]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openembedded/openembedded-core.git/commitdiff
busybox: fix CVE-2022-48174
authorMeenali Gupta <meenali.gupta@windriver.com>
Fri, 1 Sep 2023 11:49:40 +0000 (11:49 +0000)
committerSteve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Fri, 1 Sep 2023 14:49:21 +0000 (04:49 -1000)
There is a stack overflow vulnerability in ash.c:6030 in busybox
vbefore 1.35. In the environment of Internet of Vehicles, this
vulnerability can be executed from command to arbitrary code execution.

Signed-off-by: Meenali Gupta <meenali.gupta@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2022-48174.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.35.0.bb

diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2022-48174.patch b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2022-48174.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..dd0ea19
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From cf5d0889262e1b04ec2aa4caff2f5da2d602c665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:48:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] busybox: shell: avoid segfault on ${0::0/0~09J}. Closes 15216
+function old new delta evaluate_string 1011 1053 +42
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=d417193cf37ca1005830d7e16f5fa7e1d8a44209]
+CVE: CVE-2022-48174
+
+Signed-off-by: Meenali Gupta <meenali.gupta@windriver.com>
+---
+ shell/math.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/shell/math.c b/shell/math.c
+index 76d22c9..727c294 100644
+--- a/shell/math.c
++++ b/shell/math.c
+@@ -577,6 +577,28 @@ static arith_t strto_arith_t(const char *nptr, char **endptr)
+ # endif
+ #endif
+
++//TODO: much better estimation than expr_len/2? Such as:
++//static unsigned estimate_nums_and_names(const char *expr)
++//{
++//    unsigned count = 0;
++//    while (*(expr = skip_whitespace(expr)) != '\0') {
++//            const char *p;
++//            if (isdigit(*expr)) {
++//                    while (isdigit(*++expr))
++//                            continue;
++//                    count++;
++//                    continue;
++//            }
++//            p = endofname(expr);
++//            if (p != expr) {
++//                    expr = p;
++//                    count++;
++//                    continue;
++//            }
++//    }
++//    return count;
++//}
++
+ static arith_t
+ evaluate_string(arith_state_t *math_state, const char *expr)
+ {
+@@ -584,10 +606,12 @@ evaluate_string(arith_state_t *math_state, const char *expr)
+       const char *errmsg;
+       const char *start_expr = expr = skip_whitespace(expr);
+       unsigned expr_len = strlen(expr) + 2;
+-      /* Stack of integers */
+-      /* The proof that there can be no more than strlen(startbuf)/2+1
+-       * integers in any given correct or incorrect expression
+-       * is left as an exercise to the reader. */
++      /* Stack of integers/names */
++      /* There can be no more than strlen(startbuf)/2+1
++       * integers/names in any given correct or incorrect expression.
++       * (modulo "09v09v09v09v09v" case,
++       * but we have code to detect that early)
++       */
+       var_or_num_t *const numstack = alloca((expr_len / 2) * sizeof(numstack[0]));
+       var_or_num_t *numstackptr = numstack;
+       /* Stack of operator tokens */
+@@ -652,6 +676,13 @@ evaluate_string(arith_state_t *math_state, const char *expr)
+                       numstackptr->var = NULL;
+                       errno = 0;
+                       numstackptr->val = strto_arith_t(expr, (char**) &expr);
++                      /* A number can't be followed by another number, or a variable name.
++                       * We'd catch this later anyway, but this would require numstack[]
++                       * to be twice as deep to handle strings where _every_ char is
++                       * a new number or name. Example: 09v09v09v09v09v09v09v09v09v
++                       */
++                      if (isalnum(*expr) || *expr == '_')
++                              goto err;
+ //bb_error_msg("val:%lld", numstackptr->val);
+                       if (errno)
+                               numstackptr->val = 0; /* bash compat */
+--
+2.40.0
index e9ca6fdb1a01bd7ee758b1e0d60689b01712ed8c..07a5137d2aa726a8266a9eaacf3d84ad79ee4b72 100644 (file)
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://busybox.net/downloads/busybox-${PV}.tar.bz2;name=tarball \
            file://0002-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-30065.patch \
            file://0001-devmem-add-128-bit-width.patch \
+          file://CVE-2022-48174.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI:append:libc-musl = " file://musl.cfg "