commit
8754e67ad4ac692c67ff1f99c0d07156f04ae40c upstream.
Due to ITS, indirect branches in the lower half of a cacheline may be
vulnerable to branch target injection attack.
Introduce ITS-safe thunks to patch indirect branches in the lower half of
cacheline with the thunk. Also thunk any eBPF generated indirect branches
in emit_indirect_jump().
Below category of indirect branches are not mitigated:
- Indirect branches in the .init section are not mitigated because they are
discarded after boot.
- Indirect branches that are explicitly marked retpoline-safe.
Note that retpoline also mitigates the indirect branches against ITS. This
is because the retpoline sequence fills an RSB entry before RET, and it
does not suffer from RSB-underflow part of the ITS.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
indirect branches.
See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
+config MITIGATION_ITS
+ bool "Enable Indirect Target Selection mitigation"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+ depends on RETPOLINE && RETHUNK
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable Indirect Target Selection (ITS) mitigation. ITS is a bug in
+ BPU on some Intel CPUs that may allow Spectre V2 style attacks. If
+ disabled, mitigation cannot be enabled via cmdline.
+ See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/indirect-target-selection.rst>
+
endif
config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
#define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL (21*32+ 2) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control available */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW (21*32+ 3) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control enabled */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT (21*32+ 4) /* "" Clear branch history at vmexit using SW loop */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS (21*32 + 5) /* "" Use thunk for indirect branches in lower half of cacheline */
/*
* BUG word(s)
_ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \
".popsection\n\t"
+#define ITS_THUNK_SIZE 64
+
typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE];
+typedef u8 its_thunk_t[ITS_THUNK_SIZE];
extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
+extern its_thunk_t __x86_indirect_its_thunk_array[];
#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
return i;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS
+
+static int __emit_trampoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes,
+ void *call_dest, void *jmp_dest)
+{
+ u8 op = insn->opcode.bytes[0];
+ int i = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Clang does 'weird' Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_r11 conditional
+ * tail-calls. Deal with them.
+ */
+ if (is_jcc32(insn)) {
+ bytes[i++] = op;
+ op = insn->opcode.bytes[1];
+ goto clang_jcc;
+ }
+
+ if (insn->length == 6)
+ bytes[i++] = 0x2e; /* CS-prefix */
+
+ switch (op) {
+ case CALL_INSN_OPCODE:
+ __text_gen_insn(bytes+i, op, addr+i,
+ call_dest,
+ CALL_INSN_SIZE);
+ i += CALL_INSN_SIZE;
+ break;
+
+ case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE:
+clang_jcc:
+ __text_gen_insn(bytes+i, op, addr+i,
+ jmp_dest,
+ JMP32_INSN_SIZE);
+ i += JMP32_INSN_SIZE;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ WARN(1, "%pS %px %*ph\n", addr, addr, 6, addr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(i != insn->length);
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+static int emit_its_trampoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, int reg, u8 *bytes)
+{
+ return __emit_trampoline(addr, insn, bytes,
+ __x86_indirect_its_thunk_array[reg],
+ __x86_indirect_its_thunk_array[reg]);
+}
+
+/* Check if an indirect branch is at ITS-unsafe address */
+static bool cpu_wants_indirect_its_thunk_at(unsigned long addr, int reg)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS))
+ return false;
+
+ /* Indirect branch opcode is 2 or 3 bytes depending on reg */
+ addr += 1 + reg / 8;
+
+ /* Lower-half of the cacheline? */
+ return !(addr & 0x20);
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Rewrite the compiler generated retpoline thunk calls.
*
bytes[i++] = 0xe8; /* LFENCE */
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS
+ /*
+ * Check if the address of last byte of emitted-indirect is in
+ * lower-half of the cacheline. Such branches need ITS mitigation.
+ */
+ if (cpu_wants_indirect_its_thunk_at((unsigned long)addr + i, reg))
+ return emit_its_trampoline(addr, insn, reg, bytes);
+#endif
+
ret = emit_indirect(op, reg, bytes + i);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
"SRSO function pair won't alias");
#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS) && !defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_FORCE_FUNCTION_ALIGN_64B)
+. = ASSERT(__x86_indirect_its_thunk_rax & 0x20, "__x86_indirect_thunk_rax not in second half of cacheline");
+. = ASSERT(((__x86_indirect_its_thunk_rcx - __x86_indirect_its_thunk_rax) % 64) == 0, "Indirect thunks are not cacheline apart");
+. = ASSERT(__x86_indirect_its_thunk_array == __x86_indirect_its_thunk_rax, "Gap in ITS thunk array");
+#endif
+
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
SYM_FUNC_END(entry_untrain_ret)
__EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS
+
+.macro ITS_THUNK reg
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_indirect_its_thunk_\reg, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+ jmp *%\reg
+ int3
+ .align 32, 0xcc /* fill to the end of the line */
+ .skip 32, 0xcc /* skip to the next upper half */
+.endm
+
+/* ITS mitigation requires thunks be aligned to upper half of cacheline */
+.align 64, 0xcc
+.skip 32, 0xcc
+SYM_CODE_START(__x86_indirect_its_thunk_array)
+
+#define GEN(reg) ITS_THUNK reg
+#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
+#undef GEN
+
+ .align 64, 0xcc
+SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_its_thunk_array)
+
+#endif
+
SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
{
u8 *prog = *pprog;
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS) &&
+ cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS)) {
+ OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(reg);
+ emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_its_thunk_array[reg], ip);
+ } else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) {
EMIT_LFENCE();
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);
} else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) {
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable.git / commitdiff
