{
fr_io_track_t const *track = talloc_get_type_abort_const(request->async->packet_ctx, fr_io_track_t);
fr_io_address_t const *address = track->address;
- fr_client_t const *client;
+ fr_client_t const *client;
+ fr_radius_ctx_t common_ctx;
+ fr_radius_decode_ctx_t decode_ctx;
fr_assert(data[0] < FR_RADIUS_CODE_MAX);
client = address->radclient;
- /*
- * !client->active means a fake packet defining a dynamic client - so there will
- * be no secret defined yet - so can't verify.
- */
- if (client->active &&
- fr_radius_verify(data, NULL, (uint8_t const *) client->secret, talloc_array_length(client->secret) - 1,
- client->message_authenticator) < 0) {
- RPEDEBUG("Failed verifying packet signature.");
- return -1;
- }
+ common_ctx = (fr_radius_ctx_t) {
+ .secret = client->secret,
+ .secret_length = talloc_array_length(client->secret) - 1,
+ };
+
+ decode_ctx = (fr_radius_decode_ctx_t) {
+ .common = &common_ctx,
+ .tmp_ctx = talloc(request, uint8_t),
+ .end = data + data_len,
+ .verify = client->active,
+ .require_message_authenticator = client->message_authenticator,
+ };
/*
- * Hacks for now until we have a lower-level decode routine.
+ * The verify() routine over-writes the request packet vector.
+ *
+ * @todo - That needs to be changed.
*/
request->packet->code = data[0];
request->packet->id = data[1];
request->packet->data_len = data_len;
/*
- * Note that we don't set a limit on max_attributes here.
- * That MUST be set and checked in the underlying
- * transport, via a call to fr_radius_ok().
+ * !client->active means a fake packet defining a dynamic client - so there will
+ * be no secret defined yet - so can't verify.
*/
if (fr_radius_decode(request->request_ctx, &request->request_pairs,
- request->packet->data, request->packet->data_len, NULL,
- client->secret, talloc_array_length(client->secret) - 1) < 0) {
- RPEDEBUG("Failed decoding packet");
+ data, data_len, &decode_ctx) < 0) {
+ talloc_free(decode_ctx.tmp_ctx);
+ RPEDEBUG("Failed reading packet");
return -1;
}
+ talloc_free(decode_ctx.tmp_ctx);
/*
* Set the rest of the fields.
rlm_radius_udp_t const *inst = h->thread->inst;
size_t packet_len;
uint8_t code;
+ fr_radius_ctx_t common_ctx;
+ fr_radius_decode_ctx_t decode_ctx;
*response_code = 0; /* Initialise to keep the rest of the code happy */
return DECODE_FAIL_UNKNOWN_PACKET_CODE;
}
- if (fr_radius_verify(data, request_authenticator,
- (uint8_t const *) inst->secret, talloc_array_length(inst->secret) - 1, false) < 0) {
- RPWDEBUG("Ignoring response with invalid signature");
- return DECODE_FAIL_MA_INVALID;
- }
+ common_ctx = (fr_radius_ctx_t) {
+ .secret = inst->secret,
+ .secret_length = talloc_array_length(inst->secret) - 1,
+ };
+
+ decode_ctx = (fr_radius_decode_ctx_t) {
+ .common = &common_ctx,
+ .request_code = u->code,
+ .vector = &request_authenticator[0],
+ .tmp_ctx = talloc(ctx, uint8_t),
+ .end = data + packet_len,
+ .verify = true,
+ };
/*
- * Decode the attributes, in the context of the reply.
- * This only fails if the packet is strangely malformed,
- * or if we run out of memory.
+ * !client->active means a fake packet defining a dynamic client - so there will
+ * be no secret defined yet - so can't verify.
*/
- if (fr_radius_decode(ctx, reply, data, packet_len, request_authenticator,
- inst->secret, talloc_array_length(inst->secret) - 1) < 0) {
- REDEBUG("Failed decoding attributes for packet");
- fr_pair_list_free(reply);
+ if (fr_radius_decode(request->request_ctx, &request->request_pairs,
+ data, data_len, &decode_ctx) < 0) {
+ talloc_free(decode_ctx.tmp_ctx);
+ RPEDEBUG("Failed reading packet");
return DECODE_FAIL_UNKNOWN;
}
+ talloc_free(decode_ctx.tmp_ctx);
RDEBUG("Received %s ID %d length %ld reply packet on connection %s",
fr_radius_packet_names[code], code, packet_len, h->name);
return fr_dbuff_set(dbuff, &work_dbuff);
}
-/** Decode a raw RADIUS packet into VPs.
- *
- */
-ssize_t fr_radius_decode(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, fr_pair_list_t *out,
- uint8_t const *packet, size_t packet_len, uint8_t const *vector,
- char const *secret, size_t secret_len)
+ssize_t fr_radius_decode(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, fr_pair_list_t *out,
+ uint8_t *packet, size_t packet_len,
+ fr_radius_decode_ctx_t *decode_ctx)
{
ssize_t slen;
uint8_t const *attr, *end;
- fr_radius_ctx_t common_ctx = {};
- fr_radius_decode_ctx_t packet_ctx = {};
-
- common_ctx.secret = secret;
- common_ctx.secret_length = secret_len;
- memcpy(common_ctx.vector, vector ? vector : packet + 4, sizeof(common_ctx.vector));
- packet_ctx.common = &common_ctx;
- packet_ctx.tmp_ctx = talloc_init_const("tmp");
- packet_ctx.end = packet + packet_len;
+ /*
+ * We can skip verification for dynamic client checks, and where packets are unsigned as with
+ * RADIUS/1.1.
+ */
+ if (decode_ctx->verify) {
+ if (fr_radius_verify(packet, decode_ctx->vector,
+ (uint8_t const *) decode_ctx->common->secret, decode_ctx->common->secret_length,
+ decode_ctx->require_message_authenticator) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
attr = packet + 20;
end = packet + packet_len;
* he doesn't, all hell breaks loose.
*/
while (attr < end) {
- slen = fr_radius_decode_pair(ctx, out, attr, (end - attr), &packet_ctx);
- if (slen < 0) {
- fail:
- talloc_free(packet_ctx.tmp_ctx);
- talloc_free(packet_ctx.tags);
- return slen;
- }
+ slen = fr_radius_decode_pair(ctx, out, attr, (end - attr), decode_ctx);
+ if (slen < 0) return slen;
/*
* If slen is larger than the room in the packet,
* all kinds of bad things happen.
*/
if (!fr_cond_assert(slen <= (end - attr))) {
- goto fail;
+ return -slen;
}
attr += slen;
- talloc_free_children(packet_ctx.tmp_ctx);
+ talloc_free_children(decode_ctx->tmp_ctx);
}
/*
* We've parsed the whole packet, return that.
*/
- talloc_free(packet_ctx.tmp_ctx);
- talloc_free(packet_ctx.tags);
return packet_len;
}
+
int fr_radius_init(void)
{
if (instance_count > 0) {
test_ctx->end = data + packet_len;
- return fr_radius_decode(ctx, out, data, packet_len, test_ctx->common->vector,
- test_ctx->common->secret, talloc_array_length(test_ctx->common->secret) - 1);
+ return fr_radius_decode(ctx, out, UNCONST(uint8_t *, data), packet_len, test_ctx);
}
static ssize_t decode_pair(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, fr_pair_list_t *out, NDEBUG_UNUSED fr_dict_attr_t const *parent,
#define flag_long_extended(_flags) (!(_flags)->extra && (_flags)->subtype == FLAG_LONG_EXTENDED_ATTR)
#define flag_tunnel_password(_flags) (!(_flags)->extra && (((_flags)->subtype == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD) || ((_flags)->subtype == FLAG_TAGGED_TUNNEL_PASSWORD)))
+typedef struct {
+ fr_pair_t *parent;
+ fr_dcursor_t cursor;
+} fr_radius_tag_ctx_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ char const *secret;
+ size_t secret_length;
+
+ bool add_proxy_state; //!< do we add a Proxy-State?
+ uint64_t my_proxy_state; //!< if so, this is its value
+
+ uint32_t acct_delay_time; //!< additional time to add to acct_delay_time
+
+ uint8_t vector[RADIUS_AUTH_VECTOR_LENGTH]; //!< vector for authenticating the reply
+} fr_radius_ctx_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ fr_radius_ctx_t *common;
+
+ fr_fast_rand_t rand_ctx; //!< for tunnel passwords
+ int salt_offset; //!< for tunnel passwords
+
+ uint8_t tag; //!< current tag for encoding
+
+ bool disallow_tunnel_passwords; //!< not all packets can have tunnel passwords
+ bool seen_message_authenticator;
+} fr_radius_encode_ctx_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ fr_radius_ctx_t *common;
+
+ uint8_t const *vector; //!< of the request packet
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; //!< for temporary things cleaned up during decoding
+ uint8_t const *end; //!< end of the packet
+
+ uint8_t request_code; //!< original code for the request.
+
+ bool tunnel_password_zeros; //!< check for trailing zeros on decode
+ bool verify; //!< can skip verify for dynamic clients
+ bool require_message_authenticator;
+
+ fr_radius_tag_ctx_t **tags; //!< for decoding tagged attributes
+ fr_pair_list_t *tag_root; //!< Where to insert tag attributes.
+ TALLOC_CTX *tag_root_ctx; //!< Where to allocate new tag attributes.
+} fr_radius_decode_ctx_t;
+
/*
* protocols/radius/base.c
*/
char const *secret, UNUSED size_t secret_len, int code, int id, fr_pair_list_t *vps);
ssize_t fr_radius_decode(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, fr_pair_list_t *out,
- uint8_t const *packet, size_t packet_len, uint8_t const *vector,
- char const *secret, UNUSED size_t secret_len) CC_HINT(nonnull(1,2,3,6));
+ uint8_t *packet, size_t packet_len,
+ fr_radius_decode_ctx_t *decode_ctx) CC_HINT(nonnull);
int fr_radius_init(void);
#define fr_radius_packet_log_hex(_log, _packet) _fr_radius_packet_log_hex(_log, _packet, __FILE__, __LINE__)
void _fr_radius_packet_log_hex(fr_log_t const *log, fr_radius_packet_t const *packet, char const *file, int line) CC_HINT(nonnull);
-typedef struct {
- fr_pair_t *parent;
- fr_dcursor_t cursor;
-} fr_radius_tag_ctx_t;
-
-typedef struct {
- char const *secret;
- size_t secret_length;
-
- bool add_proxy_state; //!< do we add a Proxy-State?
- uint64_t my_proxy_state; //!< if so, this is its value
-
- uint32_t acct_delay_time; //!< additional time to add to acct_delay_time
-
- uint8_t vector[RADIUS_AUTH_VECTOR_LENGTH]; //!< vector for authenticating the reply
-} fr_radius_ctx_t;
-
-typedef struct {
- fr_radius_ctx_t *common;
-
- fr_fast_rand_t rand_ctx; //!< for tunnel passwords
- int salt_offset; //!< for tunnel passwords
-
- uint8_t tag; //!< current tag for encoding
- bool disallow_tunnel_passwords; //!< not all packets can have tunnel passwords
- bool seen_message_authenticator;
-} fr_radius_encode_ctx_t;
-
-typedef struct {
- fr_radius_ctx_t *common;
-
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; //!< for temporary things cleaned up during decoding
- uint8_t const *end; //!< end of the packet
-
- bool tunnel_password_zeros; //!< check for trailing zeros on decode
-
- fr_radius_tag_ctx_t **tags; //!< for decoding tagged attributes
- fr_pair_list_t *tag_root; //!< Where to insert tag attributes.
- TALLOC_CTX *tag_root_ctx; //!< Where to allocate new tag attributes.
-} fr_radius_decode_ctx_t;
-
/*
* protocols/radius/abinary.c
*/
projects / thirdparty / freeradius-server.git / commitdiff
