Stefano Garzarella says:
====================
vsock/virtio: fix TX credit handling
The original series was posted by Melbin K Mathew <mlbnkm1@gmail.com> till v4.
Since it's a real issue and the original author seems busy, I'm sending
the new version fixing my comments but keeping the authorship (and restoring
mine on patch 2 as reported on v4).
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/
20260116201517.273302-1-sgarzare@redhat.com/
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/
20251217181206.
3681159-1-mlbnkm1@gmail.com/
From Melbin K Mathew <mlbnkm1@gmail.com>:
This series fixes TX credit handling in virtio-vsock:
Patch 1: Fix potential underflow in get_credit() using s64 arithmetic
Patch 2: Fix vsock_test seqpacket bounds test
Patch 3: Cap TX credit to local buffer size (security hardening)
Patch 4: Add stream TX credit bounds regression test
The core issue is that a malicious guest can advertise a huge buffer
size via SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE, causing the host to allocate
excessive sk_buff memory when sending data to that guest.
On an unpatched Ubuntu 22.04 host (~64 GiB RAM), running a PoC with
32 guest vsock connections advertising 2 GiB each and reading slowly
drove Slab/SUnreclaim from ~0.5 GiB to ~57 GiB; the system only
recovered after killing the QEMU process.
With this series applied, the same PoC shows only ~35 MiB increase in
Slab/SUnreclaim, no host OOM, and the guest remains responsive.
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260121093628.9941-1-sgarzare@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>