sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology
private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a
malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the
parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available.
Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete
snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size.
The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int,
but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes
negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check,
as reported in the stable review thread reference below.
Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This
rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser
dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/CANiDSCsjR5NHqu_Ui5cOqWdJgFqmYsQ9WR8O7m0WOhngaYXFpw@mail.gmail.com/t/#m9b3be379221e79327cc13fd71009287368ef4f23
Fixes: 215e5fe75881 ("ASoC: SOF: topology: reject invalid vendor array size in token parser")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel <cassiogabrielcontato@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260603-sof-topology-array-size-signed-v1-1-84f97879a4ef@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
int ret;
while (array_size > 0 && total < count * token_instance_num) {
+ if (array_size < (int)sizeof(*array))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
asize = le32_to_cpu(array->size);
/* validate asize */
- if (asize < sizeof(*array)) {
+ if (asize < (int)sizeof(*array)) {
dev_err(scomp->dev, "error: invalid array size 0x%x\n",
asize);
return -EINVAL;