u8 emsk[EAP_EMSK_LEN];
u8 rand[EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN], autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
u8 auts[EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN];
+ u8 reauth_mac[EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN];
int num_id_req, num_notification;
u8 *pseudonym;
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
+ /* At this stage the received MAC has been verified. Use this MAC for
+ * reauth Session-Id calculation if all other checks pass.
+ * The peer does not use the local MAC but the received MAC in deriving
+ * Session-Id. */
+ os_memcpy(data->reauth_mac, attr->mac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Server MAC",
+ data->reauth_mac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
"message did not include encrypted data");
if (data->state != SUCCESS)
return NULL;
- *len = 1 + EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN + EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN;
+ if (!data->reauth)
+ *len = 1 + EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN + EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN;
+ else
+ *len = 1 + EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN + EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN;
id = os_malloc(*len);
if (id == NULL)
return NULL;
id[0] = data->eap_method;
- os_memcpy(id + 1, data->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
- os_memcpy(id + 1 + EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
+ if (!data->reauth) {
+ os_memcpy(id + 1, data->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(id + 1 + EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN, data->autn,
+ EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
+ } else {
+ os_memcpy(id + 1, data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(id + 1 + EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN, data->reauth_mac,
+ EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ }
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Derived Session-Id", id, *len);
return id;
u8 ck[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN];
u8 ik[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN];
u8 res[EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN];
+ u8 reauth_mac[EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN];
size_t res_len;
enum {
IDENTITY, CHALLENGE, REAUTH, NOTIFICATION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id)
{
struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+ struct wpabuf *buf;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Generating Re-authentication");
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
- return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, data->k_aut, NULL, 0);
+ buf = eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->eap_method, data->k_aut, NULL, 0);
+
+ /* Remember this MAC before sending it to the peer. This MAC is used for
+ * Session-Id calculation after receiving response from the peer and
+ * after all other checks pass. */
+ os_memcpy(data->reauth_mac,
+ wpabuf_head(buf) + wpabuf_len(buf) - EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN,
+ EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+
+ return buf;
}
if (data->state != SUCCESS)
return NULL;
- *len = 1 + EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN + EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN;
+ if (!data->reauth)
+ *len = 1 + EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN + EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN;
+ else
+ *len = 1 + EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN + EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN;
id = os_malloc(*len);
if (id == NULL)
return NULL;
id[0] = data->eap_method;
- os_memcpy(id + 1, data->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
- os_memcpy(id + 1 + EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
+ if (!data->reauth) {
+ os_memcpy(id + 1, data->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(id + 1 + EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN, data->autn,
+ EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
+ } else {
+ os_memcpy(id + 1, data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(id + 1 + EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN, data->reauth_mac,
+ EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ }
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Derived Session-Id", id, *len);
return id;