Fix auth-token usage with management-def-auth

When auth-token verify succeeds during a reauth, other auth
methods (plugin, script, management) are skipped unless
external-auth is in effect (skip_auth gets set to true).

However, in this case, the status of management-def-auth
(ks->mda_status) stays at its default value of ACF_PENDING
and will never change. This causes TLS keys to go out of sync
and an eventual client disconnect.

Further, a message saying username/password authentication is
"deferred" gets logged which is misleading.
For example:

test/127.0.0.1:35874 TLS: Username/auth-token authentication
    succeeded for username 'test'

followed by

test/127.0.0.1:35874 TLS: Username/Password authentication
    deferred for username 'test' [CN SET]

Fix by setting ks->mda_status to ACF_DISABLED, and do not
set ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_DEFERRED when skip_auth is true.

Also log a warning message when token is marked as expired on
missing the reneg window.

Reported by: Connor Edwards <connor.edwards@b2c2.com>

Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Message-Id: <20220704025840.2558-1-selva.nair@gmail.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg24627.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
(cherry picked from commit ddbe6a6fc26586d09f5a9105f13124c479b4d993)

diff --git a/src/openvpn/auth_token.c b/src/openvpn/auth_token.c
index 37af6605897ba8735b9c4eb84ac7972901767051..7c4d15d1adfe830d1a2cd4f6922b9931343650b6 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/auth_token.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/auth_token.c
@@ -349,8 +349,8 @@ verify_auth_token(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    /* Accept session tokens that not expired are in the acceptable range
-     * for renogiations */
+    /* Accept session tokens only if their timestamp is in the acceptable range
+     * for renegotiations */
     bool in_renog_time = now >= timestamp
                          && now < timestamp + 2 * session->opt->renegotiate_seconds;
 
@@ -362,13 +362,15 @@ verify_auth_token(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,
 
     if (!in_renog_time && !initialtoken)
     {
+        msg(M_WARN, "Timestamp (%" PRIu64 ") of auth-token is out of the renegotiation window",
+            timestamp);
         ret |= AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED;
     }
 
     /* Sanity check the initial timestamp */
     if (timestamp < timestamp_initial)
     {
-        msg(M_WARN, "Initial timestamp (%" PRIu64 " in token from client earlier than "
+        msg(M_WARN, "Initial timestamp (%" PRIu64 ") in token from client earlier than "
             "current timestamp %" PRIu64 ". Broken/unsynchronised clock?",
             timestamp_initial, timestamp);
         ret |= AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED;

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
index 7f977c0d1a77c74efc1804b82cd6e73ce8ea3d11..efa2f436ad9f9cc306531efbfe14908af3ef9260 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
@@ -1397,7 +1397,14 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,
 #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH
         if (man_def_auth != KMDA_UNDEF)
         {
-            ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_DEFERRED;
+            if (skip_auth)
+            {
+                ks->mda_status = ACF_DISABLED;
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_DEFERRED;
+            }
         }
 #endif
         if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME))