]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commitdiff
x86/bugs: Simplify the retbleed=stuff checks
authorPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Wed, 11 Jun 2025 17:29:15 +0000 (10:29 -0700)
committerBorislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Mon, 23 Jun 2025 10:16:30 +0000 (12:16 +0200)
Simplify the nested checks, remove redundant print and comment.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-2-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

index 53649df2c4d66c6bd3aa34dec69af9df253bccfc..94d0de3e61aec32b3b67c8d21f89a8c67b93dff3 100644 (file)
@@ -1263,24 +1263,16 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
                return;
 
-       /*
-        * retbleed=stuff is only allowed on Intel.  If stuffing can't be used
-        * then a different mitigation will be selected below.
-        *
-        * its=stuff will also attempt to enable stuffing.
-        */
-       if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ||
-           its_mitigation == ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF) {
-               if (spectre_v2_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) {
-                       pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n");
-                       retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
-               } else {
-                       if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF)
-                               pr_info("Retbleed mitigation updated to stuffing\n");
+        /* ITS can also enable stuffing */
+       if (its_mitigation == ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF)
+               retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
 
-                       retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
-               }
+       if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF &&
+           spectre_v2_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) {
+               pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n");
+               retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
        }
+
        /*
         * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
         * retbleed= cmdline option except for call depth based stuffing