const u8 *key_data;
size_t keyhdrlen, mic_len;
u8 *mic;
- bool is_mld = false;
u8 *key_data_buf = NULL;
size_t key_data_buf_len = 0;
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || !sm)
return;
-#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
- is_mld = sm->mld_assoc_link_id >= 0;
-#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
-
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data, data_len);
mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
key_data, key_data_length);
}
- /* TODO: Make this more robust for distinguising EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 from
- * 4/4. Secure=1 is used in msg 2/4 when doing PTK rekeying, so the
- * MLD mechanism here does not work without the somewhat undesired check
- * on wpa_ptk_state.. Would likely need to decrypt Key Data first to be
- * able to know which message this is in MLO cases.. */
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
msg = REQUEST;
msgtxt = "Request";
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) &&
!get_ie(key_data, key_data_length, WLAN_EID_RSN)) ||
(mic_len == 0 && (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA) &&
- key_data_length == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ||
- (is_mld && (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) &&
- sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) {
+ key_data_length == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
msg = PAIRWISE_4;
msgtxt = "4/4 Pairwise";
} else {