get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in
parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of
a Rock Ridge "SL" (symbolic link) record. Each component is a two-byte
header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies
slp->len + 2 bytes. Both loops read slp->len and advance to the next
component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does
memcpy(rpnt, slp->text, slp->len), but neither checks that the component
lies within the SL record before dereferencing it.
A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the
record (rr->len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255
bytes. When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for
example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE
record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then
copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user
space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory.
ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media -
desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without
CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled.
Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes
before using it. In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing
output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record makes readlink()
fail with -EIO rather than silently returning a truncated target; in
parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() stop the inode-size walk.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260607011823.217748-1-hexlabsecurity@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
inode->i_size = symlink_len;
while (slen > 1) {
rootflag = 0;
+ /* keep the component within the SL record */
+ if (slp->len + 2 > slen)
+ goto eio;
switch (slp->flags & ~1) {
case 0:
inode->i_size +=
slp = &rr->u.SL.link;
while (slen > 1) {
rootflag = 0;
+ /*
+ * A component is slp->len + 2 bytes (a two-byte header plus
+ * len bytes of text). If it does not fit in the bytes left in
+ * the SL record the record is malformed: fail like the plimit
+ * checks below so readlink() returns -EIO, not a truncated path.
+ */
+ if (slp->len + 2 > slen)
+ return NULL;
switch (slp->flags & ~1) {
case 0:
if (slp->len > plimit - rpnt)