seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering

commit cf6cb56ef24410fb5308f9655087f1eddf4452e6 upstream.

When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached
process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe.

The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp
filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known
syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp
to control their syscall surface.

Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is
not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and
there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to
explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes.

Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration.

Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be
supported in i386.

Fixes: ff474a78cef5 ("uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe")
Reported-by: Rafael Buchbinder <rafi@rbk.io>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHsH6Gs3Eh8DFU0wq58c_LF8A4_+o6z456J7BidmcVY2AqOnHQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250121182939.33d05470@gandalf.local.home/T/#me2676c378eff2d6a33f3054fed4a5f3afa64e65b
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250128145806.1849977-1-eyal.birger@gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250202162921.335813-2-eyal.birger@gmail.com
[kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 385d48293a5fa152bfb3e7e30a074cab3fd019db..0cd1f8b5a102ee3e2b84a0a3b13672d4c1646c5a 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -749,6 +749,15 @@ static bool seccomp_is_const_allow(struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog,
        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fprog))
                return false;
 
+       /* Our single exception to filtering. */
+#ifdef __NR_uretprobe
+#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
+       if (sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE)
+#endif
+               if (sd->nr == __NR_uretprobe)
+                       return true;
+#endif
+
        for (pc = 0; pc < fprog->len; pc++) {
                struct sock_filter *insn = &fprog->filter[pc];
                u16 code = insn->code;
@@ -1023,6 +1032,9 @@ static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action,
  */
 static const int mode1_syscalls[] = {
        __NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
+#ifdef __NR_uretprobe
+       __NR_uretprobe,
+#endif
        -1, /* negative terminated */
 };