PASN: Add pairing verification wrapper function for Wi-Fi Aware

Wi-Fi Aware uses PASN handshake to authenticate peer devices. Devices
can simply verify each other for subsequent sessions as long as the keys
remain valid after authentication has been successful and pairing has
been established.

In pairing verification, Wi-Fi Aware devices uses PASN Authentication
frames with custom PMKID and Wi-Fi Aware R4 specific verification IEs.
It does not use wrapped data in the Authentication frames. This function
provides support to construct PASN Authentication frames for pairing
verification.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>

diff --git a/src/pasn/pasn_common.h b/src/pasn/pasn_common.h
index 837ea4fc0c75824b8d79760f635411f179dc6c93..fa73e3b6f121d4816a3d52c39d9b0894dbee8785 100644 (file)
--- a/src/pasn/pasn_common.h
+++ b/src/pasn/pasn_common.h
@@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ int wpas_pasn_start(struct wpas_pasn *pasn, const u8 *own_addr,
                    int freq, const u8 *beacon_rsne, u8 beacon_rsne_len,
                    const u8 *beacon_rsnxe, u8 beacon_rsnxe_len,
                    const struct wpabuf *comeback);
+int wpa_pasn_verify(struct wpas_pasn *pasn, const u8 *own_addr,
+                   const u8 *bssid, int akmp, int cipher, u16 group,
+                   int freq, const u8 *beacon_rsne, u8 beacon_rsne_len,
+                   const u8 *beacon_rsnxe, u8 beacon_rsnxe_len,
+                   const struct wpabuf *comeback);
 int wpa_pasn_auth_rx(struct wpas_pasn *pasn, const u8 *data, size_t len,
                     struct wpa_pasn_params_data *pasn_params);
 int wpa_pasn_auth_tx_status(struct wpas_pasn *pasn,

diff --git a/src/pasn/pasn_initiator.c b/src/pasn/pasn_initiator.c
index 71f4120294d137bb646232226c03ef4052d8e8f8..16e7b51481b81bde6b6b0771c03b58fef0f34e7d 100644 (file)
--- a/src/pasn/pasn_initiator.c
+++ b/src/pasn/pasn_initiator.c
@@ -511,7 +511,8 @@ static u8 wpas_pasn_get_wrapped_data_format(struct wpas_pasn *pasn)
 
 
 static struct wpabuf * wpas_pasn_build_auth_1(struct wpas_pasn *pasn,
-                                             const struct wpabuf *comeback)
+                                             const struct wpabuf *comeback,
+                                             bool verify)
 {
        struct wpabuf *buf, *pubkey = NULL, *wrapped_data_buf = NULL;
        const u8 *pmkid;
@@ -562,7 +563,8 @@ static struct wpabuf * wpas_pasn_build_auth_1(struct wpas_pasn *pasn,
                 * Note: Even when PMKSA is available, also add wrapped data as
                 * it is possible that the PMKID is no longer valid at the AP.
                 */
-               wrapped_data_buf = wpas_pasn_get_wrapped_data(pasn);
+               if (!verify)
+                       wrapped_data_buf = wpas_pasn_get_wrapped_data(pasn);
        }
 
        if (wpa_pasn_add_rsne(buf, pmkid, pasn->akmp, pasn->cipher) < 0)
@@ -855,56 +857,16 @@ static int wpas_pasn_set_pmk(struct wpas_pasn *pasn,
 }
 
 
-int wpas_pasn_start(struct wpas_pasn *pasn, const u8 *own_addr,
-                   const u8 *bssid, int akmp, int cipher, u16 group,
-                   int freq, const u8 *beacon_rsne, u8 beacon_rsne_len,
-                   const u8 *beacon_rsnxe, u8 beacon_rsnxe_len,
-                   const struct wpabuf *comeback)
+static int wpas_pasn_send_auth_1(struct wpas_pasn *pasn, const u8 *own_addr,
+                                const u8 *bssid, int akmp, int cipher,
+                                u16 group, int freq,
+                                const u8 *beacon_rsne, u8 beacon_rsne_len,
+                                const u8 *beacon_rsnxe, u8 beacon_rsnxe_len,
+                                const struct wpabuf *comeback, bool verify)
 {
        struct wpabuf *frame;
        int ret;
 
-       /* TODO: Currently support only ECC groups */
-       if (!dragonfly_suitable_group(group, 1)) {
-               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-                          "PASN: Reject unsuitable group %u", group);
-               return -1;
-       }
-
-       switch (akmp) {
-       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN:
-               break;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SAE
-       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE:
-
-               if (beacon_rsnxe &&
-                   !ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(beacon_rsnxe,
-                                          WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SAE_H2E)) {
-                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-                                  "PASN: AP does not support SAE H2E");
-                       return -1;
-               }
-
-               pasn->sae.state = SAE_NOTHING;
-               pasn->sae.send_confirm = 0;
-               break;
-#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
-       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256:
-       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384:
-               break;
-#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK:
-       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X:
-       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384:
-               break;
-#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-       default:
-               wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: Unsupported AKMP=0x%x", akmp);
-               return -1;
-       }
-
        pasn->ecdh = crypto_ecdh_init(group);
        if (!pasn->ecdh) {
                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Failed to init ECDH");
@@ -936,11 +898,11 @@ int wpas_pasn_start(struct wpas_pasn *pasn, const u8 *own_addr,
        os_memcpy(pasn->bssid, bssid, ETH_ALEN);
 
        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-                  "PASN: Init: " MACSTR " akmp=0x%x, cipher=0x%x, group=%u",
-                  MAC2STR(pasn->bssid), pasn->akmp, pasn->cipher,
-                  pasn->group);
+                  "PASN: Init%s: " MACSTR " akmp=0x%x, cipher=0x%x, group=%u",
+                  verify ? " (verify)" : "",
+                  MAC2STR(pasn->bssid), pasn->akmp, pasn->cipher, pasn->group);
 
-       frame = wpas_pasn_build_auth_1(pasn, comeback);
+       frame = wpas_pasn_build_auth_1(pasn, comeback, verify);
        if (!frame) {
                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Failed building 1st auth frame");
                goto fail;
@@ -963,6 +925,83 @@ fail:
 }
 
 
+int wpas_pasn_start(struct wpas_pasn *pasn, const u8 *own_addr,
+                   const u8 *bssid, int akmp, int cipher, u16 group,
+                   int freq, const u8 *beacon_rsne, u8 beacon_rsne_len,
+                   const u8 *beacon_rsnxe, u8 beacon_rsnxe_len,
+                   const struct wpabuf *comeback)
+{
+       /* TODO: Currently support only ECC groups */
+       if (!dragonfly_suitable_group(group, 1)) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+                          "PASN: Reject unsuitable group %u", group);
+               return -1;
+       }
+
+       switch (akmp) {
+       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN:
+               break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SAE
+       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE:
+
+               if (beacon_rsnxe &&
+                   !ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(beacon_rsnxe,
+                                          WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SAE_H2E)) {
+                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+                                  "PASN: AP does not support SAE H2E");
+                       return -1;
+               }
+
+               pasn->sae.state = SAE_NOTHING;
+               pasn->sae.send_confirm = 0;
+               break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
+#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
+       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256:
+       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384:
+               break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK:
+       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X:
+       case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384:
+               break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+       default:
+               wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: Unsupported AKMP=0x%x", akmp);
+               return -1;
+       }
+
+       return wpas_pasn_send_auth_1(pasn, own_addr, bssid, akmp, cipher, group,
+                                    freq, beacon_rsne, beacon_rsne_len,
+                                    beacon_rsnxe, beacon_rsnxe_len, comeback,
+                                    false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wi-Fi Aware uses PASN handshake to authenticate peer devices.
+ * Devices can simply verify each other for subsequent sessions using
+ * pairing verification procedure.
+ *
+ * In pairing verification, Wi-Fi aware devices use PASN authentication
+ * frames with a custom PMKID and Wi-Fi Aware R4 specific verification IEs.
+ * It does not use wrapped data in the Authentication frames. This function
+ * provides support to construct PASN Authentication frames for pairing
+ * verification.
+ */
+int wpa_pasn_verify(struct wpas_pasn *pasn, const u8 *own_addr,
+                   const u8 *bssid, int akmp, int cipher, u16 group,
+                   int freq, const u8 *beacon_rsne, u8 beacon_rsne_len,
+                   const u8 *beacon_rsnxe, u8 beacon_rsnxe_len,
+                   const struct wpabuf *comeback)
+{
+       return wpas_pasn_send_auth_1(pasn, own_addr, bssid, akmp, cipher, group,
+                                    freq, beacon_rsne, beacon_rsne_len,
+                                    beacon_rsnxe, beacon_rsnxe_len, comeback,
+                                    true);
+}
+
+
 int wpa_pasn_auth_rx(struct wpas_pasn *pasn, const u8 *data, size_t len,
                     struct wpa_pasn_params_data *pasn_params)