoc structure but as the
- * parent structure is just an array of bytes it a lot of work
- * work just prepending 4 bytes
- */
- *(r->out.data_out) = talloc_zero_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, uncrypted_data->length + 4);
- W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*(r->out.data_out));
- memcpy(4+*(r->out.data_out), uncrypted_data->data, uncrypted_data->length);
- *(r->out.data_out_len) = uncrypted_data->length + 4;
-
- return WERR_OK;
-}
-
-/*
- * Strictly, this function no longer uses Heimdal in order to generate an RSA
- * key, but GnuTLS.
- *
- * The resulting key is then imported into Heimdal's RSA structure.
- *
- * We use GnuTLS because it can reliably generate 2048 bit keys every time.
- * Windows clients strictly require 2048, no more since it won't fit and no
- * less either. Heimdal would almost always generate a smaller key.
- */
-static WERROR create_heimdal_rsa_key(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx,
- hx509_private_key *pk, RSA **rsa)
-{
- int ret;
- uint8_t *p0 = NULL;
- const uint8_t *p;
- size_t len;
- int bits = 2048;
- int RSA_returned_bits;
- gnutls_x509_privkey_t gtls_key;
- WERROR werr;
-
- *rsa = NULL;
-
- ret = gnutls_global_init();
- if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
- DBG_ERR("TLS error: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret));
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_init(>ls_key);
- if (ret != 0) {
- gnutls_global_deinit();
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- /*
- * Unlike Heimdal's RSA_generate_key_ex(), this generates a
- * 2048 bit key 100% of the time. The heimdal code had a ~1/8
- * chance of doing so, chewing vast quantities of computation
- * and entropy in the process.
- */
-
- ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_generate(gtls_key, GNUTLS_PK_RSA, bits, 0);
- if (ret != 0) {
- werr = WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* No need to check error code, this SHOULD fail */
- gnutls_x509_privkey_export(gtls_key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, NULL, &len);
-
- if (len < 1) {
- werr = WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto done;
- }
-
- p0 = talloc_size(ctx, len);
- if (p0 == NULL) {
- werr = WERR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
- goto done;
- }
- p = p0;
-
- /*
- * Only this GnuTLS export function correctly exports the key,
- * we can't use gnutls_rsa_params_export_raw() because while
- * it appears to be fixed in more recent versions, in the
- * Ubuntu 14.04 version 2.12.23 (at least) it incorrectly
- * exports one of the key parameters (qInv). Additionally, we
- * would have to work around subtle differences in big number
- * representations.
- *
- * We need access to the RSA parameters directly (in the
- * parameter RSA **rsa) as the caller has to manually encode
- * them in a non-standard data structure.
- */
- ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_export(gtls_key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, p0, &len);
-
- if (ret != 0) {
- werr = WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto done;
- }
-
- /*
- * To dump the key we can use :
- * rk_dumpdata("h5lkey", p0, len);
- */
- ret = hx509_parse_private_key(*hctx, &_hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num ,
- p0, len, HX509_KEY_FORMAT_DER, pk);
-
- if (ret != 0) {
- werr = WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto done;
- }
-
- *rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, len);
- TALLOC_FREE(p0);
-
- if (*rsa == NULL) {
- hx509_private_key_free(pk);
- werr = WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto done;
- }
-
- RSA_returned_bits = BN_num_bits((*rsa)->n);
- DEBUG(6, ("GnuTLS returned an RSA private key with %d bits\n", RSA_returned_bits));
-
- if (RSA_returned_bits != bits) {
- DEBUG(0, ("GnuTLS unexpectedly returned an RSA private key with %d bits, needed %d\n", RSA_returned_bits, bits));
- hx509_private_key_free(pk);
- werr = WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto done;
- }
-
- werr = WERR_OK;
-
-done:
- if (p0 != NULL) {
- memset(p0, 0, len);
- TALLOC_FREE(p0);
- }
-
- gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(gtls_key);
- gnutls_global_deinit();
- return werr;
-}
-
-static WERROR self_sign_cert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, hx509_request *req,
- time_t lifetime, hx509_private_key *private_key,
- hx509_cert *cert, DATA_BLOB *guidblob)
-{
- SubjectPublicKeyInfo spki;
- hx509_name subject = NULL;
- hx509_ca_tbs tbs;
- struct heim_bit_string uniqueid;
- struct heim_integer serialnumber;
- int ret, i;
-
- uniqueid.data = talloc_memdup(ctx, guidblob->data, guidblob->length);
- if (uniqueid.data == NULL) {
- return WERR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
- }
- /* uniqueid is a bit string in which each byte represent 1 bit (1 or 0)
- * so as 1 byte is 8 bits we need to provision 8 times more space as in the
- * blob
- */
- uniqueid.length = 8 * guidblob->length;
-
- serialnumber.data = talloc_array(ctx, uint8_t,
- guidblob->length);
- if (serialnumber.data == NULL) {
- talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
- return WERR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
- }
-
- /* Native AD generates certificates with serialnumber in reversed notation */
- for (i = 0; i < guidblob->length; i++) {
- uint8_t *reversed = (uint8_t *)serialnumber.data;
- uint8_t *uncrypt = guidblob->data;
- reversed[i] = uncrypt[guidblob->length - 1 - i];
- }
- serialnumber.length = guidblob->length;
- serialnumber.negative = 0;
-
- memset(&spki, 0, sizeof(spki));
-
- ret = hx509_request_get_name(*hctx, *req, &subject);
- if (ret !=0) {
- goto fail_subject;
- }
- ret = hx509_request_get_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(*hctx, *req, &spki);
- if (ret !=0) {
- goto fail_spki;
- }
-
- ret = hx509_ca_tbs_init(*hctx, &tbs);
- if (ret !=0) {
- goto fail_tbs;
- }
-
- ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_spki(*hctx, tbs, &spki);
- if (ret !=0) {
- goto fail;
- }
- ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_subject(*hctx, tbs, subject);
- if (ret !=0) {
- goto fail;
- }
- ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_notAfter_lifetime(*hctx, tbs, lifetime);
- if (ret !=0) {
- goto fail;
- }
- ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_unique(*hctx, tbs, &uniqueid, &uniqueid);
- if (ret !=0) {
- goto fail;
- }
- ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_serialnumber(*hctx, tbs, &serialnumber);
- if (ret !=0) {
- goto fail;
- }
- ret = hx509_ca_sign_self(*hctx, tbs, *private_key, cert);
- if (ret !=0) {
- goto fail;
- }
- hx509_name_free(&subject);
- free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
- hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs);
-
- return WERR_OK;
-
-fail:
- hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs);
-fail_tbs:
- free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
-fail_spki:
- hx509_name_free(&subject);
-fail_subject:
- talloc_free(uniqueid.data);
- talloc_free(serialnumber.data);
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-}
-
-static WERROR create_req(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, hx509_request *req,
- hx509_private_key *signer,RSA **rsa, const char *dn)
-{
- int ret;
- SubjectPublicKeyInfo key;
-
- hx509_name name;
- WERROR werr;
-
- werr = create_heimdal_rsa_key(ctx, hctx, signer, rsa);
- if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
- return werr;
- }
-
- hx509_request_init(*hctx, req);
- ret = hx509_parse_name(*hctx, dn, &name);
- if (ret != 0) {
- RSA_free(*rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(signer);
- hx509_request_free(req);
- hx509_name_free(&name);
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- ret = hx509_request_set_name(*hctx, *req, name);
- if (ret != 0) {
- RSA_free(*rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(signer);
- hx509_request_free(req);
- hx509_name_free(&name);
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
- hx509_name_free(&name);
-
- ret = hx509_private_key2SPKI(*hctx, *signer, &key);
- if (ret != 0) {
- RSA_free(*rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(signer);
- hx509_request_free(req);
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
- ret = hx509_request_set_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(*hctx, *req, &key);
- if (ret != 0) {
- RSA_free(*rsa);
- hx509_private_key_free(signer);
- free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&key);
- hx509_request_free(req);
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&key);
-
- return WERR_OK;
-}
-
-/* Return an error when we fail to generate a certificate */
-static WERROR generate_bkrp_cert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, const char *dn)
-{
- heim_octet_string data;
- WERROR werr;
- RSA *rsa;
- hx509_context hctx;
- hx509_private_key pk;
- hx509_request req;
- hx509_cert cert;
- DATA_BLOB blob;
- DATA_BLOB blobkeypair;
- DATA_BLOB *tmp;
- int ret;
- bool ok = true;
- struct GUID guid = GUID_random();
- NTSTATUS status;
- char *secret_name;
- struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- uint32_t nb_seconds_validity = 3600 * 24 * 365;
-
- DEBUG(6, ("Trying to generate a certificate\n"));
- hx509_context_init(&hctx);
- werr = create_req(ctx, &hctx, &req, &pk, &rsa, dn);
- if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return werr;
- }
-
- status = GUID_to_ndr_blob(&guid, ctx, &blob);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- werr = self_sign_cert(ctx, &hctx, &req, nb_seconds_validity, &pk, &cert, &blob);
- if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
- hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- ret = hx509_cert_binary(hctx, cert, &data);
- if (ret !=0) {
- hx509_cert_free(cert);
- hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- keypair.cert.data = talloc_memdup(ctx, data.data, data.length);
- keypair.cert.length = data.length;
-
- /*
- * Heimdal's bignum are big endian and the
- * structure expect it to be in little endian
- * so we reverse the buffer to make it work
- */
- tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx, rsa->e);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ok = false;
- } else {
- keypair.public_exponent = *tmp;
- SMB_ASSERT(tmp->length <= 4);
- /*
- * The value is now in little endian but if can happen that the length is
- * less than 4 bytes.
- * So if we have less than 4 bytes we pad with zeros so that it correctly
- * fit into the structure.
- */
- if (tmp->length < 4) {
- /*
- * We need the expo to fit 4 bytes
- */
- keypair.public_exponent.data = talloc_zero_array(ctx, uint8_t, 4);
- memcpy(keypair.public_exponent.data, tmp->data, tmp->length);
- keypair.public_exponent.length = 4;
- }
- }
-
- tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->d);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ok = false;
- } else {
- keypair.private_exponent = *tmp;
- }
-
- tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->n);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ok = false;
- } else {
- keypair.modulus = *tmp;
- }
-
- tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->p);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ok = false;
- } else {
- keypair.prime1 = *tmp;
- }
-
- tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->q);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ok = false;
- } else {
- keypair.prime2 = *tmp;
- }
-
- tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->dmp1);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ok = false;
- } else {
- keypair.exponent1 = *tmp;
- }
-
- tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->dmq1);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ok = false;
- } else {
- keypair.exponent2 = *tmp;
- }
-
- tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->iqmp);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ok = false;
- } else {
- keypair.coefficient = *tmp;
- }
-
- /* One of the keypair allocation was wrong */
- if (ok == false) {
- der_free_octet_string(&data);
- hx509_cert_free(cert);
- hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
- keypair.certificate_len = keypair.cert.length;
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&blobkeypair, ctx, &keypair, (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- der_free_octet_string(&data);
- hx509_cert_free(cert);
- hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- secret_name = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "BCKUPKEY_%s", GUID_string(ctx, &guid));
- if (secret_name == NULL) {
- der_free_octet_string(&data);
- hx509_cert_free(cert);
- hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return WERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
- }
-
- status = set_lsa_secret(ctx, ldb_ctx, secret_name, &blobkeypair);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Failed to save the secret %s\n", secret_name));
- }
- talloc_free(secret_name);
-
- GUID_to_ndr_blob(&guid, ctx, &blob);
- status = set_lsa_secret(ctx, ldb_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED", &blob);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Failed to save the secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n"));
- }
-
- der_free_octet_string(&data);
- hx509_cert_free(cert);
- hx509_private_key_free(&pk);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return WERR_OK;
-}
-
-static WERROR bkrp_retrieve_client_wrap_key(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx)
-{
- struct GUID guid;
- char *guid_string;
- DATA_BLOB lsa_secret;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- NTSTATUS status;
-
- /*
- * here we basicaly need to return our certificate
- * search for lsa secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED first
- */
-
- status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx,
- ldb_ctx,
- "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED",
- &lsa_secret);
- if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) {
- /* Ok we can be in this case if there was no certs */
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx;
- char *dn = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "CN=%s",
- lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
-
- WERROR werr = generate_bkrp_cert(mem_ctx, dce_call, ldb_ctx, dn);
- if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx,
- ldb_ctx,
- "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED",
- &lsa_secret);
-
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- /* Ok we really don't manage to get this certs ...*/
- DEBUG(2, ("Unable to locate BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED after cert generation\n"));
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- }
- } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- if (lsa_secret.length == 0) {
- DEBUG(1, ("No secret in BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED, are we an undetected RODC?\n"));
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- } else {
- char *cert_secret_name;
-
- status = GUID_from_ndr_blob(&lsa_secret, &guid);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- }
-
- guid_string = GUID_string(mem_ctx, &guid);
- if (guid_string == NULL) {
- /* We return file not found because the client
- * expect this error
- */
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- }
-
- cert_secret_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
- "BCKUPKEY_%s",
- guid_string);
- status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx,
- ldb_ctx,
- cert_secret_name,
- &lsa_secret);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- }
-
- if (lsa_secret.length != 0) {
- struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair;
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&lsa_secret, mem_ctx, &keypair,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- }
- *(r->out.data_out_len) = keypair.cert.length;
- *(r->out.data_out) = talloc_memdup(mem_ctx, keypair.cert.data, keypair.cert.length);
- W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*(r->out.data_out));
- return WERR_OK;
- } else {
- DEBUG(1, ("No or broken secret called %s\n", cert_secret_name));
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
- }
-
- return WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-}
-
-static WERROR generate_bkrp_server_wrap_key(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx)
-{
- struct GUID guid = GUID_random();
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- DATA_BLOB blob_wrap_key, guid_blob;
- struct bkrp_dc_serverwrap_key wrap_key;
- NTSTATUS status;
- char *secret_name;
- TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
-
- generate_random_buffer(wrap_key.key, sizeof(wrap_key.key));
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&blob_wrap_key, ctx, &wrap_key, (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_dc_serverwrap_key);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- TALLOC_FREE(frame);
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- secret_name = talloc_asprintf(frame, "BCKUPKEY_%s", GUID_string(ctx, &guid));
- if (secret_name == NULL) {
- TALLOC_FREE(frame);
- return WERR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
- }
-
- status = set_lsa_secret(frame, ldb_ctx, secret_name, &blob_wrap_key);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Failed to save the secret %s\n", secret_name));
- TALLOC_FREE(frame);
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- status = GUID_to_ndr_blob(&guid, frame, &guid_blob);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Failed to save the secret %s\n", secret_name));
- TALLOC_FREE(frame);
- }
-
- status = set_lsa_secret(frame, ldb_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_P", &guid_blob);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Failed to save the secret %s\n", secret_name));
- TALLOC_FREE(frame);
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- TALLOC_FREE(frame);
-
- return WERR_OK;
-}
-
-/*
- * Find the specified decryption keys from the LSA secrets store as
- * G$BCKUPKEY_keyGuidString.
- */
-
-static WERROR bkrp_do_retrieve_server_wrap_key(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
- struct bkrp_dc_serverwrap_key *server_key,
- struct GUID *guid)
-{
- NTSTATUS status;
- DATA_BLOB lsa_secret;
- char *secret_name;
- char *guid_string;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
-
- guid_string = GUID_string(mem_ctx, guid);
- if (guid_string == NULL) {
- /* We return file not found because the client
- * expect this error
- */
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- }
-
- secret_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_%s", guid_string);
- if (secret_name == NULL) {
- return WERR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
- }
-
- status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx, secret_name, &lsa_secret);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(10, ("Error while fetching secret %s\n", secret_name));
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
- if (lsa_secret.length == 0) {
- /* RODC case, we do not have secrets locally */
- DEBUG(1, ("Unable to fetch value for secret %s, are we an undetected RODC?\n",
- secret_name));
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&lsa_secret, mem_ctx, server_key,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_dc_serverwrap_key);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Unable to parse the ndr encoded server wrap key %s\n", secret_name));
- return WERR_INVALID_DATA;
- }
-
- return WERR_OK;
-}
-
-/*
- * Find the current, preferred ServerWrap Key by looking at
- * G$BCKUPKEY_P in the LSA secrets store.
- *
- * Then find the current decryption keys from the LSA secrets store as
- * G$BCKUPKEY_keyGuidString.
- */
-
-static WERROR bkrp_do_retrieve_default_server_wrap_key(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
- struct bkrp_dc_serverwrap_key *server_key,
- struct GUID *returned_guid)
-{
- NTSTATUS status;
- DATA_BLOB guid_binary;
-
- status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_P", &guid_binary);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(10, ("Error while fetching secret BCKUPKEY_P to find current GUID\n"));
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- } else if (guid_binary.length == 0) {
- /* RODC case, we do not have secrets locally */
- DEBUG(1, ("Unable to fetch value for secret BCKUPKEY_P, are we an undetected RODC?\n"));
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- status = GUID_from_ndr_blob(&guid_binary, returned_guid);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- }
-
- return bkrp_do_retrieve_server_wrap_key(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx,
- server_key, returned_guid);
-}
-
-static WERROR bkrp_server_wrap_decrypt_data(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r ,struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx)
-{
- struct auth_session_info *session_info =
- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call);
- WERROR werr;
- struct bkrp_server_side_wrapped decrypt_request;
- DATA_BLOB sid_blob, encrypted_blob, symkey_blob;
- DATA_BLOB blob;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct bkrp_dc_serverwrap_key server_key;
- struct bkrp_rc4encryptedpayload rc4payload;
- struct dom_sid *caller_sid;
- uint8_t symkey[20]; /* SHA-1 hash len */
- uint8_t mackey[20]; /* SHA-1 hash len */
- uint8_t mac[20]; /* SHA-1 hash len */
- unsigned int hash_len;
- HMAC_CTX ctx;
-
- blob.data = r->in.data_in;
- blob.length = r->in.data_in_len;
-
- if (r->in.data_in_len == 0 || r->in.data_in == NULL) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(&blob, mem_ctx, &decrypt_request,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_server_side_wrapped);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- if (decrypt_request.magic != BACKUPKEY_SERVER_WRAP_VERSION) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- werr = bkrp_do_retrieve_server_wrap_key(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx, &server_key,
- &decrypt_request.guid);
- if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
- return werr;
- }
-
- dump_data_pw("server_key: \n", server_key.key, sizeof(server_key.key));
-
- dump_data_pw("r2: \n", decrypt_request.r2, sizeof(decrypt_request.r2));
-
- /*
- * This is *not* the leading 64 bytes, as indicated in MS-BKRP 3.1.4.1.1
- * BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, it really is the whole key
- */
- HMAC(EVP_sha1(), server_key.key, sizeof(server_key.key),
- decrypt_request.r2, sizeof(decrypt_request.r2),
- symkey, &hash_len);
-
- dump_data_pw("symkey: \n", symkey, hash_len);
-
- /* rc4 decrypt sid and secret using sym key */
- symkey_blob = data_blob_const(symkey, sizeof(symkey));
-
- encrypted_blob = data_blob_const(decrypt_request.rc4encryptedpayload,
- decrypt_request.ciphertext_length);
-
- arcfour_crypt_blob(encrypted_blob.data, encrypted_blob.length, &symkey_blob);
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(&encrypted_blob, mem_ctx, &rc4payload,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_rc4encryptedpayload);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- if (decrypt_request.payload_length != rc4payload.secret_data.length) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- dump_data_pw("r3: \n", rc4payload.r3, sizeof(rc4payload.r3));
-
- /*
- * This is *not* the leading 64 bytes, as indicated in MS-BKRP 3.1.4.1.1
- * BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, it really is the whole key
- */
- HMAC(EVP_sha1(), server_key.key, sizeof(server_key.key),
- rc4payload.r3, sizeof(rc4payload.r3),
- mackey, &hash_len);
-
- dump_data_pw("mackey: \n", mackey, sizeof(mackey));
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&sid_blob, mem_ctx, &rc4payload.sid,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_dom_sid);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, mackey, hash_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- /* SID field */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, sid_blob.data, sid_blob.length);
- /* Secret field */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, rc4payload.secret_data.data, rc4payload.secret_data.length);
- HMAC_Final(&ctx, mac, &hash_len);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- dump_data_pw("mac: \n", mac, sizeof(mac));
- dump_data_pw("rc4payload.mac: \n", rc4payload.mac, sizeof(rc4payload.mac));
-
- if (memcmp(mac, rc4payload.mac, sizeof(mac)) != 0) {
- return WERR_INVALID_ACCESS;
- }
-
- caller_sid = &session_info->security_token->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX];
-
- if (!dom_sid_equal(&rc4payload.sid, caller_sid)) {
- return WERR_INVALID_ACCESS;
- }
-
- *(r->out.data_out) = rc4payload.secret_data.data;
- *(r->out.data_out_len) = rc4payload.secret_data.length;
-
- return WERR_OK;
-}
-
-/*
- * For BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID we need to check the first 4 bytes to
- * determine what type of restore is wanted.
- *
- * See MS-BKRP 3.1.4.1.4 BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID point 1.
- */
-
-static WERROR bkrp_generic_decrypt_data(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx)
-{
- if (r->in.data_in_len < 4 || r->in.data_in == NULL) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- if (IVAL(r->in.data_in, 0) == BACKUPKEY_SERVER_WRAP_VERSION) {
- return bkrp_server_wrap_decrypt_data(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx);
- }
-
- return bkrp_client_wrap_decrypt_data(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx);
-}
-
-/*
- * We have some data, such as saved website or IMAP passwords that the
- * client would like to put into the profile on-disk. This needs to
- * be encrypted. This version gives the server the data over the
- * network (protected only by the negotiated transport encryption),
- * and asks that it be encrypted and returned for long-term storage.
- *
- * The data is NOT stored in the LSA, but a key to encrypt the data
- * will be stored. There is only one active encryption key per domain,
- * it is pointed at with G$BCKUPKEY_P in the LSA secrets store.
- *
- * The potentially multiple valid decryptiong keys (and the encryption
- * key) are in turn stored in the LSA secrets store as
- * G$BCKUPKEY_keyGuidString.
- *
- */
-
-static WERROR bkrp_server_wrap_encrypt_data(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r ,struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx)
-{
- struct auth_session_info *session_info =
- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call);
- DATA_BLOB sid_blob, encrypted_blob, symkey_blob, server_wrapped_blob;
- WERROR werr;
- struct dom_sid *caller_sid;
- uint8_t symkey[20]; /* SHA-1 hash len */
- uint8_t mackey[20]; /* SHA-1 hash len */
- unsigned int hash_len;
- struct bkrp_rc4encryptedpayload rc4payload;
- HMAC_CTX ctx;
- struct bkrp_dc_serverwrap_key server_key;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct bkrp_server_side_wrapped server_side_wrapped;
- struct GUID guid;
-
- if (r->in.data_in_len == 0 || r->in.data_in == NULL) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- werr = bkrp_do_retrieve_default_server_wrap_key(mem_ctx,
- ldb_ctx, &server_key,
- &guid);
-
- if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
- if (W_ERROR_EQUAL(werr, WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)) {
- /* Generate the server wrap key since one wasn't found */
- werr = generate_bkrp_server_wrap_key(mem_ctx,
- ldb_ctx);
- if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- werr = bkrp_do_retrieve_default_server_wrap_key(mem_ctx,
- ldb_ctx,
- &server_key,
- &guid);
-
- if (W_ERROR_EQUAL(werr, WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)) {
- /* Ok we really don't manage to get this secret ...*/
- return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
- }
- } else {
- /* In theory we should NEVER reach this point as it
- should only appear in a rodc server */
- /* we do not have the real secret attribute */
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- }
-
- caller_sid = &session_info->security_token->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX];
-
- dump_data_pw("server_key: \n", server_key.key, sizeof(server_key.key));
-
- /*
- * This is the key derivation step, so that the HMAC and RC4
- * operations over the user-supplied data are not able to
- * disclose the master key. By using random data, the symkey
- * and mackey values are unique for this operation, and
- * discovering these (by reversing the RC4 over the
- * attacker-controlled data) does not return something able to
- * be used to decyrpt the encrypted data of other users
- */
- generate_random_buffer(server_side_wrapped.r2, sizeof(server_side_wrapped.r2));
-
- dump_data_pw("r2: \n", server_side_wrapped.r2, sizeof(server_side_wrapped.r2));
-
- generate_random_buffer(rc4payload.r3, sizeof(rc4payload.r3));
-
- dump_data_pw("r3: \n", rc4payload.r3, sizeof(rc4payload.r3));
-
-
- /*
- * This is *not* the leading 64 bytes, as indicated in MS-BKRP 3.1.4.1.1
- * BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, it really is the whole key
- */
- HMAC(EVP_sha1(), server_key.key, sizeof(server_key.key),
- server_side_wrapped.r2, sizeof(server_side_wrapped.r2),
- symkey, &hash_len);
-
- dump_data_pw("symkey: \n", symkey, hash_len);
-
- /*
- * This is *not* the leading 64 bytes, as indicated in MS-BKRP 3.1.4.1.1
- * BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, it really is the whole key
- */
- HMAC(EVP_sha1(), server_key.key, sizeof(server_key.key),
- rc4payload.r3, sizeof(rc4payload.r3),
- mackey, &hash_len);
-
- dump_data_pw("mackey: \n", mackey, sizeof(mackey));
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&sid_blob, mem_ctx, caller_sid,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_dom_sid);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- rc4payload.secret_data.data = r->in.data_in;
- rc4payload.secret_data.length = r->in.data_in_len;
-
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, mackey, 20, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- /* SID field */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, sid_blob.data, sid_blob.length);
- /* Secret field */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, rc4payload.secret_data.data, rc4payload.secret_data.length);
- HMAC_Final(&ctx, rc4payload.mac, &hash_len);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- dump_data_pw("rc4payload.mac: \n", rc4payload.mac, sizeof(rc4payload.mac));
-
- rc4payload.sid = *caller_sid;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&encrypted_blob, mem_ctx, &rc4payload,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_rc4encryptedpayload);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- /* rc4 encrypt sid and secret using sym key */
- symkey_blob = data_blob_const(symkey, sizeof(symkey));
- arcfour_crypt_blob(encrypted_blob.data, encrypted_blob.length, &symkey_blob);
-
- /* create server wrap structure */
-
- server_side_wrapped.payload_length = rc4payload.secret_data.length;
- server_side_wrapped.ciphertext_length = encrypted_blob.length;
- server_side_wrapped.guid = guid;
- server_side_wrapped.rc4encryptedpayload = encrypted_blob.data;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&server_wrapped_blob, mem_ctx, &server_side_wrapped,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_server_side_wrapped);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- *(r->out.data_out) = server_wrapped_blob.data;
- *(r->out.data_out_len) = server_wrapped_blob.length;
-
- return WERR_OK;
-}
-
-static WERROR dcesrv_bkrp_BackupKey(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct bkrp_BackupKey *r)
-{
- WERROR error = WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx;
- bool is_rodc;
- const char *addr = "unknown";
- /* At which level we start to add more debug of what is done in the protocol */
- const int debuglevel = 4;
-
- if (DEBUGLVL(debuglevel)) {
- const struct tsocket_address *remote_address;
- remote_address = dcesrv_connection_get_remote_address(dce_call->conn);
- if (tsocket_address_is_inet(remote_address, "ip")) {
- addr = tsocket_address_inet_addr_string(remote_address, mem_ctx);
- W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(addr);
- }
- }
-
- if (lpcfg_server_role(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx) != ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC) {
- return WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- }
-
- /*
- * Save the current remote session details so they can used by the
- * audit logging module. This allows the audit logging to report the
- * remote users details, rather than the system users details.
- */
- ldb_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(mem_ctx, dce_call);
- if (samdb_rodc(ldb_ctx, &is_rodc) != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx);
- return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- if (!is_rodc) {
- if(strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent),
- BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, strlen(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID)) == 0) {
- DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested to decrypt a wrapped secret\n", addr));
- error = bkrp_generic_decrypt_data(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx);
- }
-
- if (strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent),
- BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID, strlen(BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID)) == 0) {
- DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested certificate for client wrapped secret\n", addr));
- error = bkrp_retrieve_client_wrap_key(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx);
- }
-
- if (strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent),
- BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K, strlen(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K)) == 0) {
- DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested to decrypt a server side wrapped secret\n", addr));
- error = bkrp_server_wrap_decrypt_data(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx);
- }
-
- if (strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent),
- BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, strlen(BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID)) == 0) {
- DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested a server wrapped secret\n", addr));
- error = bkrp_server_wrap_encrypt_data(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx);
- }
- }
- /*else: I am a RODC so I don't handle backup key protocol */
-
- talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx);
- return error;
-}
-
-/* include the generated boilerplate */
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey_s.c"
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
- test suite for backupkey remote protocol rpc operations
-
- Copyright (C) Matthieu Patou 2010-2011
-
- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
- (at your option) any later version.
-
- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
- GNU General Public License for more details.
-
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-*/
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
-
-#include "torture/rpc/torture_rpc.h"
-#include "torture/ndr/ndr.h"
-
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey_c.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa_c.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
-#include "lib/cmdline/popt_common.h"
-#include "libcli/auth/proto.h"
-#include "lib/crypto/arcfour.h"
-#include <com_err.h>
-#include <hcrypto/sha.h>
-#include <system/network.h>
-#include <hx509.h>
-#include <der.h>
-#include <hcrypto/rsa.h>
-#include <hcrypto/hmac.h>
-#include <hcrypto/sha.h>
-#include <hcrypto/evp.h>
-
-enum test_wrong {
- WRONG_MAGIC,
- WRONG_R2,
- WRONG_PAYLOAD_LENGTH,
- WRONG_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH,
- SHORT_PAYLOAD_LENGTH,
- SHORT_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH,
- ZERO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH,
- ZERO_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH,
- RIGHT_KEY,
- WRONG_KEY,
- WRONG_SID,
-};
-
-/* Our very special and valued secret */
-/* No need to put const as we cast the array in uint8_t
- * we will get a warning about the discared const
- */
-static const char secret[] = "tata yoyo mais qu'est ce qu'il y a sous ton grand chapeau ?";
-
-/* Get the SID from a user */
-static struct dom_sid *get_user_sid(struct torture_context *tctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- const char *user)
-{
- struct lsa_ObjectAttribute attr;
- struct lsa_QosInfo qos;
- struct lsa_OpenPolicy2 r;
- struct lsa_Close c;
- NTSTATUS status;
- struct policy_handle handle;
- struct lsa_LookupNames l;
- struct lsa_TransSidArray sids;
- struct lsa_RefDomainList *domains = NULL;
- struct lsa_String lsa_name;
- uint32_t count = 0;
- struct dom_sid *result;
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p2;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b;
-
- const char *domain = cli_credentials_get_domain(
- popt_get_cmdline_credentials());
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- torture_rpc_connection(tctx, &p2, &ndr_table_lsarpc),
- "could not open lsarpc pipe");
- b = p2->binding_handle;
-
- if (!(tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx))) {
- return NULL;
- }
- qos.len = 0;
- qos.impersonation_level = 2;
- qos.context_mode = 1;
- qos.effective_only = 0;
-
- attr.len = 0;
- attr.root_dir = NULL;
- attr.object_name = NULL;
- attr.attributes = 0;
- attr.sec_desc = NULL;
- attr.sec_qos = &qos;
-
- r.in.system_name = "\\";
- r.in.attr = &attr;
- r.in.access_mask = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED;
- r.out.handle = &handle;
-
- status = dcerpc_lsa_OpenPolicy2_r(b, tmp_ctx, &r);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- torture_comment(tctx,
- "OpenPolicy2 failed - %s\n",
- nt_errstr(status));
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(r.out.result)) {
- torture_comment(tctx,
- "OpenPolicy2_ failed - %s\n",
- nt_errstr(r.out.result));
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- sids.count = 0;
- sids.sids = NULL;
-
- lsa_name.string = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s\\%s", domain, user);
-
- l.in.handle = &handle;
- l.in.num_names = 1;
- l.in.names = &lsa_name;
- l.in.sids = &sids;
- l.in.level = 1;
- l.in.count = &count;
- l.out.count = &count;
- l.out.sids = &sids;
- l.out.domains = &domains;
-
- status = dcerpc_lsa_LookupNames_r(b, tmp_ctx, &l);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- torture_comment(tctx,
- "LookupNames of %s failed - %s\n",
- lsa_name.string,
- nt_errstr(status));
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (domains->count == 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- result = dom_sid_add_rid(mem_ctx,
- domains->domains[0].sid,
- l.out.sids->sids[0].rid);
- c.in.handle = &handle;
- c.out.handle = &handle;
-
- status = dcerpc_lsa_Close_r(b, tmp_ctx, &c);
-
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- torture_comment(tctx,
- "dcerpc_lsa_Close failed - %s\n",
- nt_errstr(status));
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(c.out.result)) {
- torture_comment(tctx,
- "dcerpc_lsa_Close failed - %s\n",
- nt_errstr(c.out.result));
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- talloc_free(p2);
-
- torture_comment(tctx, "Get_user_sid finished\n");
- return result;
-}
-
-/*
- * Create a bkrp_encrypted_secret_vX structure
- * the version depends on the version parameter
- * the structure is returned as a blob.
- * The broken flag is to indicate if we want
- * to create a non conform to specification structre
- */
-static DATA_BLOB *create_unencryptedsecret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- bool broken,
- int version)
-{
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
- DATA_BLOB *blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
-
- if (version == 2) {
- struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2 unenc_sec;
-
- ZERO_STRUCT(unenc_sec);
- unenc_sec.secret_len = sizeof(secret);
- unenc_sec.secret = discard_const_p(uint8_t, secret);
- generate_random_buffer(unenc_sec.payload_key,
- sizeof(unenc_sec.payload_key));
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(blob, blob, &unenc_sec,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (broken) {
- /* The magic value is correctly set by the NDR push
- * but we want to test the behavior of the server
- * if a differrent value is provided
- */
- ((uint8_t*)blob->data)[4] = 79; /* A great year !!! */
- }
- }
-
- if (version == 3) {
- struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3 unenc_sec;
-
- ZERO_STRUCT(unenc_sec);
- unenc_sec.secret_len = sizeof(secret);
- unenc_sec.secret = discard_const_p(uint8_t, secret);
- generate_random_buffer(unenc_sec.payload_key,
- sizeof(unenc_sec.payload_key));
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(blob, blob, &unenc_sec,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (broken) {
- /*
- * The magic value is correctly set by the NDR push
- * but we want to test the behavior of the server
- * if a differrent value is provided
- */
- ((uint8_t*)blob->data)[4] = 79; /* A great year !!! */
- }
- }
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return blob;
-}
-
-/*
- * Create an access check structure, the format depends on the version parameter.
- * If broken is specified then we create a stucture that isn't conform to the
- * specification.
- *
- * If the structure can't be created then NULL is returned.
- */
-static DATA_BLOB *create_access_check(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- const char *user,
- bool broken,
- uint32_t version)
-{
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
- DATA_BLOB *blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- const struct dom_sid *sid = get_user_sid(tctx, tmp_ctx, user);
-
- if (sid == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (version == 2) {
- struct bkrp_access_check_v2 access_struct;
- struct sha sctx;
- uint8_t nonce[32];
-
- ZERO_STRUCT(access_struct);
- generate_random_buffer(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
- access_struct.nonce_len = sizeof(nonce);
- access_struct.nonce = nonce;
- access_struct.sid = *sid;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(blob, blob, &access_struct,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_access_check_v2);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * We pushed the whole structure including a null hash
- * but the hash need to be calculated only up to the hash field
- * so we reduce the size of what has to be calculated
- */
-
- SHA1_Init(&sctx);
- SHA1_Update(&sctx, blob->data,
- blob->length - sizeof(access_struct.hash));
- SHA1_Final(blob->data + blob->length - sizeof(access_struct.hash),
- &sctx);
-
- /* Altering the SHA */
- if (broken) {
- blob->data[blob->length - 1]++;
- }
- }
-
- if (version == 3) {
- struct bkrp_access_check_v3 access_struct;
- struct hc_sha512state sctx;
- uint8_t nonce[32];
-
- ZERO_STRUCT(access_struct);
- generate_random_buffer(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
- access_struct.nonce_len = sizeof(nonce);
- access_struct.nonce = nonce;
- access_struct.sid = *sid;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(blob, blob, &access_struct,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_access_check_v3);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*We pushed the whole structure including a null hash
- * but the hash need to be calculated only up to the hash field
- * so we reduce the size of what has to be calculated
- */
-
- SHA512_Init(&sctx);
- SHA512_Update(&sctx, blob->data,
- blob->length - sizeof(access_struct.hash));
- SHA512_Final(blob->data + blob->length - sizeof(access_struct.hash),
- &sctx);
-
- /* Altering the SHA */
- if (broken) {
- blob->data[blob->length -1]++;
- }
- }
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return blob;
-}
-
-
-static DATA_BLOB *encrypt_blob(struct torture_context *tctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- DATA_BLOB *key,
- DATA_BLOB *iv,
- DATA_BLOB *to_encrypt,
- const AlgorithmIdentifier *alg)
-{
- hx509_crypto crypto;
- hx509_context hctx;
- heim_octet_string ivos;
- heim_octet_string *encrypted;
- DATA_BLOB *blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
- int res;
-
- ivos.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, iv->length);
- ivos.length = iv->length;
- memcpy(ivos.data, iv->data, iv->length);
-
- hx509_context_init(&hctx);
- res = hx509_crypto_init(hctx, NULL, &alg->algorithm, &crypto);
- if (res) {
- torture_comment(tctx,
- "error while doing the init of the crypto object\n");
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NULL;
- }
- res = hx509_crypto_set_key_data(crypto, key->data, key->length);
- if (res) {
- torture_comment(tctx,
- "error while setting the key of the crypto object\n");
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- hx509_crypto_set_padding(crypto, HX509_CRYPTO_PADDING_NONE);
- res = hx509_crypto_encrypt(crypto,
- to_encrypt->data,
- to_encrypt->length,
- &ivos,
- &encrypted);
- if (res) {
- torture_comment(tctx, "error while encrypting\n");
- hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- *blob = data_blob_talloc(blob, encrypted->data, encrypted->length);
- der_free_octet_string(encrypted);
- free(encrypted);
- hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return blob;
-}
-
-/*
- * Certs used for this protocol have a GUID in the issuer_uniq_id field.
- * This function fetch it.
- */
-static struct GUID *get_cert_guid(struct torture_context *tctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- uint8_t *cert_data,
- uint32_t cert_len)
-{
- hx509_context hctx;
- hx509_cert cert;
- heim_bit_string issuer_unique_id;
- DATA_BLOB data;
- int hret;
- uint32_t size;
- struct GUID *guid = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct GUID);
- NTSTATUS status;
-
- hx509_context_init(&hctx);
-
- hret = hx509_cert_init_data(hctx, cert_data, cert_len, &cert);
- if (hret) {
- torture_comment(tctx, "error while loading the cert\n");
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NULL;
- }
- hret = hx509_cert_get_issuer_unique_id(hctx, cert, &issuer_unique_id);
- if (hret) {
- torture_comment(tctx, "error while getting the issuer_uniq_id\n");
- hx509_cert_free(cert);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* The issuer_unique_id is a bit string,
- * which means that the real size has to be divided by 8
- * to have the number of bytes
- */
- hx509_cert_free(cert);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- size = issuer_unique_id.length / 8;
- data = data_blob_const(issuer_unique_id.data, size);
-
- status = GUID_from_data_blob(&data, guid);
- der_free_bit_string(&issuer_unique_id);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return guid;
-}
-
-/*
- * Encrypt a blob with the private key of the certificate
- * passed as a parameter.
- */
-static DATA_BLOB *encrypt_blob_pk(struct torture_context *tctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- uint8_t *cert_data,
- uint32_t cert_len,
- DATA_BLOB *to_encrypt)
-{
- hx509_context hctx;
- hx509_cert cert;
- heim_octet_string secretdata;
- heim_octet_string encrypted;
- heim_oid encryption_oid;
- DATA_BLOB *blob;
- int hret;
-
- hx509_context_init(&hctx);
-
- hret = hx509_cert_init_data(hctx, cert_data, cert_len, &cert);
- if (hret) {
- torture_comment(tctx, "error while loading the cert\n");
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- secretdata.data = to_encrypt->data;
- secretdata.length = to_encrypt->length;
- hret = hx509_cert_public_encrypt(hctx, &secretdata,
- cert, &encryption_oid,
- &encrypted);
- hx509_cert_free(cert);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
- if (hret) {
- torture_comment(tctx, "error while encrypting\n");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
- if (blob == NULL) {
- der_free_oid(&encryption_oid);
- der_free_octet_string(&encrypted);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- *blob = data_blob_talloc(blob, encrypted.data, encrypted.length);
- der_free_octet_string(&encrypted);
- der_free_oid(&encryption_oid);
- if (blob->data == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return blob;
-}
-
-
-static struct bkrp_BackupKey *createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p, int version, DATA_BLOB *out)
-{
- struct dcerpc_binding *binding;
- struct bkrp_client_side_wrapped data;
- struct GUID *g = talloc(tctx, struct GUID);
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = talloc_zero(tctx, struct bkrp_BackupKey);
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- DATA_BLOB blob;
- NTSTATUS status;
-
- if (r == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- binding = dcerpc_binding_dup(tctx, p->binding);
- if (binding == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- status = dcerpc_binding_set_flags(binding, DCERPC_SEAL|DCERPC_AUTH_SPNEGO, 0);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ZERO_STRUCT(data);
- status = GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID, g);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- r->in.guidActionAgent = g;
- data.version = version;
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&blob, tctx, &data,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_client_side_wrapped);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return NULL;
- }
- r->in.data_in = blob.data;
- r->in.data_in_len = blob.length;
- r->out.data_out = &out->data;
- r->out.data_out_len = talloc(r, uint32_t);
- return r;
-}
-
-static struct bkrp_BackupKey *createRestoreGUIDStruct(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p, int version, DATA_BLOB *out,
- bool norevert,
- bool broken_version,
- bool broken_user,
- bool broken_magic_secret,
- bool broken_magic_access,
- bool broken_hash_access,
- bool broken_cert_guid)
-{
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- struct bkrp_client_side_wrapped data;
- DATA_BLOB *xs;
- DATA_BLOB *sec;
- DATA_BLOB *enc_sec = NULL;
- DATA_BLOB *enc_xs = NULL;
- DATA_BLOB *blob2;
- DATA_BLOB enc_sec_reverted;
- DATA_BLOB des3_key;
- DATA_BLOB aes_key;
- DATA_BLOB iv;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct GUID *guid, *g;
- int t;
- uint32_t size;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- NTSTATUS status;
- const char *user;
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, version, &out_blob);
- if (r == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (broken_user) {
- /* we take a fake user*/
- user = "guest";
- } else {
- user = cli_credentials_get_username(
- popt_get_cmdline_credentials());
- }
-
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- "Get GUID");
- torture_assert_werr_ok(tctx, r->out.result,
- "Get GUID");
-
- /*
- * We have to set it outside of the function createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct
- * the len of the blob, this is due to the fact that they don't have the
- * same size (one is 32bits the other 64bits)
- */
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
-
- sec = create_unencryptedsecret(tctx, broken_magic_secret, version);
- if (sec == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- xs = create_access_check(tctx, p, tctx, user, broken_hash_access, version);
- if (xs == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (broken_magic_access){
- /* The start of the access_check structure contains the
- * GUID of the certificate
- */
- xs->data[0]++;
- }
-
- enc_sec = encrypt_blob_pk(tctx, tctx, out_blob.data, out_blob.length, sec);
- if (!enc_sec) {
- return NULL;
- }
- enc_sec_reverted.data = talloc_array(tctx, uint8_t, enc_sec->length);
- if (enc_sec_reverted.data == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
- enc_sec_reverted.length = enc_sec->length;
-
- /*
- * We DO NOT revert the array on purpose it's in order to check that
- * when the server is not able to decrypt then it answer the correct error
- */
- if (norevert) {
- for(t=0; t< enc_sec->length; t++) {
- enc_sec_reverted.data[t] = ((uint8_t*)enc_sec->data)[t];
- }
- } else {
- for(t=0; t< enc_sec->length; t++) {
- enc_sec_reverted.data[t] = ((uint8_t*)enc_sec->data)[enc_sec->length - t -1];
- }
- }
-
- size = sec->length;
- if (version ==2) {
- const AlgorithmIdentifier *alg = hx509_crypto_des_rsdi_ede3_cbc();
- iv.data = sec->data+(size - 8);
- iv.length = 8;
-
- des3_key.data = sec->data+(size - 32);
- des3_key.length = 24;
-
- enc_xs = encrypt_blob(tctx, tctx, &des3_key, &iv, xs, alg);
- }
- if (version == 3) {
- const AlgorithmIdentifier *alg = hx509_crypto_aes256_cbc();
- iv.data = sec->data+(size-16);
- iv.length = 16;
-
- aes_key.data = sec->data+(size-48);
- aes_key.length = 32;
-
- enc_xs = encrypt_blob(tctx, tctx, &aes_key, &iv, xs, alg);
- }
-
- if (!enc_xs) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* To cope with the fact that heimdal do padding at the end for the moment */
- enc_xs->length = xs->length;
-
- guid = get_cert_guid(tctx, tctx, out_blob.data, out_blob.length);
- if (guid == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (broken_version) {
- data.version = 1;
- } else {
- data.version = version;
- }
-
- data.guid = *guid;
- data.encrypted_secret = enc_sec_reverted.data;
- data.access_check = enc_xs->data;
- data.encrypted_secret_len = enc_sec->length;
- data.access_check_len = enc_xs->length;
-
- /* We want the blob to persist after this function so we don't
- * allocate it in the stack
- */
- blob2 = talloc(tctx, DATA_BLOB);
- if (blob2 == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(blob2, tctx, &data,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_client_side_wrapped);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (broken_cert_guid) {
- blob2->data[12]++;
- }
-
- ZERO_STRUCT(*r);
-
- g = talloc(tctx, struct GUID);
- if (g == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- status = GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, g);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- r->in.guidActionAgent = g;
- r->in.data_in = blob2->data;
- r->in.data_in_len = blob2->length;
- r->in.param = 0;
- r->out.data_out = &(out->data);
- r->out.data_out_len = talloc(r, uint32_t);
- return r;
-}
-
-/* Check that we are able to receive the certificate of the DCs
- * used for client wrap version of the backup key protocol
- */
-static bool test_RetrieveBackupKeyGUID(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- if (r == NULL) {
- return false;
- }
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- "Get GUID");
-
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r->out.result,
- WERR_OK,
- "Wrong dce/rpc error code");
- } else {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,
- "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-/* Test to check the failure to recover a secret because the
- * secret blob is not reversed
- */
-static bool test_RestoreGUID_ko(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_client_side_unwrapped resp;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob,
- true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&out_blob, tctx, &resp, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_unwrapped);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err), 0, "Unable to unmarshall bkrp_client_side_unwrapped");
- if (!W_ERROR_EQUAL(r->out.result, WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER)) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_DATA,
- "Wrong error code");
- }
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_RestoreGUID_wrongversion(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_client_side_unwrapped resp;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob,
- false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&out_blob, tctx, &resp, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_unwrapped);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err), 0, "Unable to unmarshall bkrp_client_side_unwrapped");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result, WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER, "Wrong error code on wrong version");
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_RestoreGUID_wronguser(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_client_side_unwrapped resp;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob,
- false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&out_blob, tctx, &resp, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_unwrapped);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err), 0, "Unable to unmarshall bkrp_client_side_unwrapped");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result, WERR_INVALID_ACCESS, "Restore GUID");
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_RestoreGUID_v3(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_client_side_unwrapped resp;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 3, &out_blob,
- false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&out_blob, tctx, &resp, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_unwrapped);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err), 1, "Unable to unmarshall bkrp_client_side_unwrapped");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result, WERR_OK, "Restore GUID");
- torture_assert_str_equal(tctx, (char*)resp.secret.data, secret, "Wrong secret");
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_RestoreGUID(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_client_side_unwrapped resp;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob,
- false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result, WERR_OK, "Restore GUID");
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx,
- ndr_pull_struct_blob(&out_blob, tctx, &resp,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_unwrapped),
- NDR_ERR_SUCCESS,
- "Unable to unmarshall bkrp_client_side_unwrapped");
- torture_assert_str_equal(tctx, (char*)resp.secret.data, secret, "Wrong secret");
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_RestoreGUID_badmagiconsecret(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_client_side_unwrapped resp;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 3, &out_blob,
- false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&out_blob, tctx, &resp, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_unwrapped);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err), 0, "Unable to unmarshall bkrp_client_side_unwrapped");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result, WERR_INVALID_DATA, "Wrong error code while providing bad magic in secret");
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_RestoreGUID_emptyrequest(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 3, &out_blob,
- false, false, false, true, false, false, true);
-
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct failed");
- r->in.data_in = talloc(tctx, uint8_t);
- r->in.data_in_len = 0;
- r->in.param = 0;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result, WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER, "Bad error code on wrong has in access check");
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_RestoreGUID_badcertguid(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_client_side_unwrapped resp;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 3, &out_blob,
- false, false, false, false, false, false, true);
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct() failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&out_blob, tctx, &resp, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_unwrapped);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err), 0, "Unable to unmarshall bkrp_client_side_unwrapped");
-
- /*
- * Windows 2012R2 has, presumably, a programming error
- * returning an NTSTATUS code on this interface
- */
- if (W_ERROR_V(r->out.result) != NT_STATUS_V(NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result, WERR_INVALID_DATA, "Bad error code on wrong has in access check");
- }
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_RestoreGUID_badmagicaccesscheck(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_client_side_unwrapped resp;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob,
- false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&out_blob, tctx, &resp, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_unwrapped);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err), 0, "Unable to unmarshall bkrp_client_side_unwrapped");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result, WERR_INVALID_DATA, "Bad error code on wrong has in access check");
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_RestoreGUID_badhashaccesscheck(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_client_side_unwrapped resp;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRestoreGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob,
- false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRestoreGUIDStruct failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r), "Restore GUID");
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&out_blob, tctx, &resp, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_unwrapped);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err), 0, "Unable to unmarshall bkrp_client_side_unwrapped");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r->out.result, WERR_INVALID_DATA, "Bad error code on wrong has in access check");
- } else {
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check that the RSA modulus in the certificate of the DCs has 2048 bits.
- */
-static bool test_RetrieveBackupKeyGUID_2048bits(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- DATA_BLOB out_blob;
- struct bkrp_BackupKey *r = createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct(tctx, p, 2, &out_blob);
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
-
- hx509_context hctx;
- int hret;
- hx509_cert cert;
- SubjectPublicKeyInfo spki;
- RSA *rsa;
- int RSA_returned_bits;
-
- torture_assert(tctx, r != NULL, "createRetrieveBackupKeyGUIDStruct failed");
-
- hx509_context_init(&hctx);
-
- if (r == NULL) {
- return false;
- }
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- const unsigned char *spki_spk_data;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- "Get GUID");
-
- torture_assert_werr_ok(tctx, r->out.result,
- "Get GUID");
-
- out_blob.length = *r->out.data_out_len;
-
- hret = hx509_cert_init_data(hctx, out_blob.data, out_blob.length, &cert);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, hret, 0, "hx509_cert_init_data failed");
-
- hret = hx509_cert_get_SPKI(hctx, cert , &spki);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, hret, 0, "hx509_cert_get_SPKI failed");
-
- /* We must take a copy, as d2i_RSAPublicKey *changes* the input parameter */
- spki_spk_data = spki.subjectPublicKey.data;
- rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &spki_spk_data, spki.subjectPublicKey.length / 8);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, rsa != NULL, 1, "d2i_RSAPublicKey failed");
-
- RSA_returned_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx,
- RSA_returned_bits,
- 2048,
- "RSA Key doesn't have 2048 bits");
-
- RSA_free(rsa);
-
- /*
- * Because we prevented spki from being changed above,
- * we can now safely call this to free it
- */
- free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki);
- hx509_cert_free(cert);
- hx509_context_free(&hctx);
-
- } else {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,
- "Get GUID");
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- struct bkrp_BackupKey r;
- struct GUID guid;
- DATA_BLOB plaintext = data_blob_const(secret, sizeof(secret));
- DATA_BLOB encrypted;
- uint32_t enclen;
- DATA_BLOB decrypted;
- uint32_t declen;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
- ZERO_STRUCT(r);
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- /* Encrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = plaintext.data;
- r.in.data_in_len = plaintext.length;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &encrypted.data;
- r.out.data_out_len = &enclen;
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "encrypt");
- } else {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,
- "encrypt");
- return true;
- }
- torture_assert_werr_ok(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- "encrypt");
- encrypted.length = *r.out.data_out_len;
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = encrypted.data;
- r.in.data_in_len = encrypted.length;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
- torture_assert_werr_ok(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- "decrypt");
- decrypted.length = *r.out.data_out_len;
-
- /* Compare */
- torture_assert_data_blob_equal(tctx, plaintext, decrypted, "Decrypt failed");
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = encrypted.data;
- r.in.data_in_len = encrypted.length;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
- torture_assert_werr_ok(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- "decrypt");
- decrypted.length = *r.out.data_out_len;
-
- /* Compare */
- torture_assert_data_blob_equal(tctx, plaintext, decrypted, "Decrypt failed");
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_keyGUID(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- struct bkrp_BackupKey r;
- struct GUID guid;
- DATA_BLOB plaintext = data_blob_const(secret, sizeof(secret));
- DATA_BLOB encrypted;
- uint32_t enclen;
- DATA_BLOB decrypted;
- uint32_t declen;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct bkrp_server_side_wrapped server_side_wrapped;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
- ZERO_STRUCT(r);
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- /* Encrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = plaintext.data;
- r.in.data_in_len = plaintext.length;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &encrypted.data;
- r.out.data_out_len = &enclen;
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "encrypt");
- } else {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,
- "encrypt");
- return true;
- }
- torture_assert_werr_ok(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- "encrypt");
- encrypted.length = *r.out.data_out_len;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&encrypted, tctx, &server_side_wrapped,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_server_side_wrapped);
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx, ndr_err, NDR_ERR_SUCCESS, "pull of server_side_wrapped");
-
- /* Change the GUID */
- server_side_wrapped.guid = GUID_random();
-
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&encrypted, tctx, &server_side_wrapped,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_server_side_wrapped);
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx, ndr_err, NDR_ERR_SUCCESS, "push of server_side_wrapped");
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = encrypted.data;
- r.in.data_in_len = encrypted.length;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_DATA,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_DATA");
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = encrypted.data;
- r.in.data_in_len = encrypted.length;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_DATA,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_DATA");
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_empty_request(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- struct bkrp_BackupKey r;
- struct GUID guid;
- DATA_BLOB decrypted;
- uint32_t declen;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- uint8_t short_request[4] = { 1, 0, 0, 0 };
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
- ZERO_STRUCT(r);
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = short_request;
- r.in.data_in_len = 0;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "encrypt");
- } else {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,
- "encrypt");
- return true;
- }
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER");
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = short_request;
- r.in.data_in_len = 0;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER");
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = NULL;
- r.in.data_in_len = 0;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX,
- "decrypt");
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = NULL;
- r.in.data_in_len = 0;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX,
- "decrypt");
-
- return true;
-}
-
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_short_request(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- struct bkrp_BackupKey r;
- struct GUID guid;
- DATA_BLOB decrypted;
- uint32_t declen;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- uint8_t short_request[4] = { 1, 0, 0, 0 };
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
- ZERO_STRUCT(r);
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = short_request;
- r.in.data_in_len = 4;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "encrypt");
- } else {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,
- "encrypt");
- return true;
- }
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER");
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = short_request;
- r.in.data_in_len = 4;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER");
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = short_request;
- r.in.data_in_len = 1;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER");
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = short_request;
- r.in.data_in_len = 1;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER");
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt_manual(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct bkrp_server_side_wrapped *server_side_wrapped,
- enum test_wrong wrong)
-{
- char *lsa_binding_string = NULL;
- struct dcerpc_binding *lsa_binding = NULL;
- struct dcerpc_pipe *lsa_p = NULL;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *lsa_b = NULL;
- struct lsa_OpenSecret r_secret;
- struct lsa_QuerySecret r_query_secret;
- struct policy_handle *handle, sec_handle;
- struct bkrp_BackupKey r;
- struct GUID preferred_key_guid;
- DATA_BLOB plaintext = data_blob_const(secret, sizeof(secret));
- DATA_BLOB preferred_key, preferred_key_clear, session_key,
- decrypt_key, decrypt_key_clear, encrypted_blob, symkey_blob,
- sid_blob;
- struct bkrp_dc_serverwrap_key server_key;
- struct lsa_DATA_BUF_PTR bufp1;
- char *key_guid_string;
- struct bkrp_rc4encryptedpayload rc4payload;
- struct dom_sid *caller_sid;
- uint8_t symkey[20]; /* SHA-1 hash len */
- uint8_t mackey[20]; /* SHA-1 hash len */
- uint8_t mac[20]; /* SHA-1 hash len */
- unsigned int hash_len;
- HMAC_CTX ctx;
- ZERO_STRUCT(r);
- ZERO_STRUCT(r_secret);
- ZERO_STRUCT(r_query_secret);
-
- /* Now read BCKUPKEY_P and prove we can do a matching decrypt and encrypt */
-
- /* lsa_OpenSecret only works with ncacn_np and AUTH_LEVEL_NONE */
- lsa_binding_string = talloc_asprintf(tctx, "ncacn_np:%s",
- torture_setting_string(tctx, "host", NULL));
- torture_assert(tctx, lsa_binding_string != NULL, "lsa_binding_string");
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_parse_binding(tctx, lsa_binding_string, &lsa_binding),
- "Failed to parse dcerpc binding");
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_pipe_connect_b(tctx, &lsa_p,
- lsa_binding, &ndr_table_lsarpc,
- popt_get_cmdline_credentials(),
- tctx->ev, tctx->lp_ctx),
- "Opening LSA pipe");
- lsa_b = lsa_p->binding_handle;
-
- torture_assert(tctx, test_lsa_OpenPolicy2(lsa_b, tctx, &handle), "OpenPolicy failed");
- r_secret.in.name.string = "G$BCKUPKEY_P";
-
- r_secret.in.handle = handle;
- r_secret.in.access_mask = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED;
- r_secret.out.sec_handle = &sec_handle;
-
- torture_comment(tctx, "Testing OpenSecret\n");
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_lsa_OpenSecret_r(lsa_b, tctx, &r_secret),
- "OpenSecret failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, r_secret.out.result,
- "OpenSecret failed");
-
- r_query_secret.in.sec_handle = &sec_handle;
- r_query_secret.in.new_val = &bufp1;
- bufp1.buf = NULL;
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_lsa_QuerySecret_r(lsa_b, tctx, &r_query_secret),
- "QuerySecret failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, r_query_secret.out.result,
- "QuerySecret failed");
-
-
- preferred_key.data = r_query_secret.out.new_val->buf->data;
- preferred_key.length = r_query_secret.out.new_val->buf->size;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_fetch_session_key(lsa_p, &session_key),
- "dcerpc_fetch_session_key failed");
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- sess_decrypt_blob(tctx,
- &preferred_key, &session_key, &preferred_key_clear),
- "sess_decrypt_blob failed");
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, GUID_from_ndr_blob(&preferred_key_clear, &preferred_key_guid),
- "GUID parse failed");
-
- torture_assert_guid_equal(tctx, server_side_wrapped->guid,
- preferred_key_guid,
- "GUID didn't match value pointed at by G$BCKUPKEY_P");
-
- /* And read BCKUPKEY_<guid> and get the actual key */
-
- key_guid_string = GUID_string(tctx, &server_side_wrapped->guid);
- r_secret.in.name.string = talloc_asprintf(tctx, "G$BCKUPKEY_%s", key_guid_string);
-
- r_secret.in.handle = handle;
- r_secret.in.access_mask = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED;
- r_secret.out.sec_handle = &sec_handle;
-
- torture_comment(tctx, "Testing OpenSecret\n");
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_lsa_OpenSecret_r(lsa_b, tctx, &r_secret),
- "OpenSecret failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, r_secret.out.result,
- "OpenSecret failed");
-
- r_query_secret.in.sec_handle = &sec_handle;
- r_query_secret.in.new_val = &bufp1;
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_lsa_QuerySecret_r(lsa_b, tctx, &r_query_secret),
- "QuerySecret failed");
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, r_query_secret.out.result,
- "QuerySecret failed");
-
-
- decrypt_key.data = r_query_secret.out.new_val->buf->data;
- decrypt_key.length = r_query_secret.out.new_val->buf->size;
-
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- sess_decrypt_blob(tctx,
- &decrypt_key, &session_key, &decrypt_key_clear),
- "sess_decrypt_blob failed");
-
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx, ndr_pull_struct_blob(&decrypt_key_clear, tctx, &server_key,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_dc_serverwrap_key),
- NDR_ERR_SUCCESS, "Failed to parse server_key");
-
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, server_key.magic, 1, "Failed to correctly decrypt server key");
-
- /*
- * This is *not* the leading 64 bytes, as indicated in MS-BKRP 3.1.4.1.1
- * BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, it really is the whole key
- */
- HMAC(EVP_sha1(), server_key.key, sizeof(server_key.key),
- server_side_wrapped->r2, sizeof(server_side_wrapped->r2),
- symkey, &hash_len);
-
- /* rc4 decrypt sid and secret using sym key */
- symkey_blob = data_blob_const(symkey, sizeof(symkey));
-
- encrypted_blob = data_blob_talloc(tctx, server_side_wrapped->rc4encryptedpayload,
- server_side_wrapped->ciphertext_length);
-
- arcfour_crypt_blob(encrypted_blob.data, encrypted_blob.length, &symkey_blob);
-
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx, ndr_pull_struct_blob(&encrypted_blob, tctx, &rc4payload,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_rc4encryptedpayload),
- NDR_ERR_SUCCESS, "Failed to parse rc4encryptedpayload");
-
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, rc4payload.secret_data.length,
- server_side_wrapped->payload_length,
- "length of decrypted payload not the length declared in surrounding structure");
-
- /*
- * This is *not* the leading 64 bytes, as indicated in MS-BKRP 3.1.4.1.1
- * BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, it really is the whole key
- */
- HMAC(EVP_sha1(), server_key.key, sizeof(server_key.key),
- rc4payload.r3, sizeof(rc4payload.r3),
- mackey, &hash_len);
-
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx, ndr_push_struct_blob(&sid_blob, tctx, &rc4payload.sid,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_dom_sid),
- NDR_ERR_SUCCESS, "unable to push SID");
-
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, mackey, hash_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- /* SID field */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, sid_blob.data, sid_blob.length);
- /* Secret field */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, rc4payload.secret_data.data, rc4payload.secret_data.length);
- HMAC_Final(&ctx, mac, &hash_len);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- torture_assert_mem_equal(tctx, mac, rc4payload.mac, sizeof(mac), "mac not correct");
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, rc4payload.secret_data.length,
- plaintext.length, "decrypted data is not correct length");
- torture_assert_mem_equal(tctx, rc4payload.secret_data.data,
- plaintext.data, plaintext.length,
- "decrypted data is not correct");
-
- /* Not strictly correct all the time, but good enough for this test */
- caller_sid = get_user_sid(tctx, tctx,
- cli_credentials_get_username(
- popt_get_cmdline_credentials()));
-
- torture_assert_sid_equal(tctx, &rc4payload.sid, caller_sid, "Secret saved with wrong SID");
-
-
- /* RE-encrypt */
-
- if (wrong == WRONG_SID) {
- rc4payload.sid.sub_auths[rc4payload.sid.num_auths - 1] = DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT;
- }
-
- dump_data_pw("mackey: \n", mackey, sizeof(mackey));
-
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx,
- ndr_push_struct_blob(&sid_blob, tctx, &rc4payload.sid,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_dom_sid),
- NDR_ERR_SUCCESS,
- "push of sid failed");
-
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, mackey, 20, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- /* SID field */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, sid_blob.data, sid_blob.length);
- /* Secret field */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, rc4payload.secret_data.data, rc4payload.secret_data.length);
- HMAC_Final(&ctx, rc4payload.mac, &hash_len);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- dump_data_pw("rc4payload.mac: \n", rc4payload.mac, sizeof(rc4payload.mac));
-
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx,
- ndr_push_struct_blob(&encrypted_blob, tctx, &rc4payload,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_rc4encryptedpayload),
- NDR_ERR_SUCCESS,
- "push of rc4payload failed");
-
- if (wrong == WRONG_KEY) {
- symkey_blob.data[0] = 78;
- symkey_blob.data[1] = 78;
- symkey_blob.data[2] = 78;
- }
-
- /* rc4 encrypt sid and secret using sym key */
- arcfour_crypt_blob(encrypted_blob.data, encrypted_blob.length, &symkey_blob);
-
- /* re-create server wrap structure */
-
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, encrypted_blob.length,
- server_side_wrapped->ciphertext_length,
- "expected encrypted length not to change");
- if (wrong == RIGHT_KEY) {
- torture_assert_mem_equal(tctx, server_side_wrapped->rc4encryptedpayload,
- encrypted_blob.data,
- encrypted_blob.length,
- "expected encrypted data not to change");
- }
-
- server_side_wrapped->payload_length = rc4payload.secret_data.length;
- server_side_wrapped->ciphertext_length = encrypted_blob.length;
- server_side_wrapped->rc4encryptedpayload = encrypted_blob.data;
-
- return true;
-}
-
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p,
- enum test_wrong wrong)
-{
- struct bkrp_BackupKey r;
- struct GUID guid;
- DATA_BLOB plaintext = data_blob_const(secret, sizeof(secret));
- DATA_BLOB encrypted;
- uint32_t enclen;
- DATA_BLOB decrypted;
- uint32_t declen;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct bkrp_server_side_wrapped server_side_wrapped;
- bool repush = false;
- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
- ZERO_STRUCT(r);
-
- dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, &auth_type, &auth_level);
-
- /* Encrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = plaintext.data;
- r.in.data_in_len = plaintext.length;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &encrypted.data;
- r.out.data_out_len = &enclen;
- if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "encrypt");
- } else {
- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,
- "encrypt");
- return true;
- }
- torture_assert_werr_ok(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- "encrypt");
- encrypted.length = *r.out.data_out_len;
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&encrypted, tctx, &server_side_wrapped,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_server_side_wrapped);
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx, ndr_err, NDR_ERR_SUCCESS, "pull of server_side_wrapped");
-
- torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, server_side_wrapped.payload_length, plaintext.length,
- "wrong payload length");
-
- switch (wrong) {
- case WRONG_MAGIC:
- /* Change the magic. Forced by our NDR layer, so do it raw */
- SIVAL(encrypted.data, 0, 78); /* valid values are 1-3 */
- break;
- case WRONG_R2:
- server_side_wrapped.r2[0] = 78;
- server_side_wrapped.r2[1] = 78;
- server_side_wrapped.r2[3] = 78;
- repush = true;
- break;
- case WRONG_PAYLOAD_LENGTH:
- server_side_wrapped.payload_length = UINT32_MAX - 8;
- repush = true;
- break;
- case WRONG_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH:
- /*
- * Change the ciphertext len. We can't push this if
- * we have it wrong, so do it raw
- */
- SIVAL(encrypted.data, 8, UINT32_MAX - 8); /* valid values are 1-3 */
- break;
- case SHORT_PAYLOAD_LENGTH:
- server_side_wrapped.payload_length = server_side_wrapped.payload_length - 8;
- repush = true;
- break;
- case SHORT_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH:
- /*
- * Change the ciphertext len. We can't push this if
- * we have it wrong, so do it raw
- */
- SIVAL(encrypted.data, 8, server_side_wrapped.ciphertext_length - 8); /* valid values are 1-3 */
- break;
- case ZERO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH:
- server_side_wrapped.payload_length = 0;
- repush = true;
- break;
- case ZERO_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH:
- /*
- * Change the ciphertext len. We can't push this if
- * we have it wrong, so do it raw
- */
- SIVAL(encrypted.data, 8, 0); /* valid values are 1-3 */
- break;
-
- case RIGHT_KEY:
- case WRONG_KEY:
- case WRONG_SID:
- torture_assert(tctx,
- test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt_manual(tctx, &server_side_wrapped, wrong),
- "test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt_manual failed");
- repush = true;
- break;
- }
-
- if (repush) {
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&encrypted, tctx, &server_side_wrapped,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_server_side_wrapped);
- torture_assert_ndr_err_equal(tctx, ndr_err, NDR_ERR_SUCCESS, "push of server_side_wrapped");
- }
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = encrypted.data;
- r.in.data_in_len = encrypted.length;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
-
- if ((wrong == WRONG_R2 || wrong == WRONG_KEY)
- && W_ERROR_EQUAL(r.out.result, WERR_INVALID_SID)) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_SID,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_SID or WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER");
- } else if (wrong == RIGHT_KEY) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_OK,
- "decrypt should succeed!");
- } else if (wrong == WRONG_SID) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_ACCESS,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_ACCESS");
- } else {
- if (!W_ERROR_EQUAL(r.out.result, WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER)) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_ACCESS,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_ACCESS or WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER");
- }
- }
-
- /* Decrypt */
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- GUID_from_string(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K, &guid),
- "obtain GUID");
-
- r.in.guidActionAgent = &guid;
- r.in.data_in = encrypted.data;
- r.in.data_in_len = encrypted.length;
- r.in.param = 0;
- r.out.data_out = &(decrypted.data);
- r.out.data_out_len = &declen;
- torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
- dcerpc_bkrp_BackupKey_r(b, tctx, &r),
- "decrypt");
-
- if ((wrong == WRONG_R2 || wrong == WRONG_KEY)
- && W_ERROR_EQUAL(r.out.result, WERR_INVALID_SID)) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_SID,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_SID or WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER");
- } else if (wrong == RIGHT_KEY) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_OK,
- "decrypt should succeed!");
- } else if (wrong == WRONG_SID) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx,
- r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_ACCESS,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_ACCESS");
- } else {
- if (!W_ERROR_EQUAL(r.out.result, WERR_INVALID_ACCESS)
- && !W_ERROR_EQUAL(r.out.result, WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER)) {
- torture_assert_werr_equal(tctx, r.out.result,
- WERR_INVALID_DATA,
- "decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_ACCESS, WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER or WERR_INVALID_DATA");
- }
- }
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_magic(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, WRONG_MAGIC);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_r2(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, WRONG_R2);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_payload_length(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, WRONG_PAYLOAD_LENGTH);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_short_payload_length(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, SHORT_PAYLOAD_LENGTH);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_zero_payload_length(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, ZERO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_ciphertext_length(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, WRONG_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_short_ciphertext_length(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, SHORT_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_decrypt_zero_ciphertext_length(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, ZERO_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt_remote_key(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, RIGHT_KEY);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt_wrong_key(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, WRONG_KEY);
-}
-
-static bool test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt_wrong_sid(struct torture_context *tctx,
- struct dcerpc_pipe *p)
-{
- return test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_stuff(tctx, p, WRONG_SID);
-}
-
-struct torture_suite *torture_rpc_backupkey(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
-{
- struct torture_suite *suite = torture_suite_create(mem_ctx, "backupkey");
-
- struct torture_rpc_tcase *tcase;
-
- tcase = torture_suite_add_rpc_iface_tcase(suite, "backupkey",
- &ndr_table_backupkey);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "retreive_backup_key_guid",
- test_RetrieveBackupKeyGUID);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "restore_guid",
- test_RestoreGUID);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "restore_guid version 3",
- test_RestoreGUID_v3);
-
-/* We double the test in order to be sure that we don't mess stuff (ie. freeing static stuff) */
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "restore_guid_2nd",
- test_RestoreGUID);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "unable_to_decrypt_secret",
- test_RestoreGUID_ko);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "wrong_user_restore_guid",
- test_RestoreGUID_wronguser);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "wrong_version_restore_guid",
- test_RestoreGUID_wrongversion);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "bad_magic_on_secret_restore_guid",
- test_RestoreGUID_badmagiconsecret);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "bad_hash_on_secret_restore_guid",
- test_RestoreGUID_badhashaccesscheck);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "bad_magic_on_accesscheck_restore_guid",
- test_RestoreGUID_badmagicaccesscheck);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "bad_cert_guid_restore_guid",
- test_RestoreGUID_badcertguid);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "empty_request_restore_guid",
- test_RestoreGUID_emptyrequest);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "retreive_backup_key_guid_2048_bits",
- test_RetrieveBackupKeyGUID_2048bits);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_encrypt_decrypt",
- test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_wrong_keyGUID",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_keyGUID);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_empty_request",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_empty_request);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_short_request",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_short_request);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_wrong_magic",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_magic);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_wrong_r2",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_r2);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_wrong_payload_length",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_payload_length);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_short_payload_length",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_short_payload_length);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_zero_payload_length",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_zero_payload_length);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_wrong_ciphertext_length",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_wrong_ciphertext_length);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_short_ciphertext_length",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_short_ciphertext_length);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_decrypt_zero_ciphertext_length",
- test_ServerWrap_decrypt_zero_ciphertext_length);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_encrypt_decrypt_remote_key",
- test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt_remote_key);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_encrypt_decrypt_wrong_key",
- test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt_wrong_key);
-
- torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "server_wrap_encrypt_decrypt_wrong_sid",
- test_ServerWrap_encrypt_decrypt_wrong_sid);
-
- return suite;
-}
projects / thirdparty / samba.git / commitdiff
